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All the ideas for 'Introduction to 'Language Truth and Logic'', 'Centring' and 'Scientific Objectivity'

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23 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
One view says objectivity is making a successful claim which captures the facts [Reiss/Sprenger]
     Full Idea: One conception of objectivity is that the facts are 'out there', and it is the task of scientists to discover, analyze and sytematize them. 'Objective' is a success word: if a claim is objective, it successfully captures some feature of the world.
     From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 2)
     A reaction: This seems to describe truth, rather than objectivity. You can establish accurate facts by subjective means. You can be fairly objective but miss the facts. Objectivity is a mode of thought, not a link to reality.
An absolute scientific picture of reality must not involve sense experience, which is perspectival [Reiss/Sprenger]
     Full Idea: Sense experience is necessarily perspectival, so to the extent to which scientific theories are to track the absolute conception [of reality], they must describe a world different from sense experience.
     From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 2.3)
     A reaction: This is a beautifully simple and interesting point. Even when you are looking at a tree, to grasp its full reality you probably need to close your eyes (which is bad news for artists).
Topic and application involve values, but can evidence and theory choice avoid them? [Reiss/Sprenger]
     Full Idea: There may be values involved in the choice of a research problem, the gathering of evidence, the acceptance of a theory, and the application of results. ...The first and fourth do involve values, but what of the second and third?
     From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 3.1)
     A reaction: [compressed] My own view is that the danger of hidden distorting values has to be recognised, but it is then possible, by honest self-criticism, to reduce them to near zero. Sociological enquiry is different, of course.
The Value-Free Ideal in science avoids contextual values, but embraces epistemic values [Reiss/Sprenger]
     Full Idea: According to the Value-Free Ideal, scientific objectivity is characterised by absence of contextual values and by exclusive commitment to epistemic values in scientific reasoning.
     From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 3.1)
     A reaction: This seems appealing, because it concedes that we cannot be value-free, without suggesting that we are unavoidably swamped by values. The obvious question is whether the two types of value can be sharply distinguished.
Value-free science needs impartial evaluation, theories asserting facts, and right motivation [Reiss/Sprenger]
     Full Idea: Three components of value-free science are Impartiality (appraising theories only by epistemic scientific standards), Neutrality (the theories make no value statements), and Autonomy (the theory is motivated only by science).
     From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 3.3)
     A reaction: [They are summarising Hugh Lacey, 1999, 2002] I'm not sure why the third criterion matters, if the first two are met. If a tobacco company commissions research on cigarettes, that doesn't necessarily make the findings false or prejudiced.
Thermometers depend on the substance used, and none of them are perfect [Reiss/Sprenger]
     Full Idea: Thermometers assume the length of the fluid or gas is a function of temperature, and different substances yield different results. It was decided that different thermometers using the same substance should match, and air was the best, but not perfect.
     From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 4.1)
     A reaction: [summarising Hasok Chang's research] This is a salutary warning that instruments do not necessarily solve the problem of objectivity, though thermometers do seem to be impersonal, and offer relative accuracy (i.e. ranking temperatures). Cf breathalysers.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
Being is revealed at the point between waking and sleep [Anon (Cent)]
     Full Idea: At the point of sleep when sleep has not yet come and external wakefulness vanishes, at this point being is revealed.
     From: Anon (Cent) (Centring [c.500 BCE], 50)
     A reaction: One for Heidegger. The problem with eastern philosophy is that no one expects that this revelation could be put into words, so we cannot compare our revelations of being, or pass them on to others. Which means they can't be criticised.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
Basic propositions refer to a single experience, are incorrigible, and conclusively verifiable [Ayer]
     Full Idea: There is a class of empirical propositions, which I call 'basic propositions', which can be verified conclusively, since they refer solely to the contents of a single experience, which are incorrigible.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Introduction to 'Language Truth and Logic' [1946], p.13)
     A reaction: A classic statement of empirical foundationalism. I sort of agree that 'single experiences' are a 'given' for philosophy, but is questionable whether there is anything which could both be a single experience AND give rise to a proposition.
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
The 'experimenter's regress' says success needs reliability, which is only tested by success [Reiss/Sprenger]
     Full Idea: The 'experimenter's regress' says that to know whether a result is correct, one needs to know whether the apparatus is reliable. But one doesn't know whether the apparatus is reliable unless one knows that it produces correct results ...and so on.
     From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 2.3)
     A reaction: [H. Collins (1985), a sociologist] I take this to be a case of the triumphant discovery of a vicious circle which destroys all knowledge turning out to be a benign circle. We build up a coherent relationship between reliable results and good apparatus.
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
The Bayesian approach is explicitly subjective about probabilities [Reiss/Sprenger]
     Full Idea: The Bayesian approach is outspokenly subjective: probability is used for quantifying a scientist's subjective degree of belief in a particular hypothesis. ...It just provides sound rules for learning from experience.
     From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 4.2)
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / a. Other minds
Neglect your self, and feel the consciousness of each other being [Anon (Cent)]
     Full Idea: Feel the consciousness of each person as your own consciousness. So, leaving aside concern for self, become each being.
