92 ideas
1695 | Without extensive examination firm statements are hard, but studying the difficulties is profitable [Aristotle] |
1698 | Both sides of contraries need not exist (as health without sickness, white without black) [Aristotle] |
1697 | The contrary of good is bad, but the contrary of bad is either good or another evil [Aristotle] |
11034 | The differentiae of genera which are different are themselves different in kind [Aristotle] |
18367 | A true existence statement has its truth caused by the existence of the thing [Aristotle] |
11033 | Predications of predicates are predications of their subjects [Aristotle] |
4098 | The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent [Crane] |
11044 | One is prior to two, because its existence is implied by two [Aristotle] |
11042 | Parts of a line join at a point, so it is continuous [Aristotle] |
11041 | Some quantities are discrete, like number, and others continuous, like lines, time and space [Aristotle] |
11286 | Primary being must be more than mere indeterminate ultimate subject of predication [Politis on Aristotle] |
1700 | There are six kinds of change: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, change of place [Aristotle] |
1699 | A thing is prior to another if it implies its existence [Aristotle] |
18366 | Of interdependent things, the prior one causes the other's existence [Aristotle] |
4077 | Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties [Crane] |
4078 | Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity [Crane] |
11035 | There are ten basic categories for thinking about things [Aristotle] |
3311 | The categories (substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion, place, time) peter out inconsequentially [Benardete,JA on Aristotle] |
13121 | Substance,Quantity,Quality,Relation,Place,Time,Being-in-a-position,Having,Doing,Being affected [Aristotle, by Westerhoff] |
16116 | Aristotle derived categories as answers to basic questions about nature, size, quality, location etc. [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
21345 | Aristotle said relations are not substances, so (if they exist) they must be accidents [Aristotle, by Heil] |
16155 | Aristotle promoted the importance of properties and objects (rather than general and particular) [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
11032 | Some things said 'of' a subject are not 'in' the subject [Aristotle] |
11038 | We call them secondary 'substances' because they reveal the primary substances [Aristotle] |
4083 | If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete [Crane] |
4082 | The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague [Crane] |
16739 | Four species of quality: states, capacities, affects, and forms [Aristotle, by Pasnau] |
4079 | Properties are causes [Crane] |
11037 | Colour must be in an individual body, or it is not embodied [Aristotle] |
16154 | Aristotle gave up his earlier notion of individuals, because it relied on universals [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
12351 | Genus and species are substances, because only they reveal the primary substance [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
1694 | Substances have no opposites, and don't come in degrees (including if the substance is a man) [Aristotle] |
16091 | Is primary substance just an ultimate subject, or some aspect of a complex body? [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
11280 | Primary being is 'that which lies under', or 'particular substance' [Aristotle, by Politis] |
4068 | Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence [Crane] |
11040 | A single substance can receive contrary properties [Aristotle] |
16140 | Secondary substances do have subjects, so they are not ultimate in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
10965 | In earlier Aristotle the substances were particulars, not kinds [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred] |
11036 | A 'primary' substance is in each subject, with species or genera as 'secondary' substances [Aristotle] |
8287 | Earlier Aristotle had objects as primary substances, but later he switched to substantial form [Aristotle, by Lowe] |
12350 | Things are called 'substances' because they are subjects for everything else [Aristotle] |
11039 | A primary substance reveals a 'this', which is an individual unit [Aristotle] |
12361 | Primary substances are ontological in 'Categories', and explanatory in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
3315 | Aristotle denigrates the category of relation, but for modern absolutists self-relation is basic [Benardete,JA on Aristotle] |
4096 | Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions [Crane] |
4097 | Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs [Crane] |
4093 | Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere) [Crane] |
4108 | Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it? [Crane] |
4105 | The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes [Crane] |
4104 | One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine [Crane] |
4102 | The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum [Crane] |
4101 | If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see [Crane] |
4109 | If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual [Crane] |
4103 | The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects [Crane] |
4065 | Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things? [Crane] |
4092 | The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question [Crane] |
4087 | Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes [Crane] |
4095 | Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes [Crane] |
4106 | If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes [Crane] |
4089 | Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane] |
4090 | Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane] |
4107 | With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same [Crane] |
4069 | Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible [Crane] |
4074 | Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane] |
4091 | The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality [Crane] |
4070 | Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane] |
4084 | Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic [Crane] |
4080 | If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane] |
4085 | Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution [Crane] |
4075 | Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation [Crane] |
4073 | Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone [Crane] |
4072 | The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind [Crane] |
4094 | Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane] |
23438 | Full rationality must include morality [Foot] |
4100 | The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false. [Crane] |
4067 | Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought [Crane] |
4063 | In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived. [Crane] |
12349 | Only what can be said of many things is a predicable [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
11837 | Some predicates signify qualification of a substance, others the substance itself [Aristotle] |
23437 | Practical reason is goodness in choosing actions [Foot] |
23436 | It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring [Foot] |
23431 | Human defects are just like plant or animal defects [Foot] |
23433 | Humans need courage like a plant needs roots [Foot] |
23432 | Concepts such as function, welfare, flourishing and interests only apply to living things [Foot] |
23434 | There is no fact-value gap in 'owls should see in the dark' [Foot] |
23439 | Principles are not ultimate, but arise from the necessities of human life [Foot] |
23435 | If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?' [Foot] |
4071 | Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow [Crane] |
4076 | Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation [Crane] |
11043 | It is not possible for fire to be cold or snow black [Aristotle] |
1696 | Change goes from possession to loss (as in baldness), but not the other way round [Aristotle] |
4066 | It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate [Crane] |