77 ideas
8558 | One system has properties, powers, events, similarity and substance [Shoemaker] |
8559 | Analysis aims at internal relationships, not reduction [Shoemaker] |
15092 | Formerly I said properties are individuated by essential causal powers and causing instantiation [Shoemaker, by Shoemaker] |
8543 | Genuine properties are closely related to genuine changes [Shoemaker] |
8551 | Properties must be essentially causal if we can know and speak about them [Shoemaker] |
8557 | To ascertain genuine properties, examine the object directly [Shoemaker] |
15761 | We should abandon the idea that properties are the meanings of predicate expressions [Shoemaker] |
15756 | Some truths are not because of a thing's properties, but because of the properties of related things [Shoemaker] |
15758 | Things have powers in virtue of (which are entailed by) their properties [Shoemaker] |
8547 | One power can come from different properties; a thing's powers come from its properties [Shoemaker] |
8549 | Properties are functions producing powers, and powers are functions producing effects [Shoemaker] |
12678 | Shoemaker says all genuine properties are dispositional [Shoemaker, by Ellis] |
8545 | A causal theory of properties focuses on change, not (say) on abstract properties of numbers [Shoemaker] |
15757 | 'Square', 'round' and 'made of copper' show that not all properties are dispositional [Shoemaker] |
15759 | The identity of a property concerns its causal powers [Shoemaker] |
15760 | Properties are clusters of conditional powers [Shoemaker] |
15762 | Could properties change without the powers changing, or powers change without the properties changing? [Shoemaker] |
8552 | If properties are separated from causal powers, this invites total elimination [Shoemaker] |
4040 | The notions of property and of causal power are parts of a single system of related concepts [Shoemaker] |
15765 | Actually, properties are individuated by causes as well as effects [Shoemaker] |
8548 | Dispositional predicates ascribe powers, and the rest ascribe properties [Shoemaker] |
9485 | Universals concern how things are, and how they could be [Shoemaker, by Bird] |
8550 | Triangular and trilateral are coextensive, but different concepts; but powers and properties are the same [Shoemaker] |
8555 | There is no subset of properties which guarantee a thing's identity [Shoemaker] |
8554 | Possible difference across worlds depends on difference across time in the actual world [Shoemaker] |
15764 | 'Conceivable' is either not-provably-false, or compatible with what we know? [Shoemaker] |
8562 | It is possible to conceive what is not possible [Shoemaker] |
5937 | The goodness of opinions depends on their grounds, and corresponding degrees of conviction [Ross] |
5936 | Knowledge is superior to opinion because it is certain [Ross] |
19553 | Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne] |
5927 | I prefer the causal theory to sense data, because sensations are events, not apprehensions [Ross] |
19551 | How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne] |
19552 | We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne] |
19554 | Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne] |
5940 | Two goods may be comparable, although they are not commensurable [Ross] |
8556 | Grueness is not, unlike green and blue, associated with causal potential [Shoemaker] |
5924 | Identical objects must have identical value [Ross] |
5933 | Aesthetic enjoyment combines pleasure with insight [Ross] |
5928 | Beauty is neither objective nor subjective, but a power of producing certain mental events [Ross] |
5911 | Moral duties are as fundamental to the universe as the axioms of mathematics [Ross] |
5926 | The beauty of a patch of colour might be the most important fact about it [Ross] |
7259 | Ross said moral principles are self-evident from the facts, but not from pure thought [Ross, by Dancy,J] |
5913 | The moral convictions of thoughtful educated people are the raw data of ethics [Ross] |
5920 | Value is held to be either a quality, or a relation (usually between a thing and a mind) [Ross] |
5923 | The arguments for value being an objective or a relation fail, so it appears to be a quality [Ross] |
5918 | The thing is intrinsically good if it would be good when nothing else existed [Ross] |
5930 | All things being equal, we all prefer the virtuous to be happy, not the vicious [Ross] |
5922 | An instrumentally good thing might stay the same, but change its value because of circumstances [Ross] |
5921 | We can ask of pleasure or beauty whether they are valuable, but not of goodness [Ross] |
5932 | The four goods are: virtue, pleasure, just allocation of pleasure, and knowledge [Ross] |
5910 | The three intrinsic goods are virtue, knowledge and pleasure [Ross] |
5898 | 'Right' and 'good' differ in meaning, as in a 'right action' and a 'good man' [Ross] |
5899 | If there are two equally good acts, they may both be right, but neither a duty [Ross] |
5904 | In the past 'right' just meant what is conventionally accepted [Ross] |
5919 | Goodness is a wider concept than just correct ethical conduct [Ross] |
5941 | Motives decide whether an action is good, and what is done decides whether it was right [Ross] |
5938 | Virtue is superior to pleasure, as pleasure is never a duty, but goodness is [Ross] |
5931 | All other things being equal, a universe with more understanding is better [Ross] |
5939 | Morality is not entirely social; a good moral character should love truth [Ross] |
5905 | We clearly value good character or understanding, as well as pleasure [Ross] |
5929 | No one thinks it doesn't matter whether pleasure is virtuously or viciously acquired [Ross] |
5906 | Promise-keeping is bound by the past, and is not concerned with consequences [Ross] |
18622 | Promises create a new duty to a particular person; they aren't just a strategy to achieve well-being [Ross] |
5908 | Prima facie duties rest self-evidently on particular circumstance [Ross] |
5917 | People lose their rights if they do not respect the rights of others [Ross] |
5900 | We should do our duty, but not from a sense of duty [Ross] |
5942 | We like people who act from love, but admire more the people who act from duty [Ross] |
5909 | Be faithful, grateful, just, beneficent, non-malevolent, and improve yourself [Ross, by PG] |
5914 | An act may be described in innumerable ways [Ross] |
5912 | We should use money to pay debts before giving to charity [Ross] |
5916 | Rights were originally legal, and broadened to include other things [Ross] |
5915 | Rights can be justly claimed, so animals have no rights, as they cannot claim any [Ross] |
8542 | If causality is between events, there must be reference to the properties involved [Shoemaker] |
8560 | If causal laws describe causal potentialities, the same laws govern properties in all possible worlds [Shoemaker] |
15763 | If properties are causal, then causal necessity is a species of logical necessity [Shoemaker] |
8561 | If a world has different causal laws, it must have different properties [Shoemaker] |
8553 | It looks as if the immutability of the powers of a property imply essentiality [Shoemaker] |