Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics', 'Russell' and 'Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity'

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9 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics

21959	Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW]
	Full Idea: Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things.
	From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], Intro)
	A reaction: This is the first sentence of Moore's book, and a touchstone idea all the way through. It stands up well, because it says enough without committing to too much. I have to agree with it. It implies explanation as the key. I like generality too.

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism

6408	Russell needed three extra axioms to reduce maths to logic: infinity, choice and reducibility [Grayling]
	Full Idea: In order to deduce the theorems of mathematics from purely logical axioms, Russell had to add three new axioms to those of standards logic, which were: the axiom of infinity, the axiom of choice, and the axiom of reducibility.
	From: A.C. Grayling (Russell [1996], Ch.2)
	A reaction: The third one was adopted to avoid his 'barber' paradox, but many thinkers do not accept it. The interesting question is why anyone would 'accept' or 'reject' an axiom.

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding

17304	As causation links across time, grounding links the world across levels [Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: Grounding is something like metaphysical causation. Just as causation links the world across time, grounding links the world across levels. Grounding connects the more fundamental to the less fundamental, and thereby backs a certain form of explanation.
	From: Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], Intro)
	A reaction: Obviously you need 'levels' for this, which we should take to be structural levels.

17306	If ground is transitive and irreflexive, it has a strict partial ordering, giving structure [Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: By treating grounding as transitive (and irreflexive), one generates a strict partial ordering that induces metaphysical structure.
	From: Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], Intro)
	A reaction: Schaffer's paper goes on to attach the claim that grounding is transitive, but I didn't find his examples very convincing.

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism

21958	Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW]
	Full Idea: Appearances in general are nothing outside our representations, which is just what we mean by transcendental ideality.
	From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], B535/A507)

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence

6414	Two propositions might seem self-evident, but contradict one another [Grayling]
	Full Idea: Two propositions might contradict each other despite appearing self-evident when considered separately.
	From: A.C. Grayling (Russell [1996], Ch.2)
	A reaction: Russell's proposal (Idea 5416) is important here, that self-evidence comes in degrees. If self-evidence was all-or-nothing, Grayling's point would be a major problem, but it isn't. Bonjour explores the idea more fully (e.g. Idea 3704)

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / b. Contrastive explanations

17308	Explaining 'Adam ate the apple' depends on emphasis, and thus implies a contrast [Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: Explaining why ADAM ate the apple is a different matter from explaining why he ATE the apple, and from why he ate THE APPLE. ...In my view the best explanations incorporate ....contrastive information.
	From: Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], 4.3.1)
	A reaction: But why are the contrasts Eve, or throwing it, or a pear? It occurs to me that this is wrong! The contrast is with anything else which could have gone in subject, verb or object position. It is a matter of categories, not of contrasts.

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature

17305	I take what is fundamental to be the whole spatiotemporal manifold and its fields [Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: I myself would prefer to speak of what is fundamental in terms of the whole spatiotemporal manifold and the fields that permeate it, with parts counting as derivative of the whole.
	From: Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], 4.1.1)
	A reaction: Not quite the Parmenidean One, since it has parts, but a nice try at updating the great man. Note the reference to 'fields', suggesting that this view is grounded in the physics rather than metaphysics. How many fields has it got?

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation

17307	Nowadays causation is usually understood in terms of equations and variable ranges [Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: The leading treatments of causation work within 'structural equation models', with events represented via variables each of which is allotted a range of permitted values, which constitute a 'contrast space'.
	From: Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], 4.3.1)
	A reaction: Like Woodward's idea that causation is a graph, this seems to be a matter of plotting or formalising correlations between activities, which is a very Humean approach to causation.