30 ideas
15105 | F(x) walked into a bar. The barman said.. [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: F(x) walked into a bar. The barman said, 'Sorry, we don't cater for functions'. | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
7755 | Singular terms refer, using proper names, definite descriptions, singular personal pronouns, demonstratives, etc. [Lycan] |
Full Idea: The paradigmatic referring devices are singular terms, denoting particular items. In English these include proper names, definite descriptions, singular personal pronouns, demonstrative pronouns, and a few others. | |
From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch. 1) | |
A reaction: This list provides the agenda for twentieth century philosophy of language, since this is the point where language is supposed to hook onto the world. |
12408 | Sartre to Waitress: Coffee with no cream, please... [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: Sartre to Waitress: Coffee with no cream, please. Waitress: Sorry, we're out of cream; would no milk do? | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
12397 | Said Plato: 'The things that we feel... [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: Said Plato: 'The things that we feel/ Are not ontologically real,/ But just the excrescence/ Of numinous essence/ Our senses can never reveal.' [Basil Ransome-Davis] | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
12407 | Barman to Descartes: Would you like another drink?... [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: Barman to Descartes: Would you like another drink? Descartes: I think not (...and promptly vanishes) | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
12399 | There was a young student called Fred... [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: There was a young student called Fred,/ Who was questioned on Descartes and said:/ 'It's perfectly clear/ That I'm not really here,/ For I haven't a thought in my head.' [V.R. Ormerod] | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
20963 | A philosopher and his wife are out for a drive... [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: A philosopher and his wife are out for a drive in the country. 'Oh look!' she says, 'Those sheep have been shorn.' 'Yes', says the philosopher, 'on this side'. | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
2614 | Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer] |
Full Idea: Nowadays phenomenalism is held to be a theory of perception which says that physical objects are logical constructions out of sense-data. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1) |
12404 | Dear Sir, Your astonishment's odd.... [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: (reply to 12403) Dear Sir, Your astonishment's odd:/ I am always about in the Quad./ And that's why the tree/ Will continue to be,/ Since observed by Yours faithfully, God.' [anon] | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
12403 | There once was a man who said: 'God... [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: There once was a man who said: 'God/ Must think it exceedingly odd/ If he finds that this tree/ Continues to be,/ When there's no-one about in the Quad.' [Ronald Knox] (reply in 12404) | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
12402 | ..But if he's a student of Berkeley... [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: (continued from 12401) ..But if he's a student of Berkeley,/ One thing will emerge, rather starkly,/ That he ought to believe/ What his senses perceive,/ No matter how dimly or darkly. [Leslie Johnson] | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
12409 | The philosopher Berkeley once said.. [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: The philosopher Berkeley once said/ In the dark to a maid in his bed:/ 'No perception, my dear,/ Means I'm not really here,/ But only a thought in your head.' [P.W.R. Foot] | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
14694 | "My dog's got synaesthesia." How does he smell? ..... [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: "My dog's got synaesthesia." How does he smell? "Purple." | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
2615 | The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer] |
Full Idea: The introduction of the term 'sense-datum' is a means of referring to appearances without prejudging the question of what it is, if anything, that they are appearances of. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1) |
12401 | A toper who spies in the distance... [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: A toper who spies in the distance,/ Striped tigers, will get some assistance/ From reading Descartes,/ Who holds that it's part/ Of his duty to doubt their existence. ... [Leslie Johnson] - (continued in 12402) | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
12410 | There once was a man who said 'Damn!... [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: There once was a man who said 'Damn!/ It is borne in upon me I am/ An engine that moves/ In predestinate grooves:/ I'm not even a bus, I'm a tram.' [M.E. Hare] | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
9392 | How do behaviourists greet each other? [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: How do behaviourists greet each other? Hi - you're fine, how am I? | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
7768 | The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation [Lycan] |
Full Idea: The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation. | |
From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: This suggests a nice connection to Fodor's account of intentional thinking. The whole package sounds right to me (though the representations need not be 'symbolic', or in mentalese). |
7766 | Meaning must be known before we can consider verification [Lycan] |
Full Idea: How could we know whether a sentence is verifiable unless we already knew what it says? | |
From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a devastating objection to verificationism. Lycan suggests that you can formulate a preliminary meaning, without accepting true meaningfulness. Maybe verification just concerns truth, and not meaning. |
7764 | Could I successfully use an expression, without actually understanding it? [Lycan] |
Full Idea: Could I not know the use of an expression and fall in with it, mechanically, but without understanding it? | |
From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: In a foreign country, you might successfully recite a long complex sentence, without understanding a single word. This doesn't doom the 'use' theory, but it means that quite a lot of detail needs to be filled in. |
7763 | It is hard to state a rule of use for a proper name [Lycan] |
Full Idea: Proper names pose a problem for the "use" theorist. Try stating a rule of use for the name 'William G. Lycan'. | |
From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: Presumably it is normally used in connection with a particular human being, and is typically the subject of a grammatical sentence. Any piece of language could also be used to, say, attract someone's attention. |
7770 | Truth conditions will come out the same for sentences with 'renate' or 'cordate' [Lycan] |
Full Idea: A Davidsonian truth theory will not be able to distinguish the meaning of a sentence containing 'renate' from that of one containing 'cordate'. | |
From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: One might achieve the distinction by referring to truth conditions in possible worlds, if there are possible worlds where some cordates are not renate. See Idea 7773. |
7773 | A sentence's truth conditions is the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true [Lycan] |
Full Idea: A sentence's truth conditions can be taken to be the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true. | |
From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: Presumably the meaning can't be complete possible worlds, so this must be a supplement to the normal truth conditions view proposed by Davidson. It particularly addresses the problem seen in Idea 7770. |
7774 | Possible worlds explain aspects of meaning neatly - entailment, for example, is the subset relation [Lycan] |
Full Idea: The possible worlds construal affords an elegant algebra of meaning by way of set theory: e.g. entailment between sentences is just the subset relation - S1 entails S2 if S2 is true in any world in which S1 is true. | |
From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: We might want to separate the meanings of sentences from their entailments (though Brandom links them, see Idea 7765). |
12405 | 'If you're aristocratic,' said Nietzsche... [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: 'If you're aristocratic,' said Nietzsche,/ 'It's thumbs up, you're OK. Pleased to mietzsche./ If you're working-class bores,/ It's thumbs down and up yours!/ If you don't know your place, then I'll tietzsche.' [Gerry Hamill] | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
9391 | Why do anarchists drink herbal tea? [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: Why do anarchists drink herbal tea? Because proper tea is theft. | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
12400 | Cries the maid: 'You must marry me Hume!'... [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: Cries the maid: 'You must marry me Hume!'/ A statement that made David fume./ He said: 'In cause and effect,/ There is a defect;/ That it's mine you can only assume.' [P.W.R. Foot] | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
16527 | Causation - we all thought we knew it/ Till Hume came along and saw through it/…. [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: Causation - we all thought we knew it / Till Hume came along and saw through it / We notice that A / Follows B every day / And frankly that's all there is to it. | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
17592 | The barman called 'Time!', and Augustine said..... [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: The barman called 'Time!'. Augustine: 'I don't know what you mean, though I did before you said that'. | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
15208 | The past, present and future walked into a bar.... [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: The past, present and future walked into a bar. It was tense. | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |