Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Wittgenstein', 'De ente praedicamentali' and 'Epistemic Justification'

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5 ideas

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things

16700	In order to speak about time and successive entities, the 'present' must be enlarged [Wycliff]
	Full Idea: It is clear from the way in which one must speak about time and other successive entities that talk about 'the present' must be enlarged. Otherwise it would have to be denied that any successive entity could exist, which is impossible.
	From: John Wycliff (De ente praedicamentali [1375], 20 p.189), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.3
	A reaction: This is a lovely idea, even if it is not quite clear what it means. The mind seems to stretch out the now anyway (as the 'specious present'), so why not embrace that in language and conscious thought?

16701	To be successive a thing needs parts, which must therefore be lodged outside that instant [Wycliff]
	Full Idea: If something is successive, it is successive with respect to its individual parts, which cannot exist at the same instant. Therefore it follows that many of its parts are lodged outside that instant.
	From: John Wycliff (De ente praedicamentali [1375], 20 p.189), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.3
	A reaction: An obvious would be to say that there are therefore no successive entities, but Wycliff is appealing to our universal acceptance of them, and offering a transcendental argument. Nice move.

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism

19679	'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig]
	Full Idea: Strong 'access' internalism says the justification must be accessible to the person holding the belief (for cognitive duty, or blame), and weaker 'mentalist' internalism just says the justification must supervene on mental features of the individual.
	From: Jonathan Kvanvig (Epistemic Justification [2011], III)
	A reaction: [compressed] I think I'm a strong access internalist. I doubt whether there is a correct answer to any of this, but my conception of someone knowing something involves being able to invoke their reasons for it. Even if they forget the source.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism

19678	Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig]
	Full Idea: Strong foundationalists require truth-preserving inferential links between the foundations and what the foundations support, while weaker versions allow weaker connections, such as inductive support, or best explanation, or probabilistic support.
	From: Jonathan Kvanvig (Epistemic Justification [2011], II)
	A reaction: [He cites Alston 1989] Personally I'm a coherentist about justification, but I'm a fan of best explanation, so I'd vote for that. It's just that best explanation is not a very foundationalist sort of concept. Actually, the strong version is absurd.

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy

7091	The argument from analogy is not a strong inference, since the other being might be an actor or a robot [Grayling]
	Full Idea: The argument from analogy is a weak one, because it does not logically guarantee the inference I draw to the other's inner states, for he might be dissimulating or acting, or may even be a cleverly contrived robot which feels nothing.
	From: A.C. Grayling (Wittgenstein [1988], Ch.3)
	A reaction: This gives the impression that for an argument to be strong it must logically guarantee its inference. It strikes me that analogy is a good reason for believing in other minds, but that is because I am looking for the best explanation, not logical proof.