Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Phenomenalism', 'Reply to Professor Marcus' and 'Matter and Motion Cannot Think'

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Either reference really matters, or we don't need to replace it with substitutions [Quine]
     Full Idea: When we reconstrue quantification in terms of substituted expressions rather than real values, we waive reference. ...but if reference matters, we cannot afford to waive it as a category; and if it does not, we do not need to.
     From: Willard Quine (Reply to Professor Marcus [1962], p.183)
     A reaction: An odd dilemma to pose. Presumably the substitution account is an attempt to explain how language actually works, without mentioning dubious direct ontological commitment in the quantifiers.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer]
     Full Idea: Nowadays phenomenalism is held to be a theory of perception which says that physical objects are logical constructions out of sense-data.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1)
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer]
     Full Idea: The introduction of the term 'sense-datum' is a means of referring to appearances without prejudging the question of what it is, if anything, that they are appearances of.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1)
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
That all matter thinks is absurd, and would make each part of our bodies a distinct self-consciousness [Bentley]
     Full Idea: [Belief in thinking matter] leads to monstrous absurdities. …Every stock and stone would be a percipient and rational creature. …every single Atom of our bodies would be a distinct Animal, endued with self-consciousness and personal sensation of its own.
     From: Richard Bentley (Matter and Motion Cannot Think [1692], p.14-15), quoted by Matthew Cobb - The Idea of the Brain 2
     A reaction: Sounds correct, though presumably panpsychists don't think the flickers of consciousness in my toenails and hair constitute full-blown persons. I can't imagine what awareness is being claimed for my toenails.