4 ideas
18470 | Maybe truth-making is an unanalysable primitive, but we can specify principles for it [Smith,B] |
Full Idea: The signs are that truth-making is not analysable in terms of anything more primitive, but we need to be able to say more than just that. So we ought to consider it as specified by principles of truth-making. | |
From: Barry Smith (Truth-maker Realism: response to Gregory [2000], p.20), quoted by Fraser MacBride - Truthmakers 1.5 | |
A reaction: This is the axiomatic approach to such problems - treat the target concept as an undefinable, unanalysable primitive, and then give rules for its connections. Maybe all metaphysics should work like that, with a small bunch of primitives. |
17751 | Gödel proved the completeness of first order predicate logic in 1930 [Gödel, by Walicki] |
Full Idea: Gödel proved the completeness of first order predicate logic in his doctoral dissertation of 1930. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (Completeness of Axioms of Logic [1930]) by Michal Walicki - Introduction to Mathematical Logic History E.2.2 |
2614 | Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer] |
Full Idea: Nowadays phenomenalism is held to be a theory of perception which says that physical objects are logical constructions out of sense-data. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1) |
2615 | The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer] |
Full Idea: The introduction of the term 'sense-datum' is a means of referring to appearances without prejudging the question of what it is, if anything, that they are appearances of. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1) |