56 ideas
6504 | For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H] |
6520 | If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H] |
6485 | When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H] |
6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |
6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H] |
6502 | Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H] |
6513 | Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H] |
6512 | Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H] |
6497 | We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H] |
6494 | If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H] |
6499 | Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H] |
6500 | If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H] |
6484 | Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H] |
6508 | Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H] |
6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H] |
6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H] |
6505 | Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H] |
6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H] |
6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H] |
6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H] |
17405 | If a theory can be fudged, so can observations [Scerri] |
17397 | The periodic system is the big counterexample to Kuhn's theory of revolutionary science [Scerri] |
6515 | An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H] |
6517 | If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H] |
17393 | Scientists eventually seek underlying explanations for every pattern [Scerri] |
17403 | The periodic table suggests accommodation to facts rates above prediction [Scerri] |
6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H] |
7388 | McGinn invites surrender, by saying it is hopeless trying to imagine conscious machines [Dennett on McGinn] |
6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H] |
3185 | Multiple realisability rules out hidden essences and experts as the source of water- and gold-concepts [McGinn] |
6519 | Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H] |
17394 | Natural kinds are what are differentiated by nature, and not just by us [Scerri] |
17421 | If elements are natural kinds, might the groups of the periodic table also be natural kinds? [Scerri] |
17396 | The colour of gold is best explained by relativistic effects due to fast-moving inner-shell electrons [Scerri] |
17411 | If all elements are multiples of one (of hydrogen), that suggests once again that matter is unified [Scerri] |
17420 | The stability of nuclei can be estimated through their binding energy [Scerri] |
17407 | The electron is the main source of chemical properties [Scerri] |
17409 | Does radioactivity show that only physics can explain chemistry? [Scerri] |
17415 | A big chemistry idea is that covalent bonds are shared electrons, not transfer of electrons [Scerri] |
17392 | How can poisonous elements survive in the nutritious compound they compose? [Scerri] |
17391 | Periodicity and bonding are the two big ideas in chemistry [Scerri] |
17404 | Chemistry does not work from general principles, but by careful induction from large amounts of data [Scerri] |
17398 | 19th C views said elements survived abstractly in compounds, but also as 'material ingredients' [Scerri] |
17418 | It is now thought that all the elements have literally evolved from hydrogen [Scerri] |
17417 | To explain the table, quantum mechanics still needs to explain order of shell filling [Scerri] |
17395 | Elements were ordered by equivalent weight; later by atomic weight; finally by atomic number [Scerri] |
17410 | Moseley showed the elements progress in units, and thereby clearly identified the gaps [Scerri] |
17412 | Elements are placed in the table by the number of positive charges - the atomic number [Scerri] |
17406 | Moseley, using X-rays, showed that atomic number ordered better than atomic weight [Scerri] |
17408 | Some suggested basing the new periodic table on isotopes, not elements [Scerri] |
17414 | Pauli explained the electron shells, but not the lengths of the periods in the table [Scerri] |
17416 | Orthodoxy says the periodic table is explained by quantum mechanics [Scerri] |
17422 | The best classification needs the deepest and most general principles of the atoms [Scerri] |
17413 | Elements in the table are grouped by having the same number of outer-shell electrons [Scerri] |
17419 | Since 99.96% of the universe is hydrogen and helium, the periodic table hardly matters [Scerri] |