5 ideas
16721 | Changes in secondary qualities are caused by changes in primary qualities [Giles of Orleans] |
Full Idea: Every alteration in secondary qualities is caused by some alteration made in the primary qualities. | |
From: Giles of Orleans (On 'Generation and Corruption' [1270], I.6c) | |
A reaction: Pasnau calls this the 'supervenience' thesis, here with the addition of causation. Was this doctrine retained by Locke and Boyle? |
14794 | Instead of seeking Truth, we should seek belief that is beyond doubt [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Your problems would be greatly simplified, if, instead of saying that you want to know the Truth, you were simply to say that you want to attain a state of belief unassailable beyond doubt. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Essentials of Pragmatism [1905], I) | |
A reaction: This is not the same as saying that belief beyond doubt IS truth. He is merely offering a strategy for scientists to side-step the sort of scepticism raised by Descartes and radical empiricists. |
14792 | A 'conception', the rational implication of a word, lies in its bearing upon the conduct of life [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The present writer framed the theory that a 'conception', that is, the rational purport of a word or other expression, lies exclusively in its conceivable bearing upon the conduct of life. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Essentials of Pragmatism [1905], I) |
14793 | The definition of a concept is just its experimental implications [Peirce] |
Full Idea: If one can define accurately all the conceivable experimental phenomena which the affirmation or denial of a concept could imply, one will have therein a complete definition of the concept, and there is absolutely nothing more in it. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Essentials of Pragmatism [1905], I) | |
A reaction: Strictly, I would have thought you could only affirm or deny a complete proposition, rather than a concept. What should I do with the concept of a 'unicorn'? Note that all theories, such as empiricism or pragmatism, begin with an account of our concepts. |
18545 | The disinterested attitude of the judge is the hallmark of a judgement of beauty [Shaftesbury, by Scruton] |
Full Idea: Shaftesbury explained the peculiar features of the judgement of beauty in terms of the disinterested attitude of the judge. | |
From: report of 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Characteristics [1711]) by Roger Scruton - Beauty: a very short introduction 1 | |
A reaction: Good. I take our vocabulary to mark a distinction between expressions of subjective preference, and expressions of what aspire to be objective facts. 'I love this' versus 'this is good or beautiful'. |