55 ideas
23948 | Wisdom needs both thought and passion, with each reflecting on the other [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Wisdom is a matter of living both thoughtfully and passionately, bringing understanding to bear on every passion and forcing every passion into the light of reflection. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 3.4) | |
A reaction: His main point is that passion is a key part of wisdom, and the idea that wisdom is cold and detached is quite false. Good point. At the very least, wise people must relate sympathetically to others. |
23942 | Philosophy is creating an intellectual conceptual structure for life [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is conceptual sculpture, the shaping and developing of the intellectual structures within which we live our lives. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Intro.1) | |
A reaction: Nice. I tend to see philosophy as conceptual analysis (though creating new concepts doesn't quite fit that), but the vision of creating a huge conceptual sculpture sounds good. I would call it a system. (See my book, 'Natural Ideas'!). |
6979 | Serious metaphysics cares about entailment between sentences [Jackson] |
Full Idea: Serious metaphysics is committed to views about which sentences entail which other sentences. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This does not say that metaphysics is only about entailment, or (even worse) only about sentences. Put another way: if we wish to be wise, we must study the implications of our beliefs. Yes. |
6980 | Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story [Jackson] |
Full Idea: Conceptual analysis is the very business of addressing when and whether a story told in one vocabulary is made true by one told in some allegedly more fundamental vocabulary. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: This is a view of linguistic analysis as focusing on entailments rather than on usage or truth conditions. If philosophy is the attempt to acquire a totally consistent set of beliefs (a plausible view), then Jackson is right. |
6983 | Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis [Jackson] |
Full Idea: Intuitions about possibilities are the bread and butter of conceptual analysis. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Hence the centrality of the debate over conceivability and possibility. Which seems to reduce to the relationship between 'intuition' and 'imagination'. Imagination is a very weak guide to what is possible, and intuition is very uncertain.... |
14707 | Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings [Jackson, by Schroeter] |
Full Idea: On the empiricist view of meaning, the relevance of conceptual analysis to metaphysics is that it establishes that a putative reduction respects the original meaning of the target expression. | |
From: report of Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], p.28) by Laura Schroeter - Two-Dimensional Semantics 2.2.4 |
23945 | Reason is actually passions, guided by perspicacious reflection [Solomon] |
Full Idea: What is called 'reason' is the passions enlightened, 'illuminated' by reflection and supported by a perspicacious deliberation that the emotions in their urgency normally excluded. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Intro.4) | |
A reaction: To suggest that reason more or less is emotions strikes me as missing the point of 'perspicacious', which takes in facts outside our emotional world. We excitedly climb a cliff, then stop when we see the rocks are crumbling. |
7005 | Something can only have a place in a preferred account of things if it is entailed by the account [Jackson] |
Full Idea: The one and only way of having a place in an account told in some set of preferred terms is by being entailed by that account - a view I will refer to as the entry by entailment thesis. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: How do we distinguish between the original account, which seems to be just accepted, and the additions which accrue because they are entailed by it? Why does this club distinguish members from guests? |
6994 | Truth supervenes on being [Jackson] |
Full Idea: Truth supervenes on being. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: A nice slogan for those of us who find the word 'truth' to be meaningful. |
6984 | Smooth reductions preserve high-level laws in the lower level [Jackson] |
Full Idea: In a 'smooth' reduction the laws of the reduced theory (thermodynamics of gases) are pretty much preserved in (and isomorphic with) the corresponding laws in the reducing theory (molecular or kinetic theory of gases). | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Are the 'laws' of weather (e.g. linking humidity, temperature and pressure to rainfall) preserved at the level of physics? One might say that they are not preserved, but they are not lost either (they just fade away). Contradictions would be worrying. |
6978 | Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter [Jackson] |
Full Idea: Baldness is a much more indeterminate matter than is hair distribution, nevetheless baldness is nothing over and above hair distribution. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], p.22) | |
A reaction: This seems to support Williamson's view that there is no vagueness in nature, and that 'vague' is an entirely epistemological concept. |
6993 | Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans [Jackson] |
Full Idea: We typically count things as red just if they have a property that interacts with normal human beings to make the object look red in such a way that their so looking counts as a presentation of the property to normal humans. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This is Jackson's careful statement of the 'Australian' primary property view of colours. He is trying to make red a real property of objects, but personally I take the mention of 'normal' humans as a huge danger sign. Nice try, but no. See Idea 5456. |
