4 ideas
10801 | Either reference really matters, or we don't need to replace it with substitutions [Quine] |
Full Idea: When we reconstrue quantification in terms of substituted expressions rather than real values, we waive reference. ...but if reference matters, we cannot afford to waive it as a category; and if it does not, we do not need to. | |
From: Willard Quine (Reply to Professor Marcus [1962], p.183) | |
A reaction: An odd dilemma to pose. Presumably the substitution account is an attempt to explain how language actually works, without mentioning dubious direct ontological commitment in the quantifiers. |
22014 | Consciousness is not entirely representational, because there are pains, and the self [Schulze, by Pinkard] |
Full Idea: Schulze said Reinhold and Kant violated their own theory with the thing-in-itself, and that Reinhold was wrong that all consciousnes is representational (since pain isn't), and the self can't represent itself without a regress. | |
From: report of Gottlob Schulze (Aenesidemus [1792]) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 05 | |
A reaction: [my compressed version] This article demolished Reinhold, which is a shame, because if he had responded constructively to these criticisms he might have reached be best theory of his age. These are analytic style objections, by counterexample. |
2614 | Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer] |
Full Idea: Nowadays phenomenalism is held to be a theory of perception which says that physical objects are logical constructions out of sense-data. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1) |
2615 | The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer] |
Full Idea: The introduction of the term 'sense-datum' is a means of referring to appearances without prejudging the question of what it is, if anything, that they are appearances of. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1) |