Combining Texts
Ideas for
'', 'In Defense of Essentialism' and 'Plato on Parts and Wholes'
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12 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14193
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'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
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14195
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If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
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14196
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Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
15848
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Mereology treats constitution as a criterion of identity, as shown in the axiom of extensionality [Harte,V]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
15837
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What exactly is a 'sum', and what exactly is 'composition'? [Harte,V]
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15839
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If something is 'more than' the sum of its parts, is the extra thing another part, or not? [Harte,V]
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14198
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Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
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15838
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The problem with the term 'sum' is that it is singular [Harte,V]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190
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Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191
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Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14192
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Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
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14197
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An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
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