16 ideas
6396 | A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief [Davidson] |
Full Idea: A sentence is held true because of two factors: what the holder takes the sentence to mean, and what he believes. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Thought and Talk [1975], p.20) | |
A reaction: A key question is whether a belief (e.g. an imagistic one, or one held by an animal) could be true, even though no sentence is involved. Linguistic philosophers tend to avoid this question, or assume the answer is 'no'. |
21695 | The set scheme discredited by paradoxes is actually the most natural one [Quine] |
Full Idea: Each proposed revision of set theory is unnatural, because the natural scheme is the unrestricted one that the antinomies discredit. | |
From: Willard Quine (The Ways of Paradox [1961], p.16) | |
A reaction: You can either takes this free-far-all version of set theory, and gradually restrain it for each specific problem, or start from scratch and build up in safe steps. The latter is (I think) the 'iterated' approach. |
21693 | Russell's antinomy challenged the idea that any condition can produce a set [Quine] |
Full Idea: In the case of Russell's antinomy, the tacit and trusted pattern of reasoning that is found wanting is this: for any condition you can formulate, there is a class whose members are the things meeting the condition. | |
From: Willard Quine (The Ways of Paradox [1961], p.11) | |
A reaction: This is why Russell's Paradox is so important for set theory, which in turn makes it important for the foundations of mathematics. |
21691 | Antinomies contradict accepted ways of reasoning, and demand revisions [Quine] |
Full Idea: An 'antinomy' produces a self-contradiction by accepted ways of reasoning. It establishes that some tacit and trusted pattern of reasoning must be made explicit and henceforward be avoided or revised. | |
From: Willard Quine (The Ways of Paradox [1961], p.05) | |
A reaction: Quine treats antinomies as of much greater importance than mere paradoxes. It is often possible to give simple explanations of paradoxes, but antinomies go to the root of our belief system. This was presumably Kant's intended meaning. |
21690 | Whenever the pursuer reaches the spot where the pursuer has been, the pursued has moved on [Quine] |
Full Idea: The Achilles argument is that (if the front runner keeps running) each time the pursuer reaches a spot where the pursuer has been, the pursued has moved a bit beyond. | |
From: Willard Quine (The Ways of Paradox [1961], p.03) | |
A reaction: Quine is always wonderfully lucid, and this is the clearest simple statement of the paradox. |
21689 | A barber shaves only those who do not shave themselves. So does he shave himself? [Quine] |
Full Idea: In a certain village there is a barber, who shaves all and only those men in the village who do not shave themselves. So does the barber shave himself? The barber shaves himself if and only if he does not shave himself. | |
From: Willard Quine (The Ways of Paradox [1961], p.02) | |
A reaction: [Russell himself quoted this version of his paradox, from an unnamed source] Quine treats his as trivial because it only concerns barbers, but the full Russell paradox is a major 'antinomy', because it concerns sets. |
21694 | Membership conditions which involve membership and non-membership are paradoxical [Quine] |
Full Idea: With Russell's antinomy, ...each tie the trouble comes of taking a membership condition that itself talks in turn of membership and non-membership. | |
From: Willard Quine (The Ways of Paradox [1961], p.13) | |
A reaction: Hence various stipulations to rule out vicious circles or referring to sets of the 'wrong type' are invoked to cure the problem. The big question is how strong to make the restrictions. |
21692 | If we write it as '"this sentence is false" is false', there is no paradox [Quine] |
Full Idea: If we supplant the sentence 'this sentence is false' with one saying what it refers to, we get '"this sentence is false" is false'. But then the whole outside sentence attributes falsity no longer to itself but to something else, so there is no paradox. | |
From: Willard Quine (The Ways of Paradox [1961], p.07) | |
A reaction: Quine is pointing us towards type theory and meta-languages to solve the problem. We now have the Revenge Liar, and the problem has not been fully settled. |
11145 | Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Someone cannot have a belief unless he understands the possibility of being mistaken. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Thought and Talk [1975], p.170) | |
A reaction: If you pretend to throw a ball for a dog, but don't release it, the dog experiences being mistaken very dramatically. |
6397 | The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community [Davidson] |
Full Idea: We have the idea of belief from its role in the interpretation of language; as a private attitude it is not intelligible except in relation to public language. So a creature must be a member of a speech community to have the concept of belief. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Thought and Talk [1975], p.22) | |
A reaction: This shows how Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument (e.g. Idea 4152) hovers behind Davidson's philosophy. The idea is quite persuasive. A solitary creature just follows its mental states. The question of whether it believes them is a meta-thought. |
6392 | Thought depends on speech [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The thesis I want to refine and then argue for is that thought depends on speech. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Thought and Talk [1975], p.8) | |
A reaction: This has the instant and rather implausible implication that animals don't think. He is not, of course, saying that all thought is speech, which would leave out thinking in images. You can't do much proper thought without concepts and propositions. |
6393 | A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech [Davidson] |
Full Idea: A creature cannot have a thought unless it is an interpreter of the speech of another. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Thought and Talk [1975], p.9) | |
A reaction: His use of the word 'creature' shows that he is perfectly aware of the issue of whether animals think, and he is, presumably, denying it. At first glance this sounds silly, but maybe animals don't really 'think', in our sense of the word. |
11144 | Concepts are only possible in a language community [Davidson] |
Full Idea: A private attitude is not intelligible except as an adjustment to the public norms provided by language. It follows that a creature must be a member of speech community if it is to have the concept of belief. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Thought and Talk [1975], p.170) | |
A reaction: This obviously draws on Wittgenstein's private language argument, and strikes me as blatantly wrong, because I take higher animals to have concepts without language. Pure vision gives rise to concepts. I don't even think they are necessarily conscious. |
6395 | An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Once a sentence is understood, an utterance of it may be used to serve almost any extra-linguistic purpose; an instrument that could be put to only one use would lack autonomy of meaning, which means it should not be counted as language. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Thought and Talk [1975], p.17) | |
A reaction: I find this point very appealing, in opposition to the Wittgenstein view of meaning as use. Passwords seem to me a striking case of the separation of meaning and use. I like the phrase 'autonomy of meaning'. Random sticks can form a word. |
6394 | The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Although most utterances are not concerned with truth, it is the pattern of sentences held true that gives sentences their meaning. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Thought and Talk [1975], p.14) | |
A reaction: Davidson's distinctive version of meaning holism, as opposed to Quine's rather behaviouristic version. I agree that we relate to people through the pattern of sentences they hold true, but I am unconvinced that this 'gives sentences their meaning'. |
18671 | The ground for an attitude is not a thing's 'goodness', but its concrete characteristics [Ewing] |
Full Idea: The ground for an attitude lies not in some other ethical concept, goodness, but in the concrete, factual characteristics of what we pronounce good. ...We shall not be better off if we interpolate an indefinable characteristic of goodness besides. | |
From: A.C. Ewing (The Definition of Good [1948], p.172), quoted by Francesco Orsi - Value Theory 1.4 | |
A reaction: This is a forerunner of Scanlon's Buck-Passing theory of the source of value (in other properties). I approve of this approach. If I say 'actually this very strong cheese is really good', I'm not adding goodness to the cheese. |