Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Phenomenalism', '11: Book of Kings 1' and 'Realism'

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4 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / n. Pi
He made a molten sea, which was ten cubits across, and thirty cubits round the edge [Anon (Kings)]
     Full Idea: And he made a molten sea, ten cubits from the one brim to the other; it was round all about, and his height was five cubits: and a line of cubits did compass it round about.
     From: Anon (Kings) (11: Book of Kings 1 [c.550 BCE], 7:23)
     A reaction: In the sixth century BCE, this appears to give 3 as the value of Pi, though perhaps it shouldn't be taken too literally!
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Dummett saw realism as acceptance of bivalence, rather than of mind-independent entities [Dummett, by Potter]
     Full Idea: Dummett aimed to characterise realism in terms not of the mind-independence of the entities but of the validity of bivalence for sentences referring to them.
     From: report of Michael Dummett (Realism [1982]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 21 'Lang'
     A reaction: Hence he called himself a 'philosopher of language', rather than a 'philosopher of thought'. Philosophers of language are more likely to end up as anti-realists, I suspect.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer]
     Full Idea: Nowadays phenomenalism is held to be a theory of perception which says that physical objects are logical constructions out of sense-data.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1)
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer]
     Full Idea: The introduction of the term 'sense-datum' is a means of referring to appearances without prejudging the question of what it is, if anything, that they are appearances of.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1)