4 ideas
3157 | T.H.Huxley gave the earliest clear statement of epiphenomenalism [Huxley, by Rey] |
Full Idea: T.H.Huxley gave the earliest clear statement of epiphenomenalism. | |
From: report of T.H. Huxley (Method and Results [1893]) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 3.1.1 | |
A reaction: This is, of course, impossible, because there can't be a clear statement of epiphenomenalism. |
3154 | Brain causes mind, but it doesn't seem that mind causes actions [Huxley] |
Full Idea: All states of consciousness are caused by molecular changes of brain substance. It seems to me there is no proof that any state of consciousness is the cause of change in the motion of the matter of the organism. | |
From: T.H. Huxley (Method and Results [1893], p.244), quoted by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 3.1.1 | |
A reaction: This sounds odd. Most people would say there is nothing more obvious than mental events causing actions. It certainly seems undeniable that actions are cause by the contents of thoughts, so a molecular account of intentional states is needed. |
22688 | The Aristotelian idea that choices can be perceived needs literary texts to expound it [Nussbaum] |
Full Idea: To show forth the Aristotelian claim that 'the decision rests with perception', we need - either side by side with a philosophical outline or inside it - literary texts which display the complexity, indeterminacy, and sheer difficulty of moral choice. | |
From: Martha Nussbaum (The Golden Bowl, and Lit as Moral Philosophy [1983], II) | |
A reaction: Berys Gaut observes that this depends on a particularist view of moral choice (usually seen as Aristotelian), with little interest in principles. |
18671 | The ground for an attitude is not a thing's 'goodness', but its concrete characteristics [Ewing] |
Full Idea: The ground for an attitude lies not in some other ethical concept, goodness, but in the concrete, factual characteristics of what we pronounce good. ...We shall not be better off if we interpolate an indefinable characteristic of goodness besides. | |
From: A.C. Ewing (The Definition of Good [1948], p.172), quoted by Francesco Orsi - Value Theory 1.4 | |
A reaction: This is a forerunner of Scanlon's Buck-Passing theory of the source of value (in other properties). I approve of this approach. If I say 'actually this very strong cheese is really good', I'm not adding goodness to the cheese. |