29 ideas
| 8228 | Being is revealed at the point between waking and sleep [Anon (Cent)] |
| Full Idea: At the point of sleep when sleep has not yet come and external wakefulness vanishes, at this point being is revealed. | |
| From: Anon (Cent) (Centring [c.500 BCE], 50) | |
| A reaction: One for Heidegger. The problem with eastern philosophy is that no one expects that this revelation could be put into words, so we cannot compare our revelations of being, or pass them on to others. Which means they can't be criticised. |
| 5163 | Basic propositions refer to a single experience, are incorrigible, and conclusively verifiable [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: There is a class of empirical propositions, which I call 'basic propositions', which can be verified conclusively, since they refer solely to the contents of a single experience, which are incorrigible. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (Introduction to 'Language Truth and Logic' [1946], p.13) | |
| A reaction: A classic statement of empirical foundationalism. I sort of agree that 'single experiences' are a 'given' for philosophy, but is questionable whether there is anything which could both be a single experience AND give rise to a proposition. |
| 8232 | Neglect your self, and feel the consciousness of each other being [Anon (Cent)] |
| Full Idea: Feel the consciousness of each person as your own consciousness. So, leaving aside concern for self, become each being. | |
| From: Anon (Cent) (Centring [c.500 BCE], 83) | |
| A reaction: Good. The western scepticism about other minds puts up a barrier to this sort of thought. The best of Zen is when it encourages the use of imagination to explore what is real. But imagination struggles to distinguish what is true. |
| 5167 | The argument from analogy fails, so the best account of other minds is behaviouristic [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: There are too many objections to the argument from analogy, so I am inclined to revert to a 'behaviouristic' interpretation of propositions about other people's experiences. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (Introduction to 'Language Truth and Logic' [1946], p.26) | |
| A reaction: It seems odd to vote for behaviourism on one issue, if you aren't a general subscriber. It is one thing to say that behaviour is the best evidence for your explanation, quite another to equate the other mind with its behaviour. |
| 5164 | A statement is meaningful if observation statements can be deduced from it [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: In the improved version, a statement was verifiable, and consequently meaningful, if 'some observation-statement can be deduced from it in conjunction with certain other premises, without being deducible from those other premises alone'. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (Introduction to 'Language Truth and Logic' [1946], p.15) | |
| A reaction: I.Berlin showed that any statement S could pass this test, because if you assert 'S' and 'If S then O', these two statements entail O, which could be some random observation. Hence a 1946 revised version had to be produced. |
| 5165 | Directly verifiable statements must entail at least one new observation statement [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: A statement is directly verifiable if it is either itself an observation-statement,or is such that in conjunction with one or more observation-statements it entails at least one observation-statement which is not deducible from these other premises alone. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (Introduction to 'Language Truth and Logic' [1946], p.17) | |
| A reaction: This is the 1946 revised version of the Verification Principle, which was then torpedoed by an elaborate counterexample from Alonzo Church. Ayer thereafter abandoned attempts to find a precise statement of it. |
| 5166 | The principle of verification is not an empirical hypothesis, but a definition [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: I wish the principle of verification to be regarded, not as an empirical hypothesis, but as a definition. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (Introduction to 'Language Truth and Logic' [1946], p.21) | |
| A reaction: This is Ayer's attempt to meet the well known objection of 'turning the tables' on his theory (by asking whether it is tautological or empirically verifiable). However, if it is just a definition, then presumably it is completely arbitrary… |
| 5162 | Sentences only express propositions if they are meaningful; otherwise they are 'statements' [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: I suggest that every grammatically significant indicative sentence expresses a 'statement', but the word 'proposition' will be reserved for what is expressed by sentences that are literally meaningful. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (Introduction to 'Language Truth and Logic' [1946], p.10) | |
| A reaction: We don't have to accept Ayer's over-fussy requirements for what is meaningful to accept that this is a good distinction. Every day we hear statements from people (e.g. politicians) in which we can fish in vain for the underlying proposition. |
| 8230 | Just as you have the impulse to do something, stop [Anon (Cent)] |
| Full Idea: Just as you have the impulse to do something, stop. | |
| From: Anon (Cent) (Centring [c.500 BCE], 64) | |
| A reaction: Nice. You might train your own will like a dog in this way. It is a counterexample to the simplistic idea that all you need is a belief and a desire, and you have got an action. But (pace Searle, Ideas 3817 + 3818) this does not prove free will. |
| 21059 | General rules of action also need a judgement about when to apply them [Kant] |
