6 ideas
18528 | The single imagined 'interval' between things only exists in the intellect [Auriol] |
Full Idea: It appears that a single thing, which must be imagined as some sort of interval [intervallum] existing between two things, cannot exist in extramental reality, but only in the intellect. | |
From: Peter Auriol (Sentences [1316], I fols318 v a-b), quoted by John Heil - The Universe as We Find It 7 | |
A reaction: This is the standard medieval denial of the existence of real relations. It contrasts with post-Russell ontology, which seems to admit relations as entities. Heil and Auriol and right. |
14303 | Truth-functional conditionals have a simple falsification, when A is true and B is false [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The utility of [truth-functional conditionals] is that it puts us in possession of a rule...[namely] The hypothetical proposition may be ...falsified by a single state of things, but only by one in which A [antecedent] is true and B [consequent] is false. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (On the Algebra of Logic [1895], p.218), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions | |
A reaction: Personally I am rather more interested in verifying conditionals than in falsifying them. I certainly don't accept them until they are falsified, unless they have massive support from surrounding facts. |
2614 | Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer] |
Full Idea: Nowadays phenomenalism is held to be a theory of perception which says that physical objects are logical constructions out of sense-data. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1) |
2615 | The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer] |
Full Idea: The introduction of the term 'sense-datum' is a means of referring to appearances without prejudging the question of what it is, if anything, that they are appearances of. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1) |
16589 | Prime matter lacks essence, but is only potentially and indeterminately a physical thing [Auriol] |
Full Idea: Prime matter has no essence, nor a nature that is determinate, distinct, and actual. Instead, it is pure potential, and determinable, so that it is indeterminately and indistinctly a material thing. | |
From: Peter Auriol (Sentences [1316], II.12.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 03.1 | |
A reaction: Pasnau thinks Auriol has the best shot at explaining the vague idea of 'prime matter', with the thought that it exists, but indeterminateness is what gives it a lesser mode of existence. It strikes me as best to treat 'exist' as univocal. |
16651 | God can do anything non-contradictory, as making straightness with no line, or lightness with no parts [Auriol] |
Full Idea: If someone says 'God could make straightness without a line, and roughness and lightness in weight without parts', …then show me the reason why God can do whatever does not imply a contradiction, yet cannot do these things. | |
From: Peter Auriol (Sentences [1316], IV.12.2.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 11.4 | |
A reaction: How engagingly bonkers. The key idea preceding this is that God can do all sorts of things that are beyond our understanding. He is then obliged to offer some examples. |