4 ideas
| 18491 | The idea of 'making' can be mere conceptual explanation (like 'because') [Künne] |
| Full Idea: If we say 'being a child of our parent's sibling makes him your first cousin', that can be paraphrased using 'because', and this is the 'because' of conceptual explanation: the second part elucidates the sense of the first part. | |
| From: Wolfgang Künne (Conceptions of Truth [2003], 3.5.2) | |
| A reaction: Fans of truth-making are certainly made uncomfortable by talk of 'what makes this a good painting' or 'this made my day'. They need a bit more sharpness to the concept of 'making' a truth. |
| 2614 | Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: Nowadays phenomenalism is held to be a theory of perception which says that physical objects are logical constructions out of sense-data. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1) |
| 2615 | The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: The introduction of the term 'sense-datum' is a means of referring to appearances without prejudging the question of what it is, if anything, that they are appearances of. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (Phenomenalism [1947], §1) |
| 15877 | The aim of science is just to create a comprehensive, elegant language to describe brute facts [Poincaré, by Harré] |
| Full Idea: In Poincaré's view, we try to construct a language within which the brute facts of experience are expressed as comprehensively and as elegantly as possible. The job of science is the forging of a language precisely suited to that purpose. | |
| From: report of Henri Poincaré (The Value of Science [1906], Pt III) by Rom Harré - Laws of Nature 2 | |
| A reaction: I'm often struck by how obscure and difficult our accounts of self-evident facts can be. Chairs are easy, and the metaphysics of chairs is hideous. Why is that? I'm a robust realist, but I like Poincaré's idea. He permits facts. |