6 ideas
19370 | 'Blind thought' is reasoning without recognition of the ingredients of the reasoning [Leibniz, by Arthur,R] |
Full Idea: Leibniz invented the concept of 'blind thought' - reasoning by a manipulation of characters without being able to recognise what each character stands for. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (Towards a Universal Characteristic [1677]) by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz |
19391 | We can assign a characteristic number to every single object [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The true principle is that we can assign to every object its determined characteristic number. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Towards a Universal Characteristic [1677], p.18) | |
A reaction: I add this as a predecessor of Gödel numbering. It is part of Leibniz's huge plan for a Universal Characteristic, to map reality numerically, and then calculate the truths about it. Gödel seems to allow metaphysics to be done mathematically. |
19390 | Everything is subsumed under number, which is a metaphysical statics of the universe, revealing powers [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There is nothing which is not subsumable under number; number is therefore a fundamental metaphysical form, and arithmetic a sort of statics of the universe, in which the powers of things are revealed. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Towards a Universal Characteristic [1677], p.17) | |
A reaction: I take numbers to be a highly generalised and idealised description of an aspect of reality (seen as mainly constituted by countable substances). Seeing reality as processes doesn't lead us to number. So I like this idea. |
2614 | Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer] |
Full Idea: Nowadays phenomenalism is held to be a theory of perception which says that physical objects are logical constructions out of sense-data. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1) |
2615 | The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer] |
Full Idea: The introduction of the term 'sense-datum' is a means of referring to appearances without prejudging the question of what it is, if anything, that they are appearances of. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1) |
17613 | We should judge principles by the science, not science by some fixed principles [Zermelo] |
Full Idea: Principles must be judged from the point of view of science, and not science from the point of view of principles fixed once and for all. Geometry existed before Euclid's 'Elements', just as arithmetic and set theory did before Peano's 'Formulaire'. | |
From: Ernst Zermelo (New Proof of Possibility of Well-Ordering [1908], §2a) | |
A reaction: This shows why the axiomatisation of set theory is an ongoing and much-debated activity. |