6987 | We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity [Jackson] |
Full Idea: We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: It would be nice if there was just one sense of necessity, with the multiplication arising from the different ways in which necessities arise. In chess, checkmate is a necessity which rests on contingencies. Absolute necessities seem different. |
6988 | Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework [Jackson] |
Full Idea: There is notoriously a problem about what to say concerning mathematical sentences within the possible-worlds framework. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.3 n25) | |
A reaction: Presumably this concerns possible axioms and their combinations. |
6975 | Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties [Jackson] |
Full Idea: Possible worlds might be concrete (Lewis), or abstract (Stalnaker), or structured universals (Forrest), or collections of sentences (Jeffrey), or mere combinations of properties and relations (Armstrong). | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: A helpful summary. I don't like concrete, or collections of sentences. Whatever they are, they had better be 'possible', so not any old collection or idea will do. |
2614 | Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer] |
Full Idea: Nowadays phenomenalism is held to be a theory of perception which says that physical objects are logical constructions out of sense-data. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1) |
6982 | Long arithmetic calculations show the a priori can be fallible [Jackson] |
Full Idea: We know that being fallible and being a priori can co-exist - the results of long numerical additions are well-known examples. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: I see this realisation as a good example of progress in philosophy. Russell, who says self-evidence comes in degrees, deserves major credit. It is the key idea that once again makes rationalism respectable. |
6991 | We examine objects to determine colour; we do not introspect [Jackson] |
Full Idea: We examine objects to determine their colour; we do not introspect. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Interesting, but the theory of secondary qualities did not arise from experience, but from a theory about what is actually going on. Compare pain appearing to be in your foot. |
2615 | The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer] |
Full Idea: The introduction of the term 'sense-datum' is a means of referring to appearances without prejudging the question of what it is, if anything, that they are appearances of. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1) |
23957 | We often trust our intuitions as rational, despite their lack of reflection [Solomon] |
Full Idea: We trust certain rational 'intuitions' in ourselves which dispense with reflection but seem to follow an indisputable logic. (note: it is thought ineffable because reflection is the paradigm of rationality. It is no less rational than reflection). | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 6.4) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Solomon uses the example to support that emotion is part of rationality. Since this view of intuition is more or less mine (that intuition can be knowledge, when the justification is obscure), it seems to support his claim. |
23943 | Distinguishing reason from passion is based on an archaic 'faculty' theory [Solomon] |
Full Idea: The distinction between reason and passion is based on an archaic 'faculty' psychology of the human soul. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Intro.2) | |
A reaction: I like faculties, for philosophical purposes, as explanatory tools to account for our metaphysical and conceptual framework, but this point is well made. The danger is that we impose sharp divisions, where reality is more complex. |
6976 | In physicalism, the psychological depends on the physical, not the other way around [Jackson] |
Full Idea: Physicalism is associated with various asymmetry doctrines, most famously with the idea that the psychological depends in some sense on the physical, and not the other way around. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: Sounds okay to me. Shadows depend on objects, and not the other way round. It might suggest properties depending on substances (or bare particulars), but I prefer the dependence of processes on mechanisms (waterfalls on liquid water). |
6986 | Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori? [Jackson] |
Full Idea: Should the necessary passage from the physical account of the world to the psychological one that physicalists are committed to, be placed in the a posteriori or the a priori basket? | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: That is, is 'the physical entails the mental' empirical or a priori? See Idea 3989. If we can at least dream of substance dualism, it is hard to see how it could be fully a priori. I think I prefer to see it as an inductive explanation. |
6992 | If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible [Jackson] |
Full Idea: It would be strange if having learnt the lesson of multiple realisability that the same role may be filled by different states, we turned around and insisted that the converse - different roles filled by the same state - is impossible. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.4 n3) | |
A reaction: Good. The world is full of creatures who seem to enjoy the smell of decay etc. Some people (not me) like horror films. The separation of qualia and role leaves type-type physicalism as a possibility. Survival needs similar roles, not similar qualia. |
