39 ideas
8195 | Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett] |
8194 | Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence [Dummett] |
8190 | Intuitionists rely on the proof of mathematical statements, not their truth [Dummett] |
8198 | A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett] |
8192 | I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett] |
16730 | If matter is entirely atoms, anything else we notice in it can only be modes [Gassendi] |
14308 | We can bring dispositions into existence, as in creating an identifier [Dennett, by Mumford] |
7384 | Words are fixed by being attached to similarity clusters, without mention of 'essences' [Dennett] |
8199 | The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett] |
7374 | Light wavelengths entering the eye are only indirectly related to object colours [Dennett] |
7369 | Brains are essentially anticipation machines [Dennett] |
16619 | We observe qualities, and use 'induction' to refer to the substances lying under them [Gassendi] |
7393 | We can't draw a clear line between conscious and unconscious [Dennett] |
7367 | Perhaps the brain doesn't 'fill in' gaps in consciousness if no one is looking. [Dennett] |
7394 | Conscious events can only be explained in terms of unconscious events [Dennett] |
7391 | We can know a lot of what it is like to be a bat, and nothing important is unknown [Dennett] |
7387 | "Qualia" can be replaced by complex dispositional brain states [Dennett] |
7376 | We can't assume that dispositions will remain normal when qualia have been inverted [Dennett] |
7372 | In peripheral vision we see objects without their details, so blindsight is not that special [Dennett] |
7373 | Blindsight subjects glean very paltry information [Dennett] |
7385 | People accept blurred boundaries in many things, but insist self is All or Nothing [Dennett] |
7383 | The psychological self is an abstraction, not a thing in the brain [Dennett] |
7386 | Selves are not soul-pearls, but artefacts of social processes [Dennett] |
7381 | We tell stories about ourselves, to protect, control and define who we are [Dennett] |
7382 | We spin narratives about ourselves, and the audience posits a centre of gravity for them [Dennett] |
7370 | The brain is controlled by shifting coalitions, guided by good purposeful habits [Dennett] |
7379 | If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable [Dennett] |
7365 | Dualism wallows in mystery, and to accept it is to give up [Dennett] |
7371 | All functionalism is 'homuncular', of one grain size or another [Dennett] |
7380 | Visual experience is composed of neural activity, which we find pleasing [Dennett] |
7366 | It is arbitrary to say which moment of brain processing is conscious [Dennett] |
8193 | Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett] |
8189 | Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett] |
8191 | The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett] |
7368 | Originally there were no reasons, purposes or functions; since there were no interests, there were only causes [Dennett] |
16593 | Atoms are not points, but hard indivisible things, which no force in nature can divide [Gassendi] |
16729 | How do mere atoms produce qualities like colour, flavour and odour? [Gassendi] |
8197 | Maybe past (which affects us) and future (which we can affect) are both real [Dummett] |
8196 | The present cannot exist alone as a mere boundary; past and future truths are rendered meaningless [Dummett] |