78 ideas
3358 | Metaphysics focuses on Platonism, essentialism, materialism and anti-realism [Benardete,JA] |
3312 | There are the 'is' of predication (a function), the 'is' of identity (equals), and the 'is' of existence (quantifier) [Benardete,JA] |
3352 | Analytical philosophy analyses separate concepts successfully, but lacks a synoptic vision of the results [Benardete,JA] |
3329 | Presumably the statements of science are true, but should they be taken literally or not? [Benardete,JA] |
10017 | Truth in a model is more tractable than the general notion of truth [Hodes] |
10018 | Truth is quite different in interpreted set theory and in the skeleton of its language [Hodes] |
10987 | Three traditional names of rules are 'Simplification', 'Addition' and 'Disjunctive Syllogism' [Read] |
11004 | Necessity is provability in S4, and true in all worlds in S5 [Read] |
11018 | There are fuzzy predicates (and sets), and fuzzy quantifiers and modifiers [Read] |
11011 | Same say there are positive, negative and neuter free logics [Read] |
3326 | Set theory attempts to reduce the 'is' of predication to mathematics [Benardete,JA] |
3327 | The set of Greeks is included in the set of men, but isn't a member of it [Benardete,JA] |
3335 | The standard Z-F Intuition version of set theory has about ten agreed axioms [Benardete,JA, by PG] |
11020 | Realisms like the full Comprehension Principle, that all good concepts determine sets [Read] |
10986 | Not all validity is captured in first-order logic [Read] |
10972 | The non-emptiness of the domain is characteristic of classical logic [Read] |
10015 | Higher-order logic may be unintelligible, but it isn't set theory [Hodes] |
11024 | Semantics must precede proof in higher-order logics, since they are incomplete [Read] |
10985 | We should exclude second-order logic, precisely because it captures arithmetic [Read] |
10970 | A theory of logical consequence is a conceptual analysis, and a set of validity techniques [Read] |
10984 | Logical consequence isn't just a matter of form; it depends on connections like round-square [Read] |
10011 | Identity is a level one relation with a second-order definition [Hodes] |
10973 | A theory is logically closed, which means infinite premisses [Read] |
11007 | Quantifiers are second-order predicates [Read] |
10978 | In second-order logic the higher-order variables range over all the properties of the objects [Read] |
10016 | When an 'interpretation' creates a model based on truth, this doesn't include Fregean 'sense' [Hodes] |
10971 | A logical truth is the conclusion of a valid inference with no premisses [Read] |
10988 | Any first-order theory of sets is inadequate [Read] |
10974 | Compactness is when any consequence of infinite propositions is the consequence of a finite subset [Read] |
10975 | Compactness does not deny that an inference can have infinitely many premisses [Read] |
10977 | Compactness blocks the proof of 'for every n, A(n)' (as the proof would be infinite) [Read] |
10976 | Compactness makes consequence manageable, but restricts expressive power [Read] |
11014 | Self-reference paradoxes seem to arise only when falsity is involved [Read] |
3332 | Greeks saw the science of proportion as the link between geometry and arithmetic [Benardete,JA] |
10027 | Mathematics is higher-order modal logic [Hodes] |
3330 | Negatives, rationals, irrationals and imaginaries are all postulated to solve baffling equations [Benardete,JA] |
3337 | Natural numbers are seen in terms of either their ordinality (Peano), or cardinality (set theory) [Benardete,JA] |
10026 | Arithmetic must allow for the possibility of only a finite total of objects [Hodes] |
11025 | Infinite cuts and successors seems to suggest an actual infinity there waiting for us [Read] |
10979 | Although second-order arithmetic is incomplete, it can fully model normal arithmetic [Read] |
10980 | Second-order arithmetic covers all properties, ensuring categoricity [Read] |
10997 | Von Neumann numbers are helpful, but don't correctly describe numbers [Read] |
10021 | It is claimed that numbers are objects which essentially represent cardinality quantifiers [Hodes] |
10022 | Numerical terms can't really stand for quantifiers, because that would make them first-level [Hodes] |
3310 | If slowness is a property of walking rather than the walker, we must allow that events exist [Benardete,JA] |
12793 | Early pre-Socratics had a mass-noun ontology, which was replaced by count-nouns [Benardete,JA] |
10023 | Talk of mirror images is 'encoded fictions' about real facts [Hodes] |
11016 | Would a language without vagueness be usable at all? [Read] |
11013 | Identities and the Indiscernibility of Identicals don't work with supervaluations [Read] |
11012 | A 'supervaluation' gives a proposition consistent truth-value for classical assignments [Read] |
11019 | Supervaluations say there is a cut-off somewhere, but at no particular place [Read] |
3353 | If there is no causal interaction with transcendent Platonic objects, how can you learn about them? [Benardete,JA] |
10995 | A haecceity is a set of individual properties, essential to each thing [Read] |
3304 | Why should packed-together particles be a thing (Mt Everest), but not scattered ones? [Benardete,JA] |
3350 | Could a horse lose the essential property of being a horse, and yet continue to exist? [Benardete,JA] |
3309 | If a soldier continues to exist after serving as a soldier, does the wind cease to exist after it ceases to blow? [Benardete,JA] |
3351 | One can step into the same river twice, but not into the same water [Benardete,JA] |
3323 | Maybe self-identity isn't existence, if Pegasus can be self-identical but non-existent [Benardete,JA] |
3314 | Absolutists might accept that to exist is relative, but relative to what? How about relative to itself? [Benardete,JA] |
11001 | Equating necessity with truth in every possible world is the S5 conception of necessity [Read] |
10989 | The standard view of conditionals is that they are truth-functional [Read] |
10992 | The point of conditionals is to show that one will accept modus ponens [Read] |
11017 | Some people even claim that conditionals do not express propositions [Read] |
10983 | Knowledge of possible worlds is not causal, but is an ontology entailed by semantics [Read] |
10982 | How can modal Platonists know the truth of a modal proposition? [Read] |
10996 | Actualism is reductionist (to parts of actuality), or moderate realist (accepting real abstractions) [Read] |
10981 | A possible world is a determination of the truth-values of all propositions of a domain [Read] |
11000 | If worlds are concrete, objects can't be present in more than one, and can only have counterparts [Read] |
3306 | The clearest a priori knowledge is proving non-existence through contradiction [Benardete,JA] |
3345 | Appeals to intuition seem to imply synthetic a priori knowledge [Benardete,JA] |
3341 | Logical positivism amounts to no more than 'there is no synthetic a priori' [Benardete,JA] |
3344 | Assertions about existence beyond experience can only be a priori synthetic [Benardete,JA] |
3349 | If we know truths about prime numbers, we seem to have synthetic a priori knowledge of Platonic objects [Benardete,JA] |
10998 | The mind abstracts ways things might be, which are nonetheless real [Read] |
11005 | Negative existentials with compositionality make the whole sentence meaningless [Read] |
10966 | A proposition objectifies what a sentence says, as indicative, with secure references [Read] |
3334 | Rationalists see points as fundamental, but empiricists prefer regions [Benardete,JA] |
3308 | In the ontological argument a full understanding of the concept of God implies a contradiction in 'There is no God' [Benardete,JA] |