21 ideas
22664 | I do not care if my trivial beliefs are false, and I have no interest in many truths [Nozick] |
Full Idea: I find that I do not mind at all the thought that I have some false beliefs (of US state capitals), and there are many truths I do not care to know at all (total grains of sand on the beach). | |
From: Robert Nozick (The Nature of Rationality [1993], p.67) | |
A reaction: A useful corrective to anyone who blindly asserts that truth is the supreme human value. I would still be annoyed if someone taught me lies about these two types of truth. |
22665 | Maybe James was depicting the value of truth, and not its nature [Nozick] |
Full Idea: We might see William James's pragmatic view that truth is what works as depicting the value of truth, and not its nature. | |
From: Robert Nozick (The Nature of Rationality [1993], p.68) | |
A reaction: James didn't think that he was doing this. He firmly says that this IS truth, not just the advantages of truth. Another view is that pragmatists are giving a test for truth. |
8228 | Being is revealed at the point between waking and sleep [Anon (Cent)] |
Full Idea: At the point of sleep when sleep has not yet come and external wakefulness vanishes, at this point being is revealed. | |
From: Anon (Cent) (Centring [c.500 BCE], 50) | |
A reaction: One for Heidegger. The problem with eastern philosophy is that no one expects that this revelation could be put into words, so we cannot compare our revelations of being, or pass them on to others. Which means they can't be criticised. |
5163 | Basic propositions refer to a single experience, are incorrigible, and conclusively verifiable [Ayer] |
Full Idea: There is a class of empirical propositions, which I call 'basic propositions', which can be verified conclusively, since they refer solely to the contents of a single experience, which are incorrigible. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (Introduction to 'Language Truth and Logic' [1946], p.13) | |
A reaction: A classic statement of empirical foundationalism. I sort of agree that 'single experiences' are a 'given' for philosophy, but is questionable whether there is anything which could both be a single experience AND give rise to a proposition. |
8232 | Neglect your self, and feel the consciousness of each other being [Anon (Cent)] |
Full Idea: Feel the consciousness of each person as your own consciousness. So, leaving aside concern for self, become each being. | |
From: Anon (Cent) (Centring [c.500 BCE], 83) | |
A reaction: Good. The western scepticism about other minds puts up a barrier to this sort of thought. The best of Zen is when it encourages the use of imagination to explore what is real. But imagination struggles to distinguish what is true. |
5167 | The argument from analogy fails, so the best account of other minds is behaviouristic [Ayer] |
Full Idea: There are too many objections to the argument from analogy, so I am inclined to revert to a 'behaviouristic' interpretation of propositions about other people's experiences. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (Introduction to 'Language Truth and Logic' [1946], p.26) | |
A reaction: It seems odd to vote for behaviourism on one issue, if you aren't a general subscriber. It is one thing to say that behaviour is the best evidence for your explanation, quite another to equate the other mind with its behaviour. |
22662 | In the instrumental view of rationality it only concerns means, and not ends [Nozick] |
Full Idea: On the instrumental conception of rationality, it consists in the effective and efficient achievement of goals, ends, and desires. About the goals themselves it has little to say. | |
From: Robert Nozick (The Nature of Rationality [1993], p.64) | |
A reaction: [He quotes Russell 1954 p.viii as expressing this view] A long way from Greek logos, which obviously concerns the rational selection of right ends (for which, presumably, reasons can be given). In practice our ends may never be rational, of course. |
22663 | Rationality is normally said to concern either giving reasons, or reliability [Nozick] |
Full Idea: The two themes permeating the philosophical literature are that rationality is a matter of reasons, or that rationality is a matter of reliability. | |
From: Robert Nozick (The Nature of Rationality [1993], p.64) | |
A reaction: Since a clock can be reliable, I would have thought it concerns reasons. Or an unthinking person could reliably recite truths from memory. There is also the instrumental view of rationality. |
22666 | Is it rational to believe a truth which leads to permanent misery? [Nozick] |
Full Idea: If a mother is presented with convincing evidence that her son has committed a grave crime, but were she to believe it that would make her life thereafter miserable, is it rational for her to believe her son is guilty? | |
From: Robert Nozick (The Nature of Rationality [1993], p.69) | |
A reaction: I assume there is a conflict of rationalities, because there are conflicting ends. Presumably most mothers love the truth, but most of us also aim for happy lives. It is perfectly rational to avoid discovering a horrible family truth. |
22667 | Rationality needs some self-consciousness, to also evaluate how we acquired our reasons [Nozick] |
Full Idea: Rationality involves some degree of self-consciousness. Not only reasons are evaluated, but also the processes by which information arrives, is stored, and recalled. | |
From: Robert Nozick (The Nature of Rationality [1993], p.74) | |
A reaction: I defend the idea that animals have a degree of rationality, because they can make sensible judgements, but I cannot deny this idea. Rationality comes in degrees, and second-level thought is a huge leap forward in degree. |
5164 | A statement is meaningful if observation statements can be deduced from it [Ayer] |
