97 ideas
23890 | For Plato true wisdom is supernatural [Plato, by Weil] |
3060 | Plato never mentions Democritus, and wished to burn his books [Plato, by Diog. Laertius] |
23891 | Two contradictories force us to find a relation which will correlate them [Plato, by Weil] |
22309 | An idea can only be like another idea [Berkeley] |
6717 | Abstract ideas are impossible [Berkeley] |
18876 | Berkeley does believe in trees, but is confused about what trees are [Berkeley, by Cameron] |
14502 | Plato's idea of 'structure' tends to be mathematically expressed [Plato, by Koslicki] |
3039 | When Diogenes said he could only see objects but not their forms, Plato said it was because he had eyes but no intellect [Plato, by Diog. Laertius] |
20906 | Platonists argue for the indivisible triangle-in-itself [Plato, by Aristotle] |
17948 | Plato's Forms meant that the sophists only taught the appearance of wisdom and virtue [Plato, by Nehamas] |
556 | If there is one Form for both the Form and its participants, they must have something in common [Aristotle on Plato] |
563 | If gods are like men, they are just eternal men; similarly, Forms must differ from particulars [Aristotle on Plato] |
565 | The Forms cannot be changeless if they are in changing things [Aristotle on Plato] |
557 | A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause [Aristotle on Plato] |
6715 | Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars [Berkeley] |
6719 | No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas [Berkeley] |
6714 | Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars [Berkeley] |
9607 | The greatest discovery in human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects [Brown,JR on Plato] |
13263 | We can grasp whole things in science, because they have a mathematics and a teleology [Plato, by Koslicki] |
13261 | Plato sees an object's structure as expressible in mathematics [Plato, by Koslicki] |
13265 | Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the source of unity in a complex object [Plato, by Koslicki] |
593 | Plato's holds that there are three substances: Forms, mathematical entities, and perceptible bodies [Plato, by Aristotle] |
6729 | Material substance is just general existence which can have properties [Berkeley] |
16636 | A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents [Berkeley] |
13260 | Plato says wholes are either containers, or they're atomic, or they don't exist [Plato, by Koslicki] |
11237 | Only universals have essence [Plato, by Politis] |
11238 | Plato and Aristotle take essence to make a thing what it is [Plato, by Politis] |
6722 | Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit [Berkeley] |
6724 | The only substance is spirit, or that which perceives [Berkeley] |
6723 | The 'esse' of objects is 'percipi', and they can only exist in minds [Berkeley] |
6732 | When I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but in another mind [Berkeley] |
6726 | No one can, by abstraction, conceive extension and motion of bodies without sensible qualities [Berkeley] |
6728 | Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion [Berkeley] |
6727 | Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold [Berkeley] |
6495 | Berkeley's idealism resulted from fear of scepticism in representative realism [Robinson,H on Berkeley] |
6720 | Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations [Berkeley] |
17085 | A good explanation totally rules out the opposite explanation (so Forms are required) [Plato, by Ruben] |
20043 | Evolutionary explanations look to the past or the group, not to the individual [Stout,R] |
20058 | Not all explanation is causal. We don't explain a painting's beauty, or the irrationality of root-2, that way [Stout,R] |
23636 | Berkeley's idealism gives no grounds for believing in other minds [Reid on Berkeley] |
6736 | I know other minds by ideas which are referred by me to other agents, as their effects [Berkeley] |
6713 | If animals have ideas, and are not machines, they must have some reason [Berkeley] |
6491 | Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought [Berkeley, by Robinson,H] |
6711 | The mind creates abstract ideas by considering qualities separated from their objects [Berkeley] |
10581 | I can only combine particulars in imagination; I can't create 'abstract' ideas [Berkeley] |
6721 | Ideas are perceived by the mind, soul or self [Berkeley] |
1651 | Plato wanted to somehow control and purify the passions [Vlastos on Plato] |
6716 | Language is presumably for communication, and names stand for ideas [Berkeley] |
6718 | I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought [Berkeley] |
3324 | Plato's whole philosophy may be based on being duped by reification - a figure of speech [Benardete,JA on Plato] |
20035 | Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions [Stout,R] |
20084 | Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification [Stout,R] |
20061 | Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other [Stout,R] |
20079 | Are actions bodily movements, or a sequence of intention-movement-result? [Stout,R] |
20080 | If one action leads to another, does it cause it, or is it part of it? [Stout,R] |
20059 | I do actions, but not events, so actions are not events [Stout,R] |
20081 | Bicycle riding is not just bodily movement - you also have to be on the bicycle [Stout,R] |
20044 | The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R] |
20039 | The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R] |
20047 | Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R] |
20065 | Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R] |
20067 | You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R] |
20078 | The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R] |
20036 | Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act [Stout,R] |
20066 | Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions [Stout,R] |
20073 | Bratman has to treat shared intentions as interrelated individual intentions [Stout,R] |
20069 | A request to pass the salt shares an intention that the request be passed on [Stout,R] |
20070 | An individual cannot express the intention that a group do something like moving a piano [Stout,R] |
20071 | An intention is a goal to which behaviour is adapted, for an individual or for a group [Stout,R] |
20038 | If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant [Stout,R] |
20050 | Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent [Stout,R] |
20052 | If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action [Stout,R] |
20077 | If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency [Stout,R] |
20049 | Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause [Stout,R] |
20046 | For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it [Stout,R] |
20060 | Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R] |
20055 | A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R] |
20056 | In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R] |
20053 | An action is only yours if you produce it, rather than some state or event within you [Stout,R] |
20048 | There may be a justification relative to a person's view, and yet no absolute justification [Stout,R] |
20068 | Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R] |
7503 | Plato never refers to examining the conscience [Plato, by Foucault] |
2173 | As religion and convention collapsed, Plato sought morals not just in knowledge, but in the soul [Williams,B on Plato] |
9274 | Plato's legacy to European thought was the Good, the Beautiful and the True [Plato, by Gray] |
94 | Pleasure is better with the addition of intelligence, so pleasure is not the good [Plato, by Aristotle] |
17947 | Plato decided that the virtuous and happy life was the philosophical life [Plato, by Nehamas] |
6015 | Plato, unusually, said that theoretical and practical wisdom are inseparable [Plato, by Kraut] |
2912 | Plato is boring [Nietzsche on Plato] |
6731 | No one can explain how matter affects mind, so matter is redundant in philosophy [Berkeley] |
20083 | Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events) [Stout,R] |
6730 | We discover natural behaviour by observing settled laws of nature, not necessary connections [Berkeley] |
15861 | The laws of nature are mental regularities which we learn by experience [Berkeley] |
6734 | If properties and qualities arise from an inward essence, we will remain ignorant of nature [Berkeley] |
6735 | All motion is relative, so a single body cannot move [Berkeley] |
6733 | I cannot imagine time apart from the flow of ideas in my mind [Berkeley] |
1526 | Almost everyone except Plato thinks that time could not have been generated [Plato, by Aristotle] |
6737 | Particular evils are really good when linked to the whole system of beings [Berkeley] |