| Full Idea: A concept of the understanding, which contains the general rule, must be supplemented by an act of judgement whereby the practitioner distinguishes instances where the rule applies from those where it does not. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This is Aristotle's phronesis, and Hart's 'rules of recognition' in law courts. So is the link between theory and practice an intellectual one, or a sort of inarticulate intuition? I like 'common sense' for this ability. |
| 5168 | Moral approval and disapproval concerns classes of actions, rather than particular actions [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: The common objects of moral approval and disapproval are not particular actions so much as classes of actions. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (Introduction to 'Language Truth and Logic' [1946], p.27) | |
| A reaction: This 1946 revision of his pure emotivism looks like a move towards Hare's prescriptivism, where classes, rules and principles are seen as the window-dressing of emotivism. It's still a bad theory. |
| 21061 | Duty does not aim at an end, but gives rise to universal happiness as aim of the will [Kant] |
| Full Idea: My conception of duty does not need to be based on any particular end, but rather itself occasions a new end for the human will, that of striving with all one's power towards the highest good possible on earth, the universal happiness of the whole world. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 1B) | |
| A reaction: I see nothing in the categorical imperative that demands 'all one's power', and nothing that specifies happiness as what has to be universalised. Nietzsche, for one, thinks happiness is overrated. |
| 21060 | It can't be a duty to strive after the impossible [Kant] |
| Full Idea: It would not be a duty to strive after a certain effect of our will if this effect were impossible in experience. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], Intro) | |
| A reaction: 'Ought implies can' has become a familiar slogan. The quickest way to get shot of a tiresome duty is to persuade yourself that it is impossible. The seemingly impossible is occasionally achieved. |
| 21062 | The will's motive is the absolute law itself, and moral feeling is receptivity to law [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The will must have motives. But these are not objects of physical feeling as predetermined ends in themselves. They are none other than the absolute law itself, and the will's receptivity to it as an absolute compulsion is known as moral feeling. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 1Bb) | |
| A reaction: This sounds like our natural motivation to get the right answer when doing arithmetic, which is the innate motivation towards truth. I once heard it said that truth is the only value. So why does Donald Trump fail to value truth? |
| 21071 | There can be no restraints on freedom if reason does not reveal some basic rights [Kant] |
| Full Idea: If there is nothing which commands immediate respect through reason, such as the basic rights of man, no influence can prevail upon man's arbitrary will and restrain his freedom. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 2-Concl) | |
| A reaction: I think this is the nearest Kant gets to natural rights. It is hard to see how basic rights can be identified by pure reason, without some inbuilt human values. Kant's usual move is to say denial of them leads to a contradiction, but I'm going off that. |
| 21063 | Personal contracts are for some end, but a civil state contract involves a duty to share [Kant] |
| Full Idea: In all social contracts, we find a union of many individuals for some common end which they all share. But a union as an end in itself which they all ought to share …is only found in a society insofar as it constitutes a civil state i.e. a commonwealth. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 2 Intro) | |
| A reaction: This makes a nice link between the contractarian individual morality of Hobbes and his social contract view of society. Kant seems to reject the first but accept the second. Presumably because the first implies benefit and the second implies duty. |
| 21068 | There must be a unanimous contract that citizens accept majority decisions [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The actual principle of being content with majority decisions must be accepted unanimously and embodied in a contract, and this itself must be the ultimate basis on which a civil constitution is established. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 2-3) | |
| A reaction: This is the contract which combines a social contract with democracy. We unanimously agree not to be unanimous? Cf Idea 21065. What should the minority do when the majority elect criminal Nazi leaders? |
| 21069 | A contract is theoretical, but it can guide rulers to make laws which the whole people will accept [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The original contract …is merely an idea of reason, which nonetheless has undoubted practical reality; for it can oblige every legislator to frame his laws in such a way that they could have been produced by the united will of a whole nation. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 2-Concl) | |
| A reaction: The contractualist theory of morality of Thomas Scanlon approaches this. Note that Kant says it 'can' oblige the legislators. Nothing would compel them to follow such a principle. |
| 21070 | A law is unjust if the whole people could not possibly agree to it [Kant] |
| Full Idea: If the law is such that a whole people could not possibly agree to it …it is unjust. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 2-Concl) | |
| A reaction: Kant is explicitly trying to approximate Rousseau's general will. The categorical imperative was greatly influenced by Rousseau. The key point is not whether they accept it, but that unanimous acceptance is unthinkable. Unfair laws will fail. |
