Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Phenomenalism', 'Completeness of Axioms of Logic' and 'Belief Truth and Knowledge'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

5 ideas

4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 3. Completeness of PC
17751 Gödel proved the completeness of first order predicate logic in 1930 [Gödel, by Walicki]
     Full Idea: Gödel proved the completeness of first order predicate logic in his doctoral dissertation of 1930.
     From: report of Kurt Gödel (Completeness of Axioms of Logic [1930]) by Michal Walicki - Introduction to Mathematical Logic History E.2.2
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
2614 Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer]
     Full Idea: Nowadays phenomenalism is held to be a theory of perception which says that physical objects are logical constructions out of sense-data.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1)
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
2615 The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer]
     Full Idea: The introduction of the term 'sense-datum' is a means of referring to appearances without prejudging the question of what it is, if anything, that they are appearances of.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1)
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
3900 Maybe experience is not essential to perception, but only to the causing of beliefs [Armstrong, by Scruton]
     Full Idea: Armstrong has argued that experience, as normally understood, is not necessary to perception. To perceive is to acquire beliefs, through a causal process.
     From: report of David M. Armstrong (Belief Truth and Knowledge [1973]) by Roger Scruton - Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey 23.4
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
4253 Externalism says knowledge involves a natural relation between the belief state and what makes it true [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: Externalist accounts of non-inferential knowledge say what makes a true non-inferential belief a case of knowledge is some natural relation which holds between the belief state and the situation which makes the belief true.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Belief Truth and Knowledge [1973], 11.III.6)
     A reaction: Armstrong's concept is presumably a response to Quine's desire to 'naturalise epistemology'. Bad move, I suspect. It probably reduces knowledge to mere true belief, and hence a redundant concept.