61 ideas
21021 | Keep premises as weak as possible, to avoid controversial difficulties [Nussbaum] |
6052 | Definitions identify two concepts, so they presuppose identity [McGinn] |
6064 | Regresses are only vicious in the context of an explanation [McGinn] |
6088 | Truth is a method of deducing facts from propositions [McGinn] |
6084 | 'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall [McGinn] |
6085 | The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence [McGinn] |
6083 | The coherence theory of truth implies idealism, because facts are just coherent beliefs [McGinn] |
6087 | Without the disquotation device for truth, you could never form beliefs from others' testimony [McGinn] |
6086 | Truth is the property of propositions that makes it possible to deduce facts [McGinn] |
6051 | In 'x is F and x is G' we must assume the identity of x in the two statements [McGinn] |
6055 | Both non-contradiction and excluded middle need identity in their formulation [McGinn] |
6059 | Identity is unitary, indefinable, fundamental and a genuine relation [McGinn] |
6042 | The quantifier is overrated as an analytical tool [McGinn] |
6067 | Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists' [McGinn] |
6069 | 'Partial quantifier' would be a better name than 'existential quantifier', as no existence would be implied [McGinn] |
6068 | We need an Intentional Quantifier ("some of the things we talk about.."), so existence goes into the proposition [McGinn] |
6070 | Existence is a primary quality, non-existence a secondary quality [McGinn] |
6062 | Existence can't be analysed as instantiating a property, as instantiation requires existence [McGinn] |
6065 | We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties [McGinn] |
6082 | If causal power is the test for reality, that will exclude necessities and possibilities [McGinn] |
6075 | Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property [McGinn] |
6058 | Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role [McGinn] |
6053 | Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be [McGinn] |
6044 | Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties [McGinn] |
6043 | Type-identity is close similarity in qualities [McGinn] |
6046 | Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved [McGinn] |
6045 | It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance' [McGinn] |
6054 | Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical [McGinn] |
6066 | Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects [McGinn] |
6047 | All identity is necessary, though identity statements can be contingently true [McGinn] |
6049 | Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py' [McGinn] |
6050 | Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity [McGinn] |
6048 | Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity [McGinn] |
6080 | Modality is not objects or properties, but the type of binding of objects to properties [McGinn] |
6079 | If 'possible' is explained as quantification across worlds, there must be possible worlds [McGinn] |
3570 | Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M] |
6081 | Necessity and possibility are big threats to the empiricist view of knowledge [McGinn] |
2748 | A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J] |
6071 | Scepticism about reality is possible because existence isn't part of appearances [McGinn] |
6077 | Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects [McGinn] |
6074 | Clearly predicates have extensions (applicable objects), but are the extensions part of their meaning? [McGinn] |
21007 | Storytelling is never neutral; some features of the world must be emphasised [Nussbaum] |
21025 | Particularism gives no guidance for the future [Nussbaum] |
21026 | Compassion is unreliable, because it favours people close to us [Nussbaum] |
21019 | Social contracts assume equal powers among the participants [Nussbaum] |
21011 | We shouldn't focus on actual preferences, which may be distorted by injustices [Nussbaum] |
21008 | Liberalism does not need a comprehensive account of value [Nussbaum] |
21012 | Women are often treated like children, and not respected for their choices [Nussbaum] |
21015 | Negative liberty is incoherent; all liberties, to do and to be, require the prevention of interference [Nussbaum] |
21017 | Political freedom is an incoherent project, because some freedoms limit other freedoms [Nussbaum] |
21016 | Political and civil rights are not separate from economic and social rights [Nussbaum] |
21009 | Capabilities: Life, Health, Safety, Mental life, Love, Planning, Joining in, Nature, Play, Control [Nussbaum, by PG] |
21010 | Justice requires that the ten main capabilities of people are reasonably enabled [Nussbaum] |
21013 | Capabilities are grounded in bare humanity and agency; qualifying as rational is not needed [Nussbaum] |
21014 | Rights are not just barriers against state interference; governments must affirm capabilities of citizens [Nussbaum] |
21020 | Any establishment belief system is incompatible with full respect for all citizens [Nussbaum] |
21023 | We should respect animals in the way that we respect the animal nature in humans [Nussbaum] |
21024 | It may be no harm to kill an animal which cannot plan for its future [Nussbaum] |
21022 | The Capabilities Approach sees animals as agents, not just as having feelings [Nussbaum] |
6072 | If Satan is the most imperfect conceivable being, he must have non-existence [McGinn] |
6073 | I think the fault of the Ontological Argument is taking the original idea to be well-defined [McGinn] |