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19377
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A monad and its body are living, so life is everywhere, and comes in infinite degrees [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
Each monad, together with a particular body, makes up a living substance. Thus, there is not only life everywhere, joined to limbs or organs, but there are also infinite degrees of life in the monads, some dominating more or less over others.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], 4)
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A reaction:
Two key ideas: that each monad is linked to a body (which is presumably passive), and the infinite degrees of life in monads. Thus rocks consist of monads, but at an exceedingly low degree of life. They are stubborn and responsive.
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10243
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My ontology is quarks etc., classes of such things, classes of such classes etc. [Quine]
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Full Idea:
My tentative ontology continues to consist of quarks and their compounds, also classes of such things, classes of such classes, and so on.
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From:
Willard Quine (Structure and Nature [1992], p.9), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 4.9
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A reaction:
I would call this the Hierarchy of Abstraction (just coined it - what do you think?). Unlike Quine, I don't see why its ontology should include things called 'sets' in addition to the things that make them up.
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19353
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'Perception' is basic internal representation, and 'apperception' is reflective knowledge of perception [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
We distinguish between 'perception', the internal state of the monad representing external things, and 'apperception', which is consciousness, or the reflective knowledge of this internal state, not given to all souls, nor at all times to a given soul.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], §4)
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A reaction:
The word 'apperception' is standard in Kant. I find it surprising that modern analytic philosophers don't seem to use it when they write about perception. It strikes me as useful, but maybe specialists have a reason for avoiding it.
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21497
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If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing]
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Full Idea:
Without a detailed account, coherence is reduced to the mere muttering of the word 'coherence', which can be interpreted so as to cover all arguments, but only by making its meaning so wide as to rob it of almost all significance.
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From:
A.C. Ewing (Idealism: a critical survey [1934], p.246), quoted by Erik J. Olsson - Against Coherence 2.2
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A reaction:
I'm a fan of coherence, but it is a placeholder, involving no intrinsic or detailed theory. I just think it points to the reality of how we make judgements, especially practical ones. We can categorise the inputs, and explain the required virtues.
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5061
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Animals are semi-rational because they connect facts, but they don't see causes [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
There is a connexion between the perceptions of animals, which bears some resemblance to reason: but it is based only on the memory of facts or effects, and not at all on the knowledge of causes.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], §5)
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A reaction:
This amounts to the view that animals can do Humean induction (where you see regularities), but not Leibnizian induction (where you see necessities). I say all minds perceive patterns, but only humans can think about the patterns they have perceived.
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