23952 | I say bodily chemistry and its sensations have nothing to do with emotions [Solomon] |
Full Idea: I shall be making the claim (sujectively) that the chemistry of the body and the sensations caused by that chemistry have nothing to do with the emotions. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 4.1) | |
A reaction: Surely an unexpected stabbing pain causes fear? Isn't pain supposed to trigger appropriate emotions? That is not to say that emotions are a feature of body chemistry. |
23954 | Emotions are judgements about ourselves, and our place in the world [Solomon] |
Full Idea: An emotion is a basic judgement about our Selves and our place in the world, the projection of the values and ideals, structures and mythologies | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 5.3) | |
A reaction: Solomon's main theory. What about the Frege-Geach problem - that I feel emotions (and judgements) about fictions and remote events, in which my personal concerns and involvement are zero? Presumably these emotions are parasitic on his primary type? |
23960 | Emotions are defined by their objects [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Direction, scope and focus set the stage, but the specific object is what defines the emotion. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 7.3) | |
A reaction: This is presumably the main distinction between an emotion and a mood. He emphasises that the objects are subjective, rather than factual. |
23961 | The heart of an emotion is its judgement of values and morality [Solomon] |
Full Idea: The heart of every emotion is its value judgements, its appraisals of gain and loss, its indictment of offences and its praise of virtue, its often Manichean judgement of 'good' and 'evil'. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 7.6) | |
A reaction: He adds blame and excuse. Some of our strongest emotions can just be identifications, rather than judgements, as when we learn of someone else's triumph or disaster. On the whole I agree, though. This is important for Aristotelian virtue theory. |
23965 | Emotions can be analysed under fifteen headings [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Emotions can be analysed by direction, scope/focus, object, criteria, status, evaluations, responsibility, intersubjectivity, distance, mythology, desire, power, strategy. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 8) | |
A reaction: These are the headings Solomon actually applies in his breakdown of most of the main emotions. See his book for explanations of each of them. If people say philosophy makes no progress, I'd at least point to helpful thinking of this kind. |
23959 | Some emotions are externally directed, others internally [Solomon] |
Full Idea: 'Outer-directed' emotions (such as fear) are about particular situations, objects, or other people. …The 'inner-directed' emotions (such as vanity or regret) take one's Self as their focal point. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 7.1) | |
A reaction: This is Solomon's own distinction. Some of the emotions he cites, such as vanity, seem to me more like long term virtues or vices, rather than emotions. He did say, though, that you can have emotions without feeling, such as long-term hate. |
23946 | The passions are subjective, concerning what is important to me, rather than facts [Solomon] |
Full Idea: The passions are uniquely subjective, although they sometimes pretend to have a certain objective status. They are not concerned with the world, but with my world. They are not concerned with 'the facts', but with what is important. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Intro.5) | |
A reaction: Values pick out what is 'important'. This idea sums up Solomon's rather solipsistic view of emotions. I accept that emotions are responses, rather than objective judgements, but there is objectivity in their social dimension. Why care about politics? |
23940 | Emotions are strategies for maximising our sense of dignity and self-esteem [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Every emotion is a strategy, a purposive attempt to structure our world in such a way as to maximise our sense of personal dignity and self-esteem. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Pref) | |
A reaction: This is the main thesis of Solomon's book. There doesn't seem to be much to admire in what he takes to be our chief motivation. I would put a much more social spin on it - that our underlying urge is not self-promotion, but to fit into a community. |
23949 | Passions exist as emotions, moods and desires, which all generate meaning [Solomon] |
Full Idea: There are three fundamental species passions - emotions, moods, and desires. …What all passions have in common is their ability to bestow meaning to the circumstances of our lives. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 3.2) | |
A reaction: Moods are said to be 'generalised emotions', where emotions are about something, and desires add objectives. Solomon criticises rigid divisions between mental faculties and states, but it is hard to disagree with this distinction. |
23956 | The Myth of the Passions says they are irrational, uncontrolled and damaging [Solomon] |
Full Idea: The Myth of the Passions says emotions are irrational forces beyond our control, disruptive and stupid, unthinking and counterproductive, against our 'better interests', and often ridiculous. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 6.4) | |
A reaction: The Myth is very unlikely to be correct, for evolutionary reasons. How could there be a selection for a mental feature which distorts truths and leads to dangerous misjudgements? Most emotions motivate us to act successfully. So why do some run wild? |
