32 ideas
17713 | After 1903, Husserl avoids metaphysical commitments [Mares] |
17651 | Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman] |
17652 | Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman] |
17505 | Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam] |
17715 | The truth of the axioms doesn't matter for pure mathematics, but it does for applied [Mares] |
17716 | Mathematics is relations between properties we abstract from experience [Mares] |
17656 | Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman] |
17661 | We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman] |
17659 | Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman] |
17657 | We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman] |
17654 | A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman] |
11908 | Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam] |
17653 | Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman] |
17703 | Light in straight lines is contingent a priori; stipulated as straight, because they happen to be so [Mares] |
17714 | Aristotelians dislike the idea of a priori judgements from pure reason [Mares] |
17705 | Empiricists say rationalists mistake imaginative powers for modal insights [Mares] |
17700 | The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another [Mares] |
17660 | Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman] |
17508 | Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam] |
17658 | Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman] |
17704 | Operationalism defines concepts by our ways of measuring them [Mares] |
17650 | We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman] |
17655 | Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman] |
17710 | Aristotelian justification uses concepts abstracted from experience [Mares] |
17706 | The essence of a concept is either its definition or its conceptual relations? [Mares] |
17506 | I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam] |
17701 | Possible worlds semantics has a nice compositional account of modal statements [Mares] |
17702 | Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components [Mares] |
17649 | If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman] |
11904 | Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P] |
17507 | Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam] |
17708 | Maybe space has points, but processes always need regions with a size [Mares] |