16 ideas
15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
17809 | Gödel showed that the syntactic approach to the infinite is of limited value [Kreisel] |
17810 | The study of mathematical foundations needs new non-mathematical concepts [Kreisel] |
5517 | Individuals don't exist, but are conventional names for sets of elements [Buddha] |
17811 | The natural conception of points ducks the problem of naming or constructing each point [Kreisel] |
7600 | The Buddha believed the gods would eventually disappear, and Nirvana was much higher [Buddha, by Armstrong,K] |
7601 | Life is suffering, from which only compassion, gentleness, truth and sobriety can save us [Buddha] |