39 ideas
6267 | A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science' [Putnam] |
6272 | 'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science [Putnam] |
6276 | 'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam] |
3745 | Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor] |
3742 | Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor] |
6266 | We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science [Putnam] |
6277 | Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam] |
6264 | In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam] |
6265 | Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam] |
6269 | Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam] |
3744 | The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor] |
3749 | What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor] |
3746 | Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor] |
3747 | Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor] |
6280 | Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language [Putnam] |
3748 | Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor] |
3743 | We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor] |
6284 | If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true? [Putnam] |
6273 | Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough [Putnam] |
6274 | Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion [Putnam] |
17084 | You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects [Putnam] |
6282 | Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam] |
6281 | Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam] |
6278 | We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam] |
6271 | How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam] |
6268 | The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam] |
6279 | A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam] |
6270 | The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour [Putnam] |
6283 | Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways) [Putnam] |
6275 | You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs [Putnam] |
23262 | Experience, sympathy and history are sensible grounds for laying claim to rights [Grayling] |
23263 | Politics is driven by power cliques [Grayling] |
23254 | Democracies should require a supermajority for major questions [Grayling] |
23255 | It is essential for democracy that voting is free and well informed [Grayling] |
23260 | A cap on time of service would restrict party control and career ambitions [Grayling] |
23253 | Majority decisions are only acceptable if the minority interests are not vital [Grayling] |
23256 | Liberty and equality cannot be reconciled [Grayling] |
23258 | The very concept of democracy entails a need for justice [Grayling] |
23259 | There should be separate legislative, executive and judicial institutions [Grayling] |