Full Idea: In the improved version, a statement was verifiable, and consequently meaningful, if 'some observation-statement can be deduced from it in conjunction with certain other premises, without being deducible from those other premises alone'. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (Introduction to 'Language Truth and Logic' [1946], p.15) | |
A reaction: I.Berlin showed that any statement S could pass this test, because if you assert 'S' and 'If S then O', these two statements entail O, which could be some random observation. Hence a 1946 revised version had to be produced. |
5165 | Directly verifiable statements must entail at least one new observation statement [Ayer] |
Full Idea: A statement is directly verifiable if it is either itself an observation-statement,or is such that in conjunction with one or more observation-statements it entails at least one observation-statement which is not deducible from these other premises alone. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (Introduction to 'Language Truth and Logic' [1946], p.17) | |
A reaction: This is the 1946 revised version of the Verification Principle, which was then torpedoed by an elaborate counterexample from Alonzo Church. Ayer thereafter abandoned attempts to find a precise statement of it. |
5166 | The principle of verification is not an empirical hypothesis, but a definition [Ayer] |
Full Idea: I wish the principle of verification to be regarded, not as an empirical hypothesis, but as a definition. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (Introduction to 'Language Truth and Logic' [1946], p.21) | |
A reaction: This is Ayer's attempt to meet the well known objection of 'turning the tables' on his theory (by asking whether it is tautological or empirically verifiable). However, if it is just a definition, then presumably it is completely arbitrary… |
5162 | Sentences only express propositions if they are meaningful; otherwise they are 'statements' [Ayer] |
Full Idea: I suggest that every grammatically significant indicative sentence expresses a 'statement', but the word 'proposition' will be reserved for what is expressed by sentences that are literally meaningful. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (Introduction to 'Language Truth and Logic' [1946], p.10) | |
A reaction: We don't have to accept Ayer's over-fussy requirements for what is meaningful to accept that this is a good distinction. Every day we hear statements from people (e.g. politicians) in which we can fish in vain for the underlying proposition. |
8230 | Just as you have the impulse to do something, stop [Anon (Cent)] |
Full Idea: Just as you have the impulse to do something, stop. | |
From: Anon (Cent) (Centring [c.500 BCE], 64) | |
A reaction: Nice. You might train your own will like a dog in this way. It is a counterexample to the simplistic idea that all you need is a belief and a desire, and you have got an action. But (pace Searle, Ideas 3817 + 3818) this does not prove free will. |
5168 | Moral approval and disapproval concerns classes of actions, rather than particular actions [Ayer] |
Full Idea: The common objects of moral approval and disapproval are not particular actions so much as classes of actions. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (Introduction to 'Language Truth and Logic' [1946], p.27) | |
A reaction: This 1946 revision of his pure emotivism looks like a move towards Hare's prescriptivism, where classes, rules and principles are seen as the window-dressing of emotivism. It's still a bad theory. |
8234 | Bondage and liberation are relative terms, which only frighten those already terrified of the universe [Anon (Cent)] |
Full Idea: Since in truth, bondage and freedom are relative, these words are only for those terrified with the universe. The universe is a reflection of minds. As you see many suns in water from one sun, so see bondage and liberation. | |
From: Anon (Cent) (Centring [c.500 BCE], 110) | |
A reaction: Since most easterners have experienced permanent social repression, their philosophies all encourage them not to worry about it. No wonder marxism, proved popular, when it suggested you could actually change things. |
8229 | The serenity in blue sky beyond clouds [Anon (Cent)] |
Full Idea: Simply by looking into blue sky beyond clouds - the serenity. | |
From: Anon (Cent) (Centring [c.500 BCE], 59) | |
A reaction: Philip Larkin finds the same experience looking through high windows. If we articulate the experience, it seems to combine humility and detachment. The sky makes us insignificant, but the mind can project into the sky. |
8231 | Abandon attachment to body, and feel the joy of being everywhere [Anon (Cent)] |
Full Idea: Toss attachment for body aside, realising I am everywhere. One who is everywhere is joyous. | |
From: Anon (Cent) (Centring [c.500 BCE], 79) | |
A reaction: I really don't think it is wisdom to spend your time imagining things which are not true. I might imagine that some gorgeous film star is in love with me, but I don't recommend it. Live according to nature. We are physical beings. |
8227 | Feel your whole body saturated with cosmic essence [Anon (Cent)] |
Full Idea: Feel your substance, bones, flesh, blood, saturated with cosmic essence. | |
From: Anon (Cent) (Centring [c.500 BCE], 23) | |
A reaction: I find this unsatisfactory. Being a sad victim of materialistic western scientific culture, I don't think 'cosmic essence' exists. I could imagine myself full of the stuff, and that might feel good, but I could also imagine I had won the lottery. |
8233 | Imagine fire burning up your whole body, but not you [Anon (Cent)] |
Full Idea: Focus on fire rising through your form from the toes up until the body burns to ashes, but not you. | |
From: Anon (Cent) (Centring [c.500 BCE], 28) | |
A reaction: Try very hard to persuade yourself that you are immortal, even if you are not. Hm. Zen Buddhism actually contains very little commitment to what is true or false. It explores interesting beliefs like children playing with toys. Very post-modern. |