Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Idealism: a critical survey', 'Prologue to Ordinatio' and '12: Colossians'

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy [Paul]
     Full Idea: Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy.
     From: St Paul (12: Colossians [c.55], 2.8)
     A reaction: The same might be said of preaching. The two sorts of spoiling seem to be fanaticism and wickedness. While reason can lead to fanaticism, I believe (with Socrates) that it is unlikely to corrupt morally.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Our intellect only assents to what we believe to be true [William of Ockham]
     Full Idea: Our intellect does not assent to anything unless we believe it to be true.
     From: William of Ockham (Prologue to Ordinatio [1320], Q 1 N sqq)
     A reaction: This strikes me as being a much more accurate and commonsense view of belief than that of Hume, who simply views it phenomenologically. ...But then the remark appears to be circular. Belief requires a belief that it is true. Hm.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing]
     Full Idea: I think it is wrong to tie down the advocates of the coherence theory to a precise definition. ...It would be altogether unreasonable to demand that the moral ideal should be exhaustively defined, and the same may be true of the ideal of thought.
     From: A.C. Ewing (Idealism: a critical survey [1934], p.231), quoted by Erik J. Olsson - Against Coherence 7.6
     A reaction: I strongly agree. It is not a council of despair. I think the criteria of coherence can be articulated quite well (e.g by Thagard), and the virtues of enquiry can also be quite well specified (e.g. by Zagzebski). Very dissimilar evidence must cohere.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing]
     Full Idea: Without a detailed account, coherence is reduced to the mere muttering of the word 'coherence', which can be interpreted so as to cover all arguments, but only by making its meaning so wide as to rob it of almost all significance.
     From: A.C. Ewing (Idealism: a critical survey [1934], p.246), quoted by Erik J. Olsson - Against Coherence 2.2
     A reaction: I'm a fan of coherence, but it is a placeholder, involving no intrinsic or detailed theory. I just think it points to the reality of how we make judgements, especially practical ones. We can categorise the inputs, and explain the required virtues.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Abstractive cognition knows universals abstracted from many singulars [William of Ockham]
     Full Idea: Abstractive cognition (in one sense) relates to something abstracted from many singulars; and in this sense abstractive cognition is nothing else but cognition of a universal which can be abstracted from many things.
     From: William of Ockham (Prologue to Ordinatio [1320], Q 1 N sqq)
     A reaction: This strikes me as being correct common sense, even though it has become deeply unfashionable since Frege. We may not be able to see quite how the mind manages to see universals in a bunch of objects, but there is no better story.