Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Definition of Good', 'The Method of Truth in Metaphysics' and 'Reply to Foucher'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

4 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
19406 I strongly believe in the actual infinite, which indicates the perfections of its author [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: I am so much for the actual infinite that instead of admitting that nature abhors it, as is commonly said, I hold that it affects nature everywhere in order to indicate the perfections of its author.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reply to Foucher [1693], p.99)
     A reaction: I would have thought that, for Leibniz, while infinities indicate the perfections of their author, that is not the reason why they exist. God wasn't, presumably, showing off. Leibniz does not think we can actually know these infinities.
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
4042 Metaphysics requires the idea of people (speakers) located in space and time [Davidson]
     Full Idea: An intelligible metaphysics will assign a central place to the idea of people (= speakers) with a location in public space and time.
     From: Donald Davidson (The Method of Truth in Metaphysics [1977], §III)
     A reaction: The 'location' is the interesting bit, requiring people to be bodies, not abstractions. A big, plausible claim, but hard to prove.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
4041 Sentences held true determine the meanings of the words they contain [Davidson]
     Full Idea: Sentences held true (the linguistic representatives of beliefs) determine the meanings of the words they contain.
     From: Donald Davidson (The Method of Truth in Metaphysics [1977], §II)
     A reaction: Maybe. Historically, truth and belief presumably precede words and sentences. But words separate off from beliefs very easily. I'm not convinced. Words initiate language, not beliefs?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
18671 The ground for an attitude is not a thing's 'goodness', but its concrete characteristics [Ewing]
     Full Idea: The ground for an attitude lies not in some other ethical concept, goodness, but in the concrete, factual characteristics of what we pronounce good. ...We shall not be better off if we interpolate an indefinable characteristic of goodness besides.
     From: A.C. Ewing (The Definition of Good [1948], p.172), quoted by Francesco Orsi - Value Theory 1.4
     A reaction: This is a forerunner of Scanlon's Buck-Passing theory of the source of value (in other properties). I approve of this approach. If I say 'actually this very strong cheese is really good', I'm not adding goodness to the cheese.