21 ideas
| 7823 | Lucretius was rediscovered in 1417 [Grayling] |
| Full Idea: Lucretius's 'De Rerum Natura' was rediscovered in 1417, after languishing forgotten for six centuries. | |
| From: A.C. Grayling (What is Good? [2003], Ch.5) | |
| A reaction: A wonder. Is it the greatest book of the ancient world - because it partially preserves the lost philosophy of great Democritus? |
| 21406 | Because there is only one human reason, there can only be one true philosophy from principles [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Considered objectively, there can only be one human reason, there cannot be many philosophies; in other words, there can only be one true philosophy from principles, in however many conflicting ways men have philosophised about the same proposition. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], Pref) | |
| A reaction: An idea that embodies the Enlightenment ideal. I like the idea that there is one true philosophy, because there is only one world. Kant is talking of philosophy 'from principles', which means his transendental idealism. |
| 9987 | An aggregate in which order does not matter I call a 'set' [Bolzano] |
| Full Idea: An aggregate whose basic conception renders the arrangement of its members a matter of indifference, and whose permutation therefore produces no essential difference, I call a 'set'. | |
| From: Bernard Bolzano (Paradoxes of the Infinite [1846], §4), quoted by William W. Tait - Frege versus Cantor and Dedekind IX | |
| A reaction: The idea of 'sets' was emerging before Cantor formalised it, and clarified it by thinking about infinite sets. Nowadays we also have 'ordered' sets, which rather contradicts Bolzano, and we also expect the cardinality to be determinate. |
| 10856 | A truly infinite quantity does not need to be a variable [Bolzano] |
| Full Idea: A truly infinite quantity (for example, the length of a straight line, unbounded in either direction) does not by any means need to be a variable. | |
| From: Bernard Bolzano (Paradoxes of the Infinite [1846]), quoted by Brian Clegg - Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable §10 | |
| A reaction: This is an important idea, followed up by Cantor, which relegated to the sidelines the view of infinity as simply something that could increase without limit. Personally I like the old view, but there is something mathematically stable about infinity. |
| 21081 | We are equipped with the a priori intuitions needed for the concept of right [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Reason has taken care that the understanding is as fully equipped as possible with a priori intuitions for the construction of the concept of right. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], Intro E) | |
| A reaction: A priori intuitions are not the same as innate knowledge or innate concepts, but they must require some sort of inbuilt inner resources. Further evidence that Kant is a rationalist philosopher (if we were unsure). |
| 7809 | In an honour code shame is the supreme punishment, and revenge is a duty [Grayling] |
| Full Idea: An honour code is one in which the greatest punishment is shame, and in which revenge is a duty. | |
| From: A.C. Grayling (What is Good? [2003], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: Is this really what Nietzsche wanted to revive? Shame isn't a private matter - it needs solidarity of values in the community, and contempt for dishonour, so that it becomes everyone's worst fear. |
| 21082 | A power-based state of nature may not be unjust, but there is no justice without competent judges [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The state of nature need not be a state of injustice merely because those who live in it treat one another in terms of power. But it is devoid of justice, for if a dispute over right occurs in it, there is no competent judge to give valid decisions. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §44) | |
| A reaction: Could you not achieve justice by means of personal violence? Might not a revered older person have been accepted as a judge? |
| 21089 | Monarchs have the highest power; autocrats have complete power [Kant] |
| Full Idea: A monarch has the highest power, while an autocrat or absolute ruler is one who has all the power. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §51) | |
| A reaction: If society is strictly hierarchical (like an army) then the monarch also has all the power. At the other extreme the one holding the highest power may have very little power, because so many others have their share of the power. |
| 21086 | Hereditary nobility has not been earned, and probably won't be earned [Kant] |
| Full Idea: A hereditary nobility is a distinction bestowed before it is earned, and since it gives no ground for hoping that it will be earned, it is wholly unreal and fanciful. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §49 Gen D) | |
| A reaction: As the controller of the region of a country, a hereditary noble is the embodiment of a ruling family, which is a well established way of running things. Daft, perhaps, but there are probably worse ways of doing it. Single combat, for example. |
| 21080 | Actions are right if the maxim respects universal mutual freedoms [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Every action which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each individual's will to co-exist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law is right. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], Intro C) | |
| A reaction: This idea shows the moral basis for Kant's liberalism in politics. If all individuals acted without contact or reference to other individuals (a race of hermits) then that would appear to be optimum moral right, by this standard. |