23963 | Which emotions we feel depends on our sense of our own powers [Solomon] |
Full Idea: An emotion depends on an estimation of our own power. If a lover is jealous they welcome confrontation, but if they are just envious they assume impotence from the start. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 7.12) | |
A reaction: This seems particularly true of politics, where the possibility (or not) of influencing events makes a huge difference. We can picture a huge variety of emotions when a fight breaks out in public. |
23936 | It is only our passions which give our lives meaning [Solomon] |
Full Idea: It is our passions, and our passions alone, which provide our lives with meaning. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Pref) | |
A reaction: This presumably entails that the lives of plants have no meaning. It also seems to be rather egotistical, since it is not clear why anyone else's life should have meaning for me, if I don't directly experience their passions. Interesting, though. |
23953 | Feeling is a superficial aspect of emotion, and may be indeterminate, or even absent [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Feeling is the ornamentation of emotion, not its essence. ...For example, what is the difference in feeling between embarrassment and shame? …We may also experience an emotion like subdued anger or envy with no feeling. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 4.2) | |
A reaction: This is very persuasive, and supports the idea that what matters in an emotion is its content, rather than its phenomenology. He adds later that we are often mistaken about our own emotions. |
23964 | There are no 'basic' emotions, only socially prevalent ones [Solomon] |
Full Idea: There are no 'basic' emotions, only those emotions which are prevalent in a particular society. This reduction to a small set makes it impossible to appreciate the richness of our emotional lives. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 8) | |
A reaction: He cites Descartes as a culprit, and John Watson's famous list of fear, dependency and rage. I think Solomon is probably right. He suggests that the lists are usually individualistic and negative. Individuals may have their private basics! |
23937 | It is reason which needs the anchorage of passions, rather than vice versa [Solomon] |
Full Idea: It is not the passions who require the controls and rationalisations of reason. Rather, it is reason that requires the anchorage and earthy wisdom of the passions. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Pref) | |
A reaction: I like the second half of this. We don't just follow the winds of arguments; we decide into which of the many conflicting winds we should steer the rational arguments, and that needs passions. Only a fool doesn't rationally control their passions. |
23947 | Dividing ourselves into confrontational reason and passion destroys our harmonious whole [Solomon] |
Full Idea: To divide the soul into reason and passion …divides us against ourselves, forcing us each to be defensively half a person, instead of a harmonious whole. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 2.3) | |
A reaction: This is the best aspect of Solomon's book. I'm not sure, though, how this works in practice. Should I allow the winds of emotion to alter the course of my reasoning, or stunt my feelings by always insisting that reason plays a part? That's too dualist! |
23958 | The supposed irrationality of our emotions is often tactless or faulty expression of them [Solomon] |
Full Idea: What is often called the 'irrationality' of our emotions is rather the faulty timing or inept choice of their expressions. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 6.4) | |
A reaction: The irrationality can be pretty obvious when having a tantrum over trivia, or resenting some tiny slight, or falling in love with a dead film star. That said, his point is well made. |
6996 | Folk psychology covers input, internal role, and output [Jackson] |
Full Idea: Folk psychology has a tripartite nature, with input clauses, internal role clauses, and output clauses. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: Interesting, particularly that folk psychology refers to internal roles, or attempts to explain what is going on inside the 'black box'. The folk have collectively worked out a standard flow diagram for human thought. |
6977 | Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so [Jackson] |
Full Idea: I have been convinced by arguments (e.g. of Perry, Castañeda and Lewis) that egocentric or de se content is irreducibly so. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This is associated with the use of indexicals (like 'I' and 'now') in language. Quine disagrees, and should not be written off. Any theory of content, concepts, meaning etc. must clearly taken account of such subjective language. |
6990 | Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water' [Jackson] |
Full Idea: My guess is that objectors to the deflationary account of the Twin Earth parable are confusing the essential properties of water with the question of what is essential for being water. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: That is, we must distinguish between the actual ontology of water's properties and the conditions under which we (in our society) apply the word 'water'. Interesting. The latter issue, though, might push us back towards internalism... |
6985 | Analysis is finding necessary and sufficient conditions by studying possible cases [Jackson] |
