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All the ideas for 'Phenomenalism', 'On the General Idea of Proof Theory' and 'Problems in the Explanation of Action'

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5 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
13827 Logical consequence isn't a black box (Tarski's approach); we should explain how arguments work [Prawitz]
     Full Idea: Defining logical consequence in the way Tarski does is a rather meagre result, treating an argument as a black box, observing input and output, while disregarding inner structure. We should define logical consequence on the basis of valid arguments.
     From: Dag Prawitz (On the General Idea of Proof Theory [1974], §2)
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
13826 Model theory looks at valid sentences and consequence, but not how we know these things [Prawitz]
     Full Idea: In model theory, which has dominated the last decades, one concentrates on logically valid sentences, and what follows logically from what, but one disregards questions concerning how we know these things.
     From: Dag Prawitz (On the General Idea of Proof Theory [1974], §1)
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
2614 Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer]
     Full Idea: Nowadays phenomenalism is held to be a theory of perception which says that physical objects are logical constructions out of sense-data.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1)
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
2615 The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer]
     Full Idea: The introduction of the term 'sense-datum' is a means of referring to appearances without prejudging the question of what it is, if anything, that they are appearances of.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1)
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / b. Types of intention
20074 We can keep Davidson's account of intentions in action, by further explaining prior intentions [Davidson, by Stout,R]
     Full Idea: Davidson's original account of intentions might still stand if we could accept that prior intentions are different in kind from intentions with which one acts.
     From: report of Donald Davidson (Problems in the Explanation of Action [1987]) by Rowland Stout - Action 8 'Davidson's'
     A reaction: Davidson says prior intention is all-out judgement of desirability. Prior intentions are more deliberate, with the other intentions as a presumed background to action. Compare Sartre's dual account of the self.