5 ideas
6627 | Radical pragmatists abandon the notion of truth [Stich, by Lowe] |
Full Idea: Some radical pragmatists, such as Stich, are ready to abandon the notion of truth. | |
From: report of Stephen P. Stich (The Fragmentation of Reason [1990]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.3 n18 | |
A reaction: Such a proposal strikes me as silly (unless the vacuum left by truth can be filled by something better than just the test of whether 'it works'). It currently strikes me that pragmatism has a sane wing (led by Peirce), and a mad wing. |
18170 | The Axiom of Reducibility is self-effacing: if true, it isn't needed [Quine] |
Full Idea: The Axiom of Reducibility is self-effacing: if it is true, the ramification it is meant to cope with was pointless to begin with. | |
From: Willard Quine (Introduction to Russell's Theory of Types [1967], p.152), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics I.1 | |
A reaction: Maddy says the rejection of Reducibility collapsed the ramified theory of types into the simple theory. |
2614 | Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer] |
Full Idea: Nowadays phenomenalism is held to be a theory of perception which says that physical objects are logical constructions out of sense-data. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1) |
2615 | The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer] |
Full Idea: The introduction of the term 'sense-datum' is a means of referring to appearances without prejudging the question of what it is, if anything, that they are appearances of. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1) |
4765 | Stich accepts eliminativism (labelled 'pragmatism') about rationality and normativity [Stich, by Engel] |
Full Idea: Stich accepts a form of eliminativism (which he calls 'pragmatism') about rationality and normativity generally. | |
From: report of Stephen P. Stich (The Fragmentation of Reason [1990]) by Pascal Engel - Truth §5.3 | |
A reaction: This seems to be the correct position for a Humean empiricist connectionist. Presumably he has some good reasons for eliminating rationality. |