82 ideas
7001 | If you begin philosophy with language, you find yourself trapped in it [Heil] |
7038 | A theory with few fundamental principles might still posit a lot of entities [Heil] |
7037 | Parsimony does not imply the world is simple, but that our theories should try to be [Heil] |
9847 | A contextual definition permits the elimination of the expression by a substitution [Dummett] |
7004 | The view that truth making is entailment is misguided and misleading [Heil] |
7035 | God does not create the world, and then add the classes [Heil] |
9820 | In classical logic, logical truths are valid formulas; in higher-order logics they are purely logical [Dummett] |
9896 | A prime number is one which is measured by a unit alone [Dummett] |
18255 | Addition of quantities is prior to ordering, as shown in cyclic domains like angles [Dummett] |
9895 | A number is a multitude composed of units [Dummett] |
9852 | We understand 'there are as many nuts as apples' as easily by pairing them as by counting them [Dummett] |
9829 | The identity of a number may be fixed by something outside structure - by counting [Dummett] |
9828 | Numbers aren't fixed by position in a structure; it won't tell you whether to start with 0 or 1 [Dummett] |
9876 | Set theory isn't part of logic, and why reduce to something more complex? [Dummett] |
7017 | The reductionist programme dispenses with levels of reality [Heil] |
7003 | There are levels of organisation, complexity, description and explanation, but not of reality [Heil] |
9884 | The distinction of concrete/abstract, or actual/non-actual, is a scale, not a dichotomy [Dummett] |
9869 | Realism is just the application of two-valued semantics to sentences [Dummett] |
7045 | Realism says some of our concepts 'cut nature at the joints' [Heil] |
7065 | Anti-realists who reduce reality to language must explain the existence of language [Heil] |
7020 | Concepts don't carve up the world, which has endless overlooked or ignored divisions [Heil] |
7007 | I think of properties as simultaneously dispositional and qualitative [Heil] |
7015 | A predicate applies truly if it picks out a real property of objects [Heil] |
7042 | A theory of universals says similarity is identity of parts; for modes, similarity is primitive [Heil] |
7023 | Powers or dispositions are usually seen as caused by lower-level qualities [Heil] |
7025 | Are a property's dispositions built in, or contingently added? [Heil] |
7034 | Universals explain one-over-many relations, and similar qualities, and similar behaviour [Heil] |
7039 | How could you tell if the universals were missing from a world of instances? [Heil] |
9880 | Nominalism assumes unmediated mental contact with objects [Dummett] |
7009 | Similarity among modes will explain everthing universals were for [Heil] |
7041 | Similar objects have similar properties; properties are directly similar [Heil] |
7032 | Objects join sets because of properties; the property is not bestowed by set membership [Heil] |
7008 | Trope theorists usually see objects as 'bundles' of tropes [Heil] |
7018 | Objects are substances, which are objects considered as the bearer of properties [Heil] |
9885 | The existence of abstract objects is a pseudo-problem [Dummett] |
9858 | Abstract objects nowadays are those which are objective but not actual [Dummett] |
9859 | It is absurd to deny the Equator, on the grounds that it lacks causal powers [Dummett] |
9860 | 'We've crossed the Equator' has truth-conditions, so accept the Equator - and it's an object [Dummett] |
9872 | Abstract objects need the context principle, since they can't be encountered directly [Dummett] |
7019 | Maybe there is only one substance, space-time or a quantum field [Heil] |
7046 | Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties [Heil] |
14381 | A statue is essentially the statue, but its lump is not essentially a statue, so statue isn't lump [Yablo, by Rocca] |
7047 | Statues and bronze lumps have discernible differences, so can't be identical [Heil] |
7048 | Do we reduce statues to bronze, or eliminate statues, or allow statues and bronze? [Heil] |
9848 | Content is replaceable if identical, so replaceability can't define identity [Dummett, by Dummett] |
9842 | Frege introduced criteria for identity, but thought defining identity was circular [Dummett] |
7030 | Properties don't possess ways they are, because that just is the property [Heil] |
7028 | If properties were qualities without dispositions, they would be undetectable [Heil] |
7029 | Can we distinguish the way a property is from the property? [Heil] |
7051 | Objects only have secondary qualities because they have primary qualities [Heil] |
7044 | Secondary qualities are just primary qualities considered in the light of their effect on us [Heil] |
7052 | Colours aren't surface properties, because of radiant sources and the colour of the sky [Heil] |
7053 | Treating colour as light radiation has the implausible result that tomatoes are not red [Heil] |
7066 | If the world is just texts or social constructs, what are texts and social constructs? [Heil] |
7021 | If the world is theory-dependent, the theories themselves can't be theory-dependent [Heil] |
7026 | Science is sometimes said to classify powers, neglecting qualities [Heil] |
7060 | One form of explanation is by decomposition [Heil] |
7010 | Dispositionality provides the grounding for intentionality [Heil] |
7054 | Intentionality now has internalist (intrinsic to thinkers) and externalist (environment or community) views [Heil] |
7011 | Qualia are not extra appendages, but intrinsic ingredients of material states and processes [Heil] |
7061 | Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world [Heil] |
7063 | Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical [Heil] |
7064 | Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state [Heil] |
7027 | Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality [Heil] |
7062 | Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation [Heil] |
7059 | The 'explanatory gap' is used to say consciousness is inexplicable, at least with current concepts [Heil] |
7012 | If a car is a higher-level entity, distinct from its parts, how could it ever do anything? [Heil] |
7043 | Multiple realisability is actually one predicate applying to a diverse range of properties [Heil] |
7058 | Externalism is causal-historical, or social, or biological [Heil] |
7057 | Intentionality is based in dispositions, which are intrinsic to agents, suggesting internalism [Heil] |
9849 | Maybe a concept is 'prior' to another if it can be defined without the second concept [Dummett] |
9850 | An argument for conceptual priority is greater simplicity in explanation [Dummett] |
9873 | Abstract terms are acceptable as long as we know how they function linguistically [Dummett] |
9993 | There is no reason why abstraction by equivalence classes should be called 'logical' [Dummett, by Tait] |
9857 | We arrive at the concept 'suicide' by comparing 'Cato killed Cato' with 'Brutus killed Brutus' [Dummett] |
9833 | To abstract from spoons (to get the same number as the forks), the spoons must be indistinguishable too [Dummett] |
7013 | The Picture Theory claims we can read reality from our ways of speaking about it [Heil] |
9836 | Fregean semantics assumes a domain articulated into individual objects [Dummett] |
7002 | If propositions are states of affairs or sets of possible worlds, these lack truth values [Heil] |
7016 | The standard view is that causal sequences are backed by laws, and between particular events [Heil] |
18257 | Why should the limit of measurement be points, not intervals? [Dummett] |
7036 | The real natural properties are sparse, but there are many complex properties [Heil] |