Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Idealism: a critical survey', 'The Structure of Science' and 'The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme'

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7 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers

19044	Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson]
	Full Idea: The notion of fitting the totality of experience ...adds nothing intelligible to the simple concept of being true. ....Nothing, ...no thing, makes sentences and theories true: not experience, not surface irritations, not the world.
	From: Donald Davidson (The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme [1974], p.11), quoted by Willard Quine - On the Very Idea of a Third Dogma p.39
	A reaction: If you don't have a concept of what normally makes a sentence true, I don't see how you go about distinguishing what is true from what is false. You can't just examine the sentence to see if it has the 'primitive' property of truth. Holism is involved....

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction

3425	Reduction has been defined as deriving one theory from another by logic and maths [Nagel,E, by Kim]
	Full Idea: Ernest Nagel defines reduction as the possibility of deriving all laws of one theory by logic and mathematics to another theory, with appropriate 'bridging principles' (either definitions, or empirical laws) connecting the expressions of the two theories.
	From: report of Ernest Nagel (The Structure of Science [1961]) by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.213
	A reaction: This has been labelled as 'weak' reduction, where 'strong' reduction would be identity, as when lightning is reduced to electrical discharge. You reduce x by showing that it is y in disguise.

12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique

6400	Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson]
	Full Idea: The third dogma of empiricism is the dualism of scheme and content, of organizing system and something waiting to be organized, which cannot be made intelligible and defensible. If we give it up, it is not clear that any distinctive empiricism remains.
	From: Donald Davidson (The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme [1974], p.189)
	A reaction: The first two dogmas were 'analyticity' and 'reductionism', as identified by Quine in 1953. Presumably Hume's Principles of Association (Idea 2189) would be an example of a scheme. A key issue is whether there is any 'pure' content.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism

21513	We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing]
	Full Idea: I think it is wrong to tie down the advocates of the coherence theory to a precise definition. ...It would be altogether unreasonable to demand that the moral ideal should be exhaustively defined, and the same may be true of the ideal of thought.
	From: A.C. Ewing (Idealism: a critical survey [1934], p.231), quoted by Erik J. Olsson - Against Coherence 7.6
	A reaction: I strongly agree. It is not a council of despair. I think the criteria of coherence can be articulated quite well (e.g by Thagard), and the virtues of enquiry can also be quite well specified (e.g. by Zagzebski). Very dissimilar evidence must cohere.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique

21497	If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing]
	Full Idea: Without a detailed account, coherence is reduced to the mere muttering of the word 'coherence', which can be interpreted so as to cover all arguments, but only by making its meaning so wide as to rob it of almost all significance.
	From: A.C. Ewing (Idealism: a critical survey [1934], p.246), quoted by Erik J. Olsson - Against Coherence 2.2
	A reaction: I'm a fan of coherence, but it is a placeholder, involving no intrinsic or detailed theory. I just think it points to the reality of how we make judgements, especially practical ones. We can categorise the inputs, and explain the required virtues.

13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique

6398	Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson]
	Full Idea: Different points of view make sense, but only if there is a common co-ordinate system on which to plot them.
	From: Donald Davidson (The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme [1974], p.184)
	A reaction: This seems right to me. I am very struck by the close similarities between people from wildly differing cultural backgrounds, as seen, for example, at the Olympic Games.

19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation

6399	Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson]
	Full Idea: Studying the criteria of translation is a way of focusing on criteria of identity for conceptual schemes.
	From: Donald Davidson (The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme [1974], p.184)
	A reaction: This is why it was an inspired idea of Quine's to make translation a central topic in philosophy. We must be cautious, though, about saying that the language is the conceptual scheme, as that leaves animals with no scheme at all.