8 ideas
9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
9455 | Maybe proper names have the content of fixing a thing's category [Bealer] |
9454 | The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's [Bealer] |
9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
6901 | Understanding is needed for imagination, just as much as the other way around [Betteridge] |
9453 | Sentences saying the same with the same rigid designators may still express different propositions [Bealer] |
9452 | Propositions might be reduced to functions (worlds to truth values), or ordered sets of properties and relations [Bealer] |
9451 | Modal logic and brain science have reaffirmed traditional belief in propositions [Bealer] |