Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Idealism: a critical survey', 'Essentials of Pragmatism' and 'Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory'

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8 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
10197 An immanent universal is wholly present in more than one place [Zimmerman,DW]
     Full Idea: An immanent universal will routinely be 'at some distance from itself', in the sense that it is wholly present in more than one place.
     From: Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.306)
     A reaction: This is the Aristotelian view, which sounds distinctly implausible in this formulation. Though I suppose redness is wholly present in a tomato, in the way that fourness is wholly present in the Horsemen of the Apocalypse. How many rednesses are there?
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
10198 If only two indiscernible electrons exist, future differences must still be possible [Zimmerman,DW]
     Full Idea: If nothing existed except two electrons, which are indiscernible, it remains possible that differences will emerge later. Even if this universe has eternal symmetry, such differences are still logically, metaphysically, physically and causally possible.
     From: Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.306)
     A reaction: The question then is whether the two electrons have hidden properties that make differences possible. Zimmerman assumes that 'laws' of an indeterministic kind will do the job. I doubt that. Can differences be discerned after the event?
10199 Discernible differences at different times may just be in counterparts [Zimmerman,DW]
     Full Idea: Possible differences which may later become discernible could be treated as differences in a counterpart, which is similar to, but not identical with, the original object.
     From: Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.307)
     A reaction: [compressed] This is a reply to Idea 10198, which implies that two things could never be indiscernible over time, because of their different possibilities. One must then decide issues about rigid designation and counterparts.
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
14794 Instead of seeking Truth, we should seek belief that is beyond doubt [Peirce]
     Full Idea: Your problems would be greatly simplified, if, instead of saying that you want to know the Truth, you were simply to say that you want to attain a state of belief unassailable beyond doubt.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Essentials of Pragmatism [1905], I)
     A reaction: This is not the same as saying that belief beyond doubt IS truth. He is merely offering a strategy for scientists to side-step the sort of scepticism raised by Descartes and radical empiricists.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
21513 We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing]
     Full Idea: I think it is wrong to tie down the advocates of the coherence theory to a precise definition. ...It would be altogether unreasonable to demand that the moral ideal should be exhaustively defined, and the same may be true of the ideal of thought.
     From: A.C. Ewing (Idealism: a critical survey [1934], p.231), quoted by Erik J. Olsson - Against Coherence 7.6
     A reaction: I strongly agree. It is not a council of despair. I think the criteria of coherence can be articulated quite well (e.g by Thagard), and the virtues of enquiry can also be quite well specified (e.g. by Zagzebski). Very dissimilar evidence must cohere.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
21497 If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing]
     Full Idea: Without a detailed account, coherence is reduced to the mere muttering of the word 'coherence', which can be interpreted so as to cover all arguments, but only by making its meaning so wide as to rob it of almost all significance.
     From: A.C. Ewing (Idealism: a critical survey [1934], p.246), quoted by Erik J. Olsson - Against Coherence 2.2
     A reaction: I'm a fan of coherence, but it is a placeholder, involving no intrinsic or detailed theory. I just think it points to the reality of how we make judgements, especially practical ones. We can categorise the inputs, and explain the required virtues.
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
14792 A 'conception', the rational implication of a word, lies in its bearing upon the conduct of life [Peirce]
     Full Idea: The present writer framed the theory that a 'conception', that is, the rational purport of a word or other expression, lies exclusively in its conceivable bearing upon the conduct of life.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Essentials of Pragmatism [1905], I)
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
14793 The definition of a concept is just its experimental implications [Peirce]
     Full Idea: If one can define accurately all the conceivable experimental phenomena which the affirmation or denial of a concept could imply, one will have therein a complete definition of the concept, and there is absolutely nothing more in it.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Essentials of Pragmatism [1905], I)
     A reaction: Strictly, I would have thought you could only affirm or deny a complete proposition, rather than a concept. What should I do with the concept of a 'unicorn'? Note that all theories, such as empiricism or pragmatism, begin with an account of our concepts.