     From: Anon (Cent) (Centring [c.500 BCE], 83)
     A reaction: Good. The western scepticism about other minds puts up a barrier to this sort of thought. The best of Zen is when it encourages the use of imagination to explore what is real. But imagination struggles to distinguish what is true.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
The argument from analogy fails, so the best account of other minds is behaviouristic [Ayer]
     Full Idea: There are too many objections to the argument from analogy, so I am inclined to revert to a 'behaviouristic' interpretation of propositions about other people's experiences.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Introduction to 'Language Truth and Logic' [1946], p.26)
     A reaction: It seems odd to vote for behaviourism on one issue, if you aren't a general subscriber. It is one thing to say that behaviour is the best evidence for your explanation, quite another to equate the other mind with its behaviour.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
A statement is meaningful if observation statements can be deduced from it [Ayer]
     Full Idea: In the improved version, a statement was verifiable, and consequently meaningful, if 'some observation-statement can be deduced from it in conjunction with certain other premises, without being deducible from those other premises alone'.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Introduction to 'Language Truth and Logic' [1946], p.15)
     A reaction: I.Berlin showed that any statement S could pass this test, because if you assert 'S' and 'If S then O', these two statements entail O, which could be some random observation. Hence a 1946 revised version had to be produced.
Directly verifiable statements must entail at least one new observation statement [Ayer]
     Full Idea: A statement is directly verifiable if it is either itself an observation-statement,or is such that in conjunction with one or more observation-statements it entails at least one observation-statement which is not deducible from these other premises alone.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Introduction to 'Language Truth and Logic' [1946], p.17)
     A reaction: This is the 1946 revised version of the Verification Principle, which was then torpedoed by an elaborate counterexample from Alonzo Church. Ayer thereafter abandoned attempts to find a precise statement of it.
The principle of verification is not an empirical hypothesis, but a definition [Ayer]
     Full Idea: I wish the principle of verification to be regarded, not as an empirical hypothesis, but as a definition.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Introduction to 'Language Truth and Logic' [1946], p.21)
     A reaction: This is Ayer's attempt to meet the well known objection of 'turning the tables' on his theory (by asking whether it is tautological or empirically verifiable). However, if it is just a definition, then presumably it is completely arbitrary…
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Sentences only express propositions if they are meaningful; otherwise they are 'statements' [Ayer]
     Full Idea: I suggest that every grammatically significant indicative sentence expresses a 'statement', but the word 'proposition' will be reserved for what is expressed by sentences that are literally meaningful.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Introduction to 'Language Truth and Logic' [1946], p.10)
     A reaction: We don't have to accept Ayer's over-fussy requirements for what is meaningful to accept that this is a good distinction. Every day we hear statements from people (e.g. politicians) in which we can fish in vain for the underlying proposition.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Just as you have the impulse to do something, stop [Anon (Cent)]
     Full Idea: Just as you have the impulse to do something, stop.
     From: Anon (Cent) (Centring [c.500 BCE], 64)
     A reaction: Nice. You might train your own will like a dog in this way. It is a counterexample to the simplistic idea that all you need is a belief and a desire, and you have got an action. But (pace Searle, Ideas 3817 + 3818) this does not prove free will.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
Moral approval and disapproval concerns classes of actions, rather than particular actions [Ayer]
     Full Idea: The common objects of moral approval and disapproval are not particular actions so much as classes of actions.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Introduction to 'Language Truth and Logic' [1946], p.27)
     A reaction: This 1946 revision of his pure emotivism looks like a move towards Hare's prescriptivism, where classes, rules and principles are seen as the window-dressing of emotivism. It's still a bad theory.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Bondage and liberation are relative terms, which only frighten those already terrified of the universe [Anon (Cent)]
     Full Idea: Since in truth, bondage and freedom are relative, these words are only for those terrified with the universe. The universe is a reflection of minds. As you see many suns in water from one sun, so see bondage and liberation.
     From: Anon (Cent) (Centring [c.500 BCE], 110)
     A reaction: Since most easterners have experienced permanent social repression, their philosophies all encourage them not to worry about it. No wonder marxism, proved popular, when it suggested you could actually change things.
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 4. Zen Buddhism
Feel your whole body saturated with cosmic essence [Anon (Cent)]
     Full Idea: Feel your substance, bones, flesh, blood, saturated with cosmic essence.
     From: Anon (Cent) (Centring [c.500 BCE], 23)
     A reaction: I find this unsatisfactory. Being a sad victim of materialistic western scientific culture, I don't think 'cosmic essence' exists. I could imagine myself full of the stuff, and that might feel good, but I could also imagine I had won the lottery.
Abandon attachment to body, and feel the joy of being everywhere [Anon (Cent)]
     Full Idea: Toss attachment for body aside, realising I am everywhere. One who is everywhere is joyous.
     From: Anon (Cent) (Centring [c.500 BCE], 79)
     A reaction: I really don't think it is wisdom to spend your time imagining things which are not true. I might imagine that some gorgeous film star is in love with me, but I don't recommend it. Live according to nature. We are physical beings.
The serenity in blue sky beyond clouds [Anon (Cent)]
     Full Idea: Simply by looking into blue sky beyond clouds - the serenity.
     From: Anon (Cent) (Centring [c.500 BCE], 59)
     A reaction: Philip Larkin finds the same experience looking through high windows. If we articulate the experience, it seems to combine humility and detachment. The sky makes us insignificant, but the mind can project into the sky.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Imagine fire burning up your whole body, but not you [Anon (Cent)]
     Full Idea: Focus on fire rising through your form from the toes up until the body burns to ashes, but not you.
     From: Anon (Cent) (Centring [c.500 BCE], 28)
     A reaction: Try very hard to persuade yourself that you are immortal, even if you are not. Hm. Zen Buddhism actually contains very little commitment to what is true or false. It explores interesting beliefs like children playing with toys. Very post-modern.