13 ideas
10304 | Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics [Bernays] |
Full Idea: Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics. | |
From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934]) |
10303 | Restricted Platonism is just an ideal projection of a domain of thought [Bernays] |
Full Idea: A restricted Platonism does not claim to be more than, so to speak, an ideal projection of a domain of thought. | |
From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934], p.261) | |
A reaction: I have always found Platonism to be congenial when it talks of 'ideals', and ridiculous when it talks of a special form of 'existence'. Ideals only 'exist' because we idealise things. I may declare myself, after all, to be a Restricted Platonist. |
10306 | Mathematical abstraction just goes in a different direction from logic [Bernays] |
Full Idea: Mathematical abstraction does not have a lesser degree than logical abstraction, but rather another direction. | |
From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934], p.268) | |
A reaction: His point is that the logicists seem to think that if you increasingly abstract from mathematics, you end up with pure logic. |
7771 | We need 'events' to explain adverbs, which are adjectival predicates of events [Davidson, by Lycan] |
Full Idea: To deal with the truth conditions for some adverbs, Davidson introduced a domain of 'events', and made adverbs into adjectival predicates of events. | |
From: report of Donald Davidson (The Logical Form of Action Sentences [1967]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.9 | |
A reaction: This seems to be a striking case of a procedure of which I heartily disapprove - deriving you ontology from your semantics. Do all languages have adverbs? |
8860 | Language-learning is not good enough evidence for the existence of events [Yablo on Davidson] |
Full Idea: One needs a better reason for believing in events than the help they provide with language-learning. | |
From: comment on Donald Davidson (The Logical Form of Action Sentences [1967], §8) by Stephen Yablo - Apriority and Existence §8 | |
A reaction: I can almost believe in micro-events at the quantum level, but I cannot believe that the Renaissance (made of events within events within events) is an event, even though I may 'quantify over it', and discuss its causes and effects. |
15002 | If the best theory of adverbs refers to events, then our ontology should include events [Davidson, by Sider] |
Full Idea: Davidson argued that the best linguistic theory of adverbial modification assigns truth-conditions quantifying over events; thus we must embrace an ontology of events. | |
From: report of Donald Davidson (The Logical Form of Action Sentences [1967]) by Theodore Sider - Writing the Book of the World 07.8 | |
A reaction: Sider is critical and I agree. This is just the sort of linguistic manoeuvre that gets philosophy a bad name. As Yablo remarks, we have a terrible tendency to want to thingify everything. |
6237 | Fear of God is not conscience, which is a natural feeling of offence at bad behaviour [Shaftesbury] |
Full Idea: Conscience is to find horribly offensive the reflection of any unjust action or behaviour; to have awe and terror of the Deity, does not, of itself, imply conscience; …thus religious conscience supposes moral or natural conscience. | |
From: 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], II.II.I) | |
A reaction: The reply from religion would be that the Deity has implanted natural conscience in each creature, though this seems to deny our freedom of moral judgment. Personally I am inclined to think that values are just observations of the world - such as health. |
6234 | If an irrational creature with kind feelings was suddenly given reason, its reason would approve of kind feelings [Shaftesbury] |
Full Idea: If a creature wanting reason has many good qualities and affections, it is certain that if you give this creature a reflecting faculty, it will at the same instant approve of gratitude, kindness and pity. | |
From: 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], I.III.III) | |
A reaction: A wonderful denunciation of the authority of reason, which must have influenced David Hume. I think, though, that the inverse of this case must be considered (if suddenly given feelings, they would fall in line with reasoning). We reason about feelings. |
6233 | A person isn't good if only tying their hands prevents their mischief, so the affections decide a person's morality [Shaftesbury] |
Full Idea: We do not say that he is a good man when, having his hands tied up, he is hindered from doing the mischief he designs; …hence it is by affection merely that a creature is esteemed good or ill, natural or unnatural. | |
From: 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], I.II.I) | |
A reaction: Note that he more or less equates being morally 'ill' with being 'unnatural'. We tend to reserve 'unnatural' for extreme or perverse crimes. Personally I would place more emphasis on evil judgements, and less on evil feelings. |
6236 | People more obviously enjoy social pleasures than they do eating and drinking [Shaftesbury] |
Full Idea: How much the social pleasures are superior to any other may be known by visible tokens and effects; the marks and signs which attend this sort of joy are more intense and clear than those which attend the satisfaction of thirst and hunger. | |
From: 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], II.II.I) | |
A reaction: He presumably refers to smiles and laughter, but they could be misleading as they are partly a means of social communication. You should ask people whether they would prefer a nice conversation or a good pork chop. Nice point, though. |
6235 | Self-interest is not intrinsically good, but its absence is evil, as public good needs it [Shaftesbury] |
Full Idea: Though no creature can be called good merely for possessing the self-preserving affections, it is impossible that public good can be preserved without them; so that a creature wanting in them is wanting in natural rectitude, and may be esteemed vicious. | |
From: 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], II.I.III) | |
A reaction: Aristotle held a similar view (Idea 92). I think maybe Shaftesbury was the last call of the Aristotelians, before being engulfed by utilitarians and Kantians. This idea is at the core of capitalism. |
6232 | Every creature has a right and a wrong state which guide its actions, so there must be a natural end [Shaftesbury] |
Full Idea: We know there is a right and a wrong state of every creature; and that his right one is by nature forwarded, and by himself affectionately sought. There being therefore in every creature a certain interest or good; there must also be a natural end. | |
From: 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], I.II.I) | |
A reaction: This is an early modern statement of Aristotelian teleology, just at the point where it was falling out of fashion. The underlying concept is that of right function. I agree with Shaftesbury, but you can't stop someone damaging their health. |
5642 | For Shaftesbury, we must already have a conscience to be motivated to religious obedience [Shaftesbury, by Scruton] |
Full Idea: Shaftesbury argued that no morality could be founded in religious obedience, or piety. On the contrary, a man is motivated to such obedience only because conscience tells him that the divine being is worthy of it. | |
From: report of 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.8 | |
A reaction: This seems to me a good argument. The only alternative is that we are brought to God by a conscience which was planted in us by God, but then how would you know you were being obedient to the right hypnotist? |