Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Idealism: a critical survey', 'Truth' and 'On the Reality of Accidents'

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8 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis

10838	To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett]
	Full Idea: We cannot in general suppose that we give a proper account of a concept by describing those circumstance in which we do, and those in which we do not, make use of the relevant word. We explain the point of the concept, what we use the word for.
	From: Michael Dummett (Truth [1959], p.231)
	A reaction: Well said. I am beginning to develop a campaign to make sure that analytical philosophy focuses on understanding concepts (in a full 'logos' sort of way), and doesn't just settle for logical form or definition or rules of usage.

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth

10837	It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett]
	Full Idea: It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements.
	From: Michael Dummett (Truth [1959], p.231)
	A reaction: This strikes me as a rather contentious but very interesting claim. An even stronger claim might be that its value (its normative force) is ALL that the concept of truth contributes to speech, other aspects being analysed into something else.

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth

10840	We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett]
	Full Idea: For a particular bounded language, if it is free of ambiguity and inconsistency, it must be possible to characterize the true sentences of the language; somewhat as, for a given game, we can say which moves are winning moves.
	From: Michael Dummett (Truth [1959], p.237)
	A reaction: The background of this sounds rather like Tarski, with truth just being a baton passed from one part of the language to another, though Dummett adds the very un-Tarskian notion that truth has a value.

3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth

19171	Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson]
	Full Idea: Tarski's definition of truth is like giving a definition of what it is to win in various games, without giving a hint as to what winning is (e.g. that it is what one tries to do when playing).
	From: report of Michael Dummett (Truth [1959]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 7
	A reaction: This led Dummett to his 'normative' account of truth. Formally, the fact that speakers usually aim at truth seems irrelevant, but in life you certainly wouldn't have grasped truth if you thought falsehood was just as satisfactory. The world is involved.

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism

19382	Abstracta are abbreviated ways of talking; there are just substances, and truths about them [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: I consider abstracta not as real things but as abbreviated ways of talking ...and to that extent I am a nominalist, at least provisionally ...It suffices to posit only substances as real things, and, to assert truths about these.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Reality of Accidents [1688]), quoted by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz
	A reaction: I am a modern nominalist, in my hostility to a serious ontological commitment to abstracta. You get into trouble, though, if you say there are only objects or substances. Physics says reality may all be 'fields', or something.... 'Truths' is good.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism

21513	We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing]
	Full Idea: I think it is wrong to tie down the advocates of the coherence theory to a precise definition. ...It would be altogether unreasonable to demand that the moral ideal should be exhaustively defined, and the same may be true of the ideal of thought.
	From: A.C. Ewing (Idealism: a critical survey [1934], p.231), quoted by Erik J. Olsson - Against Coherence 7.6
	A reaction: I strongly agree. It is not a council of despair. I think the criteria of coherence can be articulated quite well (e.g by Thagard), and the virtues of enquiry can also be quite well specified (e.g. by Zagzebski). Very dissimilar evidence must cohere.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique

21497	If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing]
	Full Idea: Without a detailed account, coherence is reduced to the mere muttering of the word 'coherence', which can be interpreted so as to cover all arguments, but only by making its meaning so wide as to rob it of almost all significance.
	From: A.C. Ewing (Idealism: a critical survey [1934], p.246), quoted by Erik J. Olsson - Against Coherence 2.2
	A reaction: I'm a fan of coherence, but it is a placeholder, involving no intrinsic or detailed theory. I just think it points to the reality of how we make judgements, especially practical ones. We can categorise the inputs, and explain the required virtues.

18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought

10839	You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett]
	Full Idea: One could train a dog to bark only when a bell rang and a light shone without presupposing that it possessed the concept of conjunction.
	From: Michael Dummett (Truth [1959], p.235)