Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Idealism: a critical survey', 'Propositional Objects' and 'The General Theory of Employment'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

7 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism

18969	How do you distinguish three beliefs from four beliefs or two beliefs? [Quine]
	Full Idea: Suppose I say that I have given up precisely three beliefs since lunch. An over-coarse individuation could reduce the number to two, and an over-fine one could raise it to four.
	From: Willard Quine (Propositional Objects [1965], p.144)
	A reaction: Obviously if you ask how many beliefs I hold, it would be crazy to give a precise answer. But if I search for my cat, I give up my belief that it is in the kitchen, in the lounge and in the bathroom. That's precise enough to be three beliefs, I think.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism

21513	We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing]
	Full Idea: I think it is wrong to tie down the advocates of the coherence theory to a precise definition. ...It would be altogether unreasonable to demand that the moral ideal should be exhaustively defined, and the same may be true of the ideal of thought.
	From: A.C. Ewing (Idealism: a critical survey [1934], p.231), quoted by Erik J. Olsson - Against Coherence 7.6
	A reaction: I strongly agree. It is not a council of despair. I think the criteria of coherence can be articulated quite well (e.g by Thagard), and the virtues of enquiry can also be quite well specified (e.g. by Zagzebski). Very dissimilar evidence must cohere.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique

21497	If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing]
	Full Idea: Without a detailed account, coherence is reduced to the mere muttering of the word 'coherence', which can be interpreted so as to cover all arguments, but only by making its meaning so wide as to rob it of almost all significance.
	From: A.C. Ewing (Idealism: a critical survey [1934], p.246), quoted by Erik J. Olsson - Against Coherence 2.2
	A reaction: I'm a fan of coherence, but it is a placeholder, involving no intrinsic or detailed theory. I just think it points to the reality of how we make judgements, especially practical ones. We can categorise the inputs, and explain the required virtues.

19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense

18967	A 'proposition' is said to be the timeless cognitive part of the meaning of a sentence [Quine]
	Full Idea: A 'proposition' is the meaning of a sentence. More precisely, since propositions are supposed to be true or false once and for all, it is the meaning of an eternal sentence. More precisely still, it is the 'cognitive' meaning, involving truth, not poetry.
	From: Willard Quine (Propositional Objects [1965], p.139)
	A reaction: Quine defines this in order to attack it. I equate a proposition with a thought, and take a sentence to be an attempt to express a proposition. I have no idea why they are supposed to be 'timeless'. Philosophers have some very odd ideas.

19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique

18968	The problem with propositions is their individuation. When do two sentences express one proposition? [Quine]
	Full Idea: The trouble with propositions, as cognitive meanings of eternal sentences, is individuation. Given two eternal sentences, themselves visibly different linguistically, it is not sufficiently clear under when to say that they mean the same proposition.
	From: Willard Quine (Propositional Objects [1965], p.140)
	A reaction: If a group of people agree that two sentences mean the same thing, which happens all the time, I don't see what gives Quine the right to have a philosophical moan about some dubious activity called 'individuation'.

24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism

22601	Laissez-faire individualism doesn't work, especially in troublesome times [Keynes]
	Full Idea: It is obvious that an individualist society left to itself does not work well or even tolerably. The more troublesome the times, the worse does a laissez-faire system work.
	From: Maynard Keynes (The General Theory of Employment [1936]), quoted by Ian Dunt - How to be a Liberal 7
	A reaction: I thought I was a Communitarian, but I may be a Keynesian Liberal, committed to a safety net welfare system. I haven't quite decided yet. Political philosophy is hopeless, if the ideas actually have to be implemented. What is the criterion of 'work'?

27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space

18970	The concept of a 'point' makes no sense without the idea of absolute position [Quine]
	Full Idea: Unless we are prepared to believe that absolute position makes sense, the very idea of a point as an entity in its own right must be rejected as not merely mysterious but absurd.
	From: Willard Quine (Propositional Objects [1965], p.149)
	A reaction: The fact that without absolute position we can only think of 'points' as relative to a conceptual grid doesn't stop the grid from picking out actual locations in space, as shown by latitude and longitude.