Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Phenomenalism', 'Letters to Antoine Arnauld' and 'The Psychophysical Nexus'

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4 ideas

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
It is possible that an omnipotent God might make one and two fail to equal three [Descartes]
     Full Idea: Since every basic truth depends on God's omnipotence, I would not dare to say that God cannot make it....that one and two should not be three.
     From: René Descartes (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1645]), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 01.3
     A reaction: An unusual view. Most people would say that if Descartes can doubt something that simple, he should also doubt his reasons for believing in God's existence.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Pure supervenience explains nothing, and is a sign of something fundamental we don't know [Nagel]
     Full Idea: Pure, unexplained supervenience is never a solution to a problem but a sign that there is something fundamental we don't know.
     From: Thomas Nagel (The Psychophysical Nexus [2000], §III)
     A reaction: This seems right. It is not a theory or an explanation, merely the observation of a correlation which will require explanation. Why are they correlated?
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer]
     Full Idea: Nowadays phenomenalism is held to be a theory of perception which says that physical objects are logical constructions out of sense-data.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1)
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer]
     Full Idea: The introduction of the term 'sense-datum' is a means of referring to appearances without prejudging the question of what it is, if anything, that they are appearances of.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1)