Full Idea: Conceptual analysis is sometimes understood as the business of finding necessary and sufficient conditions by the method of possible cases. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Some (e.g. Stich) reject this, but it seems to me undeniable that the procedure can be very illuminating, even if it is never totally successful. Jackson prefers to see analysis as the study of entailments between stories about the world. |
6995 | Successful predication supervenes on nature [Jackson] |
Full Idea: Successful predication supervenes on nature. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: A nice slogan, but it is in danger of being a tautology. If I say x and y 'are my favourites/are interesting', is that 'successful' predication? Is 'Juliet is the sun' unsuccessful? |
6989 | I can understand "He has a beard", without identifying 'he', and hence the truth conditions [Jackson] |
Full Idea: If I hear someone say "He has a beard", and I don't know whether it is Jackson, Jones, or someone else, I don't know which proposition is being expressed in the sense of not knowing the conditions under which what is said is true. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This is the neatest and simplest problem I have encountered for Davidson's truth-conditions account of meaning. However, we probably just say that we understand the sense but not the reference. The strict-and-literal but not contextual meaning. |
6998 | Folk morality does not clearly distinguish between doing and allowing [Jackson] |
Full Idea: We have, it seems to me, currently no clear sense of the place and rationale of the distinction between doing and allowing in folk morality. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: Does this mean that philosophers should endeavour to appear on television in order to improve folk morality, so that Jackson, back at the ranch, can then infer the meanings of moral terms from the new improved version? |
6997 | Moral functionalism says moral terms get their meaning from their role in folk morality [Jackson] |
Full Idea: Moral functionalism is the view that the meanings of moral terms are given by their place in the network of input, internal clauses, and output that makes up folk psychology. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: Jackson considers this enough to support a cognitivist view of morality. In assuming that there is something stable called 'folk morality' he seems to be ignoring questions about cultural relativism. |
7000 | Which are prior - thin concepts like right, good, ought; or thick concepts like kindness, equity etc.? [Jackson] |
Full Idea: 'Centralists' (e.g. Bernard Williams) say thin ethical concepts (right, good, ought) are conceptually fundamental; 'non-centralists' (e.g. Susan Hurley) say that such concepts are not conceptually prior to kindness, equity and the like. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: My immediate intuition is to side with Susan Hurley, since morality grows out of immediate relationships, not out of intellectual principles and theoretical generalisations. This would go with particularist views of virtue theory. |
23944 | Emotions are our life force, and the source of most of our values [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Emotions are the life force of the soul, the source of most of our values (not all: there is always hunger, thirst, and fatigue). | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Intro.4) | |
A reaction: I am beginning to worry that Solomon's account is too individual and subjective. My personal values may derive from my emotions, but I think human and social values are based much more on objective observations and facts. We are social, not solipsists. |
23962 | Lovers adopt the interests of their beloved, rather than just valuing them [Solomon] |
Full Idea: It is often said that love takes the interests of the lover as being more important than one's own; but here again we would rather say that love takes the lovers interests as its own. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 7.9) | |
A reaction: This is because he sees emotions as almost entirely self-centred, and almost never altruistic. To me the evolutionary picture suggest a more social view. Many people want the lives of their ex- to go well, without knowing their new interests. |
23941 | 'Absurdity' is just the result of our wrong choices in life [Solomon] |
Full Idea: The 'absurdity of life' is nothing than our own unsatisfactory choices, typically of defensiveness and resentment, competition, and 'meaningless' routines. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Pref) | |
A reaction: He seems to have Camus particularly in mind. He sees love and co-operation as the cure. I sort of agree, but somewhere in all of our minds there lurks an abyss, with the good life looking like a distraction from it. |
23955 | Ideologies are mythologies which guide our actions [Solomon] |
Full Idea: Mythologies become ideologies when we play a role in them, live in them, take action and take sides. | |
From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], 6.1) | |
A reaction: This may well be a sceptical American attitude to ideology, since 'mythology' implies a fiction. But I think for most of us there exists the possibility of a good ideology, which correctly points us towards a better life. Dangerous things, though! |
6999 | It is hard to justify the huge difference in our judgements of abortion and infanticide [Jackson] |
Full Idea: We allow that abortion is permissible in many circumstances, but infanticide is hardly ever permissible, and yet it is hard to justify this disparity in moral judgement in the sense of finding the relevant difference. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: The implications of this are tough to face. A foetus is (maybe) just not as important as a new-born babe - and so a new-born babe is of less importance than a five-year old. Birth is (or was) a hugely dangerous hurdle to be cleared. |