| 21083 | Women have no role in politics [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Women in general …have no civil personality. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §46) | |
| A reaction: In case you were wondering. This is five years after Mary Wollstonecraft's book. |
| 21407 | Equality is not being bound in ways you cannot bind others [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Our innate equality is independence from being bound by others to more than one can in turn bind them. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], Div B) | |
| A reaction: This doesn't seem to capture the whole concept. The two of us may be unequally oppressed by a third. We are unequal with the third, but also with one another, though with no binding relationships. |
| 21084 | In the contract people lose their rights, but immediately regain them, in the new commonwealth [Kant] |
| Full Idea: By the original contract all members of the people give up their external freedom in order to receive it back at once as members of a commonweath. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §47) | |
| A reaction: This tries to give the impression that absolutely nothing is lost in the original alienation of rights. It is probably better to say that you give up one set of freedoms, which are replaced by a different (and presumably superior) set. |
| 21090 | If someone has largely made something, then they own it [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Whatever someone has himself substantially made is his own undisputed property. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §55) | |
| A reaction: To this extent Kant offers clear agreement with Locke about a self-evident property right. Ownership of land is the controversial bit. |
| 21087 | Human life is pointless without justice [Kant] |
| Full Idea: If justice perishes, there is no further point in men living on earth. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §49 Gen E) | |
| A reaction: I suspect that human life is also pointless if it only involves justice, and nothing else worthwhile. Are there other things so good that we might sacrifice justice to achieve them? How about maximal utilitarian happiness? |
| 21088 | Justice asserts the death penalty for murder, from a priori laws [Kant] |
| Full Idea: All murderers …must suffer the death penalty. This is what justice, as the idea of judicial power, wills in accordance with universal laws of a priori origin. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §49 Gen E) | |
| A reaction: Illustration of how giving a principle an a priori origin puts it beyond dispute. Kant is adamant that mercy mustn't interfere with the enactment of justice. And Kant obviously rejects any consequentialist approach. Remind me what is wrong with murder? |
| 21085 | The church has a political role, by offering a supreme power over people [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The church [as opposed to religion] fulfils a genuine political necessity, for it enables the people to regard themselves as subjects of an invisible supreme power to which they must pay homage. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], §49 Gen C) | |
| A reaction: I'm sure I remember Marx putting a different spin on this point… This idea captures the conservative attitude to established religion, at least in the UK. |
| 7824 | If suicide is lawful, but assisting suicide is unlawful, powerless people are denied their rights [Grayling] |
| Full Idea: An anomaly created by England's 1961 Suicide Act is that it is lawful to take one's own life, but unlawful to help anyone else to do it. This means anyone unable to commit suicide without help is denied one of their fundamental rights. | |
| From: A.C. Grayling (What is Good? [2003], Ch.8) | |
| A reaction: There is a difference, not really captured either by law or by reason, between tolerating an activity, and encouraging and helping it. I think the test question is "this activity is legal, but would you want your child to do it?" |
| 7819 | Religion gives answers, comforts, creates social order, and panders to superstition [Grayling] |
| Full Idea: The four standard explanations given for religion are that it provides answer, that it gives comfort, that it makes for social order, and that it rests on mere superstition. | |
| From: A.C. Grayling (What is Good? [2003], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: All four of these could be correct, though the first and fourth would be incompatible if religion gives correct answers. Why religion begins might be not the same as the reason why it continues. |
| 7817 | To make an afterlife appealing, this life has to be denigrated [Grayling] |
| Full Idea: It is remarkable how much the life of this world has to be denigrated to make the promise of happiness after death appealing. | |
| From: A.C. Grayling (What is Good? [2003], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be true of most religions, but it could be otherwise. Surely you want such a wonderful life to continue after death? But then you would not be obliged to do anything difficult to achieve immortality. Power comes into it... |
| 7818 | In Greek mythology only heroes can go to heaven [Grayling] |
| Full Idea: In Greek mythology only a hero like Hercules could hope to go to heaven (by becoming a god himself). | |
| From: A.C. Grayling (What is Good? [2003], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: This illustrates Nietsche's 'inversion of morality' most clearly, because Christianity says that the person most likely to go to heaven is the humblest person. |