7 ideas
17950 | The logos enables us to track one particular among a network of objects [Nehamas] |
Full Idea: The logos (the definition) is a summary statement of the path within a network of objects that one will have to follow in order to locate a particular member of that network. | |
From: Alexander Nehamas (Episteme and Logos in later Plato [1984], p.234) | |
A reaction: I like this because it confirms that Plato (as well as Aristotle) was interested in the particulars rather than in the kinds (which I take to be general truths about particulars). |
17951 | A logos may be short, but it contains reference to the whole domain of the object [Nehamas] |
Full Idea: A thing's logos, apparently short as it may be, is implicitly a very rich statement since it ultimately involves familiarity with the whole domain to which that particular object belongs. | |
From: Alexander Nehamas (Episteme and Logos in later Plato [1984], p.234) | |
A reaction: He may be wrong that the logos is short, since Aristotle (Idea 12292) says a definition can contain many assertions. |
21513 | We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing] |
Full Idea: I think it is wrong to tie down the advocates of the coherence theory to a precise definition. ...It would be altogether unreasonable to demand that the moral ideal should be exhaustively defined, and the same may be true of the ideal of thought. | |
From: A.C. Ewing (Idealism: a critical survey [1934], p.231), quoted by Erik J. Olsson - Against Coherence 7.6 | |
A reaction: I strongly agree. It is not a council of despair. I think the criteria of coherence can be articulated quite well (e.g by Thagard), and the virtues of enquiry can also be quite well specified (e.g. by Zagzebski). Very dissimilar evidence must cohere. |
21497 | If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing] |
Full Idea: Without a detailed account, coherence is reduced to the mere muttering of the word 'coherence', which can be interpreted so as to cover all arguments, but only by making its meaning so wide as to rob it of almost all significance. | |
From: A.C. Ewing (Idealism: a critical survey [1934], p.246), quoted by Erik J. Olsson - Against Coherence 2.2 | |
A reaction: I'm a fan of coherence, but it is a placeholder, involving no intrinsic or detailed theory. I just think it points to the reality of how we make judgements, especially practical ones. We can categorise the inputs, and explain the required virtues. |
7276 | All art is quite useless [Wilde] |
Full Idea: All art is quite useless. | |
From: Oscar Wilde (Preface to 'Dorian Gray' [1891]) | |
A reaction: Echoes Kant's thought that art is 'purposive without purpose'. Although I find Wilde's claims that morality has nothing to do with art to be naïve, I find this remark sympathetic. Art may play with moral feelings, but is unlikely to affect actions. |
7274 | Books are only well or badly written, not moral or immoral [Wilde] |
Full Idea: There is no such thing as a moral or an immoral book. Books are well written, or badly written. That is all. | |
From: Oscar Wilde (Preface to 'Dorian Gray' [1891]) | |
A reaction: This is simply false. Novels that are viciously (or subtly) racist, sexist, homophobic, or egotistical can obviously be immoral. I could write a nasty story about Oscar Wilde. It might, though, be very well written. If life is moral, so are novels. |
7275 | Having ethical sympathies is a bad mannerism of style in an artist [Wilde] |
Full Idea: No artist has ethical sympathies. An ethical sympathy in an artist is an unpardonable mannerism of style. | |
From: Oscar Wilde (Preface to 'Dorian Gray' [1891]) | |
A reaction: This has a Nietzschean suggestion that the artist is 'beyond good and evil', and operates on some higher level of values, which in Wilde's case seem to be purely aesthetic. You can't justify a callous murder by executing it beautifully. |