10 ideas
12772 | Philosophy is a value- and attitude-driven enterprise [Fraassen] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is a value- and attitude-driven enterprise; philosophy is in false consciousness when it sees itself otherwise. | |
From: Bas C. van Fraassen (The Empirical Stance [2002], 1.5) | |
A reaction: It is one thing to be permeated with values, and another to be value-driven. Truth, reason and logic are (I take it) granted a high value in philosophy, just as the offside rule is in football. I am trying to place reality in charge, not humanity. |
12771 | Is it likely that a successful, coherent, explanatory ontological hypothesis is true? [Fraassen] |
Full Idea: How likely is it that a truly successful, coherent, explanatory ontological hypothesis is true? | |
From: Bas C. van Fraassen (The Empirical Stance [2002], 1.5) | |
A reaction: Van Fraassen announces "I reject metaphysic" (p.3), so we know where he stands. Anything becomes less certain as it moves to a higher level of generality. Should we abandon generalisation? There is much illumination in metaphysics. |
12773 | Analytic philosophy has an exceptional arsenal of critical tools [Fraassen] |
Full Idea: Analytical philosophy can rightly pride itself on having produced the greatest critical arsenal the world has ever known. | |
From: Bas C. van Fraassen (The Empirical Stance [2002], 1.6) | |
A reaction: This is, of course, in the context of a scathing attack on the desire to use analytical methods to do speculative metaphysics. I say that if these are the best tools, then we should push forward with them to see how far we can get. |
12770 | We may end up with a huge theory of carefully constructed falsehoods [Fraassen] |
Full Idea: The specter that faces us is that we may end up having explained all that is dreamt of in our philosophies by intricately crafted postulates that are false. | |
From: Bas C. van Fraassen (The Empirical Stance [2002], 1.5) | |
A reaction: This is more persuasive that Idea 12769. People who cannot bear to live with a total absence of explanation (with Keats's 'negative capability') are most in danger from this threat. |
9616 | A set is a collection into a whole of distinct objects of our intuition or thought [Cantor] |
Full Idea: A set is any collection into a whole M of definite, distinct objects m ... of our intuition or thought. | |
From: George Cantor (The Theory of Transfinite Numbers [1897], p.85), quoted by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This is the original conception of a set, which hit trouble with Russell's Paradox. Cantor's original definition immediately invites thoughts about the status of vague objects. |
15896 | Cantor needed Power Set for the reals, but then couldn't count the new collections [Cantor, by Lavine] |
Full Idea: Cantor grafted the Power Set axiom onto his theory when he needed it to incorporate the real numbers, ...but his theory was supposed to be theory of collections that can be counted, but he didn't know how to count the new collections. | |
From: report of George Cantor (The Theory of Transfinite Numbers [1897]) by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite I | |
A reaction: I take this to refer to the countability of the sets, rather than the members of the sets. Lavine notes that counting was Cantor's key principle, but he now had to abandon it. Zermelo came to the rescue. |
2614 | Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer] |
Full Idea: Nowadays phenomenalism is held to be a theory of perception which says that physical objects are logical constructions out of sense-data. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1) |
2615 | The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer] |
Full Idea: The introduction of the term 'sense-datum' is a means of referring to appearances without prejudging the question of what it is, if anything, that they are appearances of. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1) |
12769 | Inference to best explanation contains all sorts of hidden values [Fraassen] |
Full Idea: The very phrase 'inference to the best explanation' should wave a red flag for us. What is good, better, best? What values are slipped in here, under a common name, and where do they come from? | |
From: Bas C. van Fraassen (The Empirical Stance [2002], 1.5) | |
A reaction: A point worth making, but overstated. If we are going to refuse to make judgements for fear that some wicked 'value' might creep in, our lives will be reduced to absurdity. |
12768 | We accept many scientific theories without endorsing them as true [Fraassen] |
Full Idea: The choice among theories in science may be a choice to accept in some sense falling far short of endorsement as true. | |
From: Bas C. van Fraassen (The Empirical Stance [2002], 1.5) | |
A reaction: When put like this, it is hard to deny the force of Van Fraassen's reservations about science. Lots of people, including me, use scientific theories as working assumptions for life, with nothing like full confidence in their truth. |