| 21067 | A citizen must control his own life, and possess property or an important skill [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The only qualification required by a citizen (apart, of course, from being an adult male) is that he must be his own master, and must have some property (which can include any skill, trade, fine art or science) to support himself. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 2-3) | |
| A reaction: Of course! Being one's own master evidently allows for being an employee, as long as this is a free contract, and not exploitation. Invites lots of interesting test cases. We need a Marxist commentary on this idea. |
| 21064 | A lawful civil state must embody freedom, equality and independence for its members [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The civil state, regarded purely as a lawful state, is based on the following a priori principles. 1) the freedom of every member as a human being, 2) the equality of each as a subject, 3) the independence of each as a subject. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 2 Intro) | |
| A reaction: Written in 1792, three years after the start of the French Revolution. He says that a state with an inbuilt hierarchy or aristocracy is unlawful. Which freedoms, equality in what respects, and independence from what? |
| 8234 | Bondage and liberation are relative terms, which only frighten those already terrified of the universe [Anon (Cent)] |
| Full Idea: Since in truth, bondage and freedom are relative, these words are only for those terrified with the universe. The universe is a reflection of minds. As you see many suns in water from one sun, so see bondage and liberation. | |
| From: Anon (Cent) (Centring [c.500 BCE], 110) | |
| A reaction: Since most easterners have experienced permanent social repression, their philosophies all encourage them not to worry about it. No wonder marxism, proved popular, when it suggested you could actually change things. |
| 21066 | Citizens can rise to any rank that talent, effort and luck can achieve [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Every member of the commonwealth must be entitled to reach any degree of rank which a subject can earn through his talent, his industry and his good fortune. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 2-2) | |
| A reaction: This is equality of opportunity, which is a mantra for liberals, but has been subjected to good criticisms in modern times. The main question is whether there is formal and legal equality, or actual practical equality. |
| 21065 | You can't make a contract renouncing your right to make contracts! [Kant] |
| Full Idea: No one can voluntarily renounce his rights by a contract ..to the effect that he has no rights but only duties, for such a contract would deprive him of the right to make a contract, and would thus invalidate the one he had already made. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 2-2) | |
| A reaction: Kant tries to establish all of his principles by showing that their denial is contradictory. But this example is blatantly wrong. King Lear didn't nullify his previous legislation when he abdicated, and his two daughters legally kept their territories. |
| 21072 | The people (who have to fight) and not the head of state should declare a war [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Each state must be organised so that the head of state, for whom the war costs nothing (for he wages it at the expense of the people) must no longer have the deciding vote on whether war is to be declared or not, for the people who pay for it must decide. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 3) | |
| A reaction: I would guess that he has Louis XIV particularly in mind. Imagine if Kant's proposal had been implemented in 1914. A referendum takes ages, and the people would need the facts (from the intelligence agencies). |
| 8227 | Feel your whole body saturated with cosmic essence [Anon (Cent)] |
| Full Idea: Feel your substance, bones, flesh, blood, saturated with cosmic essence. | |
| From: Anon (Cent) (Centring [c.500 BCE], 23) | |
| A reaction: I find this unsatisfactory. Being a sad victim of materialistic western scientific culture, I don't think 'cosmic essence' exists. I could imagine myself full of the stuff, and that might feel good, but I could also imagine I had won the lottery. |
| 8231 | Abandon attachment to body, and feel the joy of being everywhere [Anon (Cent)] |
| Full Idea: Toss attachment for body aside, realising I am everywhere. One who is everywhere is joyous. | |
| From: Anon (Cent) (Centring [c.500 BCE], 79) | |
| A reaction: I really don't think it is wisdom to spend your time imagining things which are not true. I might imagine that some gorgeous film star is in love with me, but I don't recommend it. Live according to nature. We are physical beings. |
| 8229 | The serenity in blue sky beyond clouds [Anon (Cent)] |
| Full Idea: Simply by looking into blue sky beyond clouds - the serenity. | |
| From: Anon (Cent) (Centring [c.500 BCE], 59) | |
| A reaction: Philip Larkin finds the same experience looking through high windows. If we articulate the experience, it seems to combine humility and detachment. The sky makes us insignificant, but the mind can project into the sky. |
| 8233 | Imagine fire burning up your whole body, but not you [Anon (Cent)] |
| Full Idea: Focus on fire rising through your form from the toes up until the body burns to ashes, but not you. | |
| From: Anon (Cent) (Centring [c.500 BCE], 28) | |
| A reaction: Try very hard to persuade yourself that you are immortal, even if you are not. Hm. Zen Buddhism actually contains very little commitment to what is true or false. It explores interesting beliefs like children playing with toys. Very post-modern. |