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All the ideas for 'Phenomenalism', 'Completeness of Axioms of Logic' and 'Philosophical Fragments'

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5 ideas

4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 3. Completeness of PC
17751 Gödel proved the completeness of first order predicate logic in 1930 [Gödel, by Walicki]
     Full Idea: Gödel proved the completeness of first order predicate logic in his doctoral dissertation of 1930.
     From: report of Kurt Gödel (Completeness of Axioms of Logic [1930]) by Michal Walicki - Introduction to Mathematical Logic History E.2.2
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
16007 I assume existence, rather than reasoning towards it [Kierkegaard]
     Full Idea: I always reason from existence, not towards existence.
     From: Sřren Kierkegaard (Philosophical Fragments [1844], p.40)
     A reaction: Kierkegaard's important premise to help show that theistic proofs for God's existence don't actually prove existence, but develop the content of a conception. [SY]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
16013 Nothing necessary can come into existence, since it already 'is' [Kierkegaard]
     Full Idea: Can the necessary come into existence? That is a change, and everything that comes into existence demonstrates that it is not necessary. The necessary already 'is'.
     From: Sřren Kierkegaard (Philosophical Fragments [1844], p.74)
     A reaction: [SY]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
2614 Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer]
     Full Idea: Nowadays phenomenalism is held to be a theory of perception which says that physical objects are logical constructions out of sense-data.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1)
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
2615 The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer]
     Full Idea: The introduction of the term 'sense-datum' is a means of referring to appearances without prejudging the question of what it is, if anything, that they are appearances of.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1)