19 ideas
12585 | Most people can't even define a chair [Peacocke] |
12699 | A body would be endless disunited parts, if it did not have a unifying form or soul [Leibniz] |
12700 | Form or soul gives unity and duration; matter gives multiplicity and change [Leibniz] |
12736 | If we understand God and his choices, we have a priori knowledge of contingent truths [Leibniz, by Garber] |
12581 | Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences [Peacocke] |
12579 | Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts [Peacocke] |
12586 | Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke] |
12698 | Every body contains a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul [Leibniz] |
18568 | Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Peacocke, by Machery] |
18571 | Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Peacocke, by Machery] |
18572 | Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery on Peacocke] |
12577 | Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it [Peacocke] |
12578 | A concept is just what it is to possess that concept [Peacocke] |
12587 | Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it [Peacocke] |
12584 | An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke] |
9335 | Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Peacocke, by Greco] |
9336 | A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Peacocke, by Horwich] |
5121 | Basing ethics on flourishing makes it consequentialist, as actions are judged by contributing to it [Harman] |
5120 | What counts as 'flourishing' must be relative to various sets of values [Harman] |