Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Phenomenalism', 'The Mirage of Social Justice' and 'Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics'

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9 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics

7920	Descriptive metaphysics aims at actual structure, revisionary metaphysics at a better structure [Strawson,P]
	Full Idea: Descriptive metaphysics (e.g. Aristotle and Kant) is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world; revisionary metaphysics (e.g. Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley) is concerned to produce a better structure.
	From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], Intro)
	A reaction: This distinction by Strawson was incredibly helpful in reinstating metaphysics as a feasible activity. I don't want to abandon the revisionary version. We can hammer the current metaphysics into a more efficient shape, or even create new concepts.

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual

7922	Descriptive metaphysics concerns unchanging core concepts and categories [Strawson,P]
	Full Idea: Descriptive metaphysics is primarily concerned with categories and concepts which, in their fundamental character, change not at all. They are the commonplaces of the least refined thinking, and the indispensable core for the most sophisticated humans.
	From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], Intro)
	A reaction: This seems to be the basic premise for a modern metaphysician such as E.J.Lowe, though such thinkers are not averse to suggesting clarifications of our conceptual scheme. The aim must be good foundations for a successful edifice of knowledge.

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis

7921	Close examination of actual word usage is the only sure way in philosophy [Strawson,P]
	Full Idea: Up to a point, the reliance upon a close examination of the actual use of words is the best, and indeed the only sure, way in philosophy.
	From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], Intro)
	A reaction: Probably the last bold assertion of ordinary language philosophy, though Strawson goes on the defend his 'deeper' version of the activity, which he says is 'descriptive metaphysics', rather than mere 'analysis'. Mere verbal analysis now looks hopeless.

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism

2614	Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer]
	Full Idea: Nowadays phenomenalism is held to be a theory of perception which says that physical objects are logical constructions out of sense-data.
	From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1)

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory

2615	The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer]
	Full Idea: The introduction of the term 'sense-datum' is a means of referring to appearances without prejudging the question of what it is, if anything, that they are appearances of.
	From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1)

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy

9282	I can only apply consciousness predicates to myself if I can apply them to others [Strawson,P]
	Full Idea: One can ascribed states of consciousness to oneself only if one can ascribe them to others. One can ascribe them to others only if one can identify other subjects of experience, and they cannot be identified only as subjects of experience.
	From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], 3.4)
	A reaction: A neat linguistic twist on the analogy argument, but rather dubious, if it is actually meant to prove that other minds exist. It is based on his view of predicates - see Idea 9281. If the rest of humanity are zombies, why would I not apply them?

16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body

9263	A person is an entity to which we can ascribe predicates of consciousness and corporeality [Strawson,P]
	Full Idea: What I mean by the concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type.
	From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], 3.4)
	A reaction: As Frankfurt points out, merely requiring the entity to be 'conscious' is a grossly inadequate definition of what we mean by a person, which is typically a being that is self-aware and capable of rational decisions between alternatives.

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates

9281	The idea of a predicate matches a range of things to which it can be applied [Strawson,P]
	Full Idea: The idea of a predicate is correlative with a range of distinguishable individuals of which the predicate can be significantly, though not necessarily truly, affirmed.
	From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], 3.4 n1)
	A reaction: Said to be one of Strawson's most important ideas. The idea is that you understand a predicate if you understand its range, not just a one-off application. So you must understand the implied universal, whatever that is.

25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice

20543	'Social justice' is a confused idea, and inequalities need no justification [Hayek, by Swift]
	Full Idea: Hayek thinks the whole idea of social justice involves a philosophical mistake, so that inequality doesn't really need justification in the first place.
	From: report of F.A. Hayek (The Mirage of Social Justice [1976]) by Adam Swift - Political Philosophy (3rd ed) 1 'Conc'
	A reaction: It is certainly hard to justify the claim that the state of nature involves equality, making its disturbance in need of justification. But surely inequalities in government policy (such as differential income tax) need justification?