Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Idealism: a critical survey', 'Moral Luck' and 'Frege'

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5 ideas

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic

7726	Aristotelian logic dealt with inferences about concepts, and there were also proposition inferences [Weiner]
	Full Idea: Till the nineteenth century, it was a common view that Aristotelian logic could evaluate inferences whose validity was based on relations between concepts, while propositional logic could evaluate inferences based on relations between propositions.
	From: Joan Weiner (Frege [1999], Ch.3)
	A reaction: Venn diagrams relate closely to Aristotelian syllogisms, as each concept is represented by a circle, and shows relations between sets. Arrows seem needed to represent how to go from one proposition to another. Is one static, the other dynamic?

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism

21513	We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing]
	Full Idea: I think it is wrong to tie down the advocates of the coherence theory to a precise definition. ...It would be altogether unreasonable to demand that the moral ideal should be exhaustively defined, and the same may be true of the ideal of thought.
	From: A.C. Ewing (Idealism: a critical survey [1934], p.231), quoted by Erik J. Olsson - Against Coherence 7.6
	A reaction: I strongly agree. It is not a council of despair. I think the criteria of coherence can be articulated quite well (e.g by Thagard), and the virtues of enquiry can also be quite well specified (e.g. by Zagzebski). Very dissimilar evidence must cohere.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique

21497	If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing]
	Full Idea: Without a detailed account, coherence is reduced to the mere muttering of the word 'coherence', which can be interpreted so as to cover all arguments, but only by making its meaning so wide as to rob it of almost all significance.
	From: A.C. Ewing (Idealism: a critical survey [1934], p.246), quoted by Erik J. Olsson - Against Coherence 2.2
	A reaction: I'm a fan of coherence, but it is a placeholder, involving no intrinsic or detailed theory. I just think it points to the reality of how we make judgements, especially practical ones. We can categorise the inputs, and explain the required virtues.

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs

3271	We can't control our own beliefs [Nagel]
	Full Idea: Our beliefs are always due to factors outside of our control.
	From: Thomas Nagel (Moral Luck [1976], p.27)

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck

3272	Moral luck can arise in character, preconditions, actual circumstances, and outcome [Nagel]
	Full Idea: Moral luck involves one's character, the antecedent circumstances of the act, the actual circumstances of the act, and the outcome of the act.
	From: Thomas Nagel (Moral Luck [1976], p.28)
	A reaction: Meaning, I take it, that there can be luck in any one of those four. A neat slicing up that doesn't quite fit the real world, where things flow. Helpful, though.