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All the ideas for 'The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics', 'Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making' and 'Mapping the Mind'

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36 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW]
     Full Idea: Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things.
     From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], Intro)
     A reaction: This is the first sentence of Moore's book, and a touchstone idea all the way through. It stands up well, because it says enough without committing to too much. I have to agree with it. It implies explanation as the key. I like generality too.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami]
     Full Idea: It is claimed that truth-makers explain universals, or ontological commitment, or commitment to realism, or to the correspondence theory of truth, or to falsify behaviourism or phenomenalism.
     From: Adolph Rami (Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making [2009], 04)
     A reaction: [compressed] This expands the view that truth-making is based on its explanatory power, rather than on its intuitive correctness. I take the theory to presuppose realism. I don't believe in universals. It marginalises correspondence. Commitment is good!
The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami]
     Full Idea: The two strategies for justifying the truth-maker principle are that it has an explanatory role (for certain philosophical problems and theses), or that it captures the best philosophical intuition of the situation.
     From: Adolph Rami (Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making [2009], 04)
     A reaction: I would go for 'intuitive', but not in the sense of a pure intuition, but with 'intuitive' as a shorthand for overall coherence. To me the appeal of truth-maker is its place in a naturalistic view of reality. I love explanation, but not here.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami]
     Full Idea: The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-many. In the latter case, different truths may have the same truth-maker, and one truth may have different truth-makers.
     From: Adolph Rami (Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making [2009], 05)
     A reaction: 'There is at least one cat' obviously has many possible truth-makers. Many statements will be made true by the mere existence of a particular cat (such as 'there is an animal in the room' and 'there is a cat in the room'). Many-many wins?
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami]
     Full Idea: The main full-blooded truth-maker principle is that x is true iff there is a y that is its truth-maker. This implies the principles that if x is true x has a truth-maker, and the principle that if x has a truth-maker then x is true.
     From: Adolph Rami (Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making [2009], 03)
     A reaction: [compressed] Rami calls the second principle 'maximalism' and the third principle 'purism'. To reject maximalism is to hold a more restricted version of truth-makers. That is, the claim is that lots of truths have truth-makers.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami]
     Full Idea: Most truth-maker theorists regard the necessitation of a truth by a truth-maker as a necessary condition of truth-making.
     From: Adolph Rami (Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making [2009], 07)
     A reaction: It seems to me that reality is crammed full of potential truth-makers, but not crammed full of truths. If there is no thinking in the universe, then there are no truths. If that is false, then what sort of weird beast is a 'truth'?
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami]
     Full Idea: Truthmaker anti-monism holds the view that there are truth-makers of different kinds. For example, objects, facts, tropes or events can all be regarded as truthmakers. Objects seem right for existential truths but not others, so anti-monism seems best.
     From: Adolph Rami (Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making [2009], 05)
     A reaction: Presumably we need to identify the different types of truth (analytic, synthetic, general, particular...), and only then ask what truth-makers there are for the different types. To presuppose one type of truthmaker would be crazy.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami]
     Full Idea: As truth-makers, some theorists only accept states of affairs, some only accept individuals and states of affairs, and some only accept individuals and particular properties.
     From: Adolph Rami (Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making [2009], 06)
     A reaction: It seems to me rash to opt for one of these. Truths come in wide-ranging and subtly different types, and the truth-makers probably have a similar range. Any one of these theories will almost certainly quickly succumb to a counterexample.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami]
     Full Idea: The thesis that 'truth supervenes on being' (with or without possible worlds) offers only a necessary condition for the truth of contingent propositions, whereas the standard truth-maker theory offers necessary and sufficient conditions.
     From: Adolph Rami (Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making [2009], 09)
     A reaction: The point, I suppose, is that the change in being might be irrelevant to the proposition in question, so any old change in being will not ensure a change in the truth of the proposition. Again we ask - but what is this truth about?
'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami]
     Full Idea: The important advantage of 'truth supervenes on being' is that it can be applied to positive and negative contingent truths, without postulating any entities that are responsible for the truth of negative truths.
     From: Adolph Rami (Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making [2009], 09)
     A reaction: [For this reason, Lewis favours a possible worlds version of the theory] I fear that it solves that problem by making the truth-maker theory so broad-brush that it not longer says very much, apart from committing it to naturalism.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami]
     Full Idea: The 'entailment principle' for truth-makers says that if x is a truth-maker for y, and y entails z, then x is a truth-maker for z.
     From: Adolph Rami (Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making [2009], 08)
     A reaction: I think the correct locution is that 'x is a potential truth-maker for z' (should anyone every formulate z, which in most cases they never will, since the entailments of y are probably infinite). Merricks would ask 'but are y and z about the same thing?'.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami]
     Full Idea: Most truth-maker theorists are internalists about the truth-maker relation. ...But the correspondence theory makes truth an external relation to some portion of reality. So a truth-maker internalist should not claim to be a narrow correspondence theorist.
     From: Adolph Rami (Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making [2009], 05)
     A reaction: [wording rearranged] Like many of Rami's distinctions in this article, this feels simplistic. Sharp distinctions can only be made using sharp vocabulary, and there isn't much of that around in philosophy!
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami]
     Full Idea: One guiding intuition concerning a correspondence theory of truth says that the relation that accounts for the truth of a truth-bearer is some kind of representation relation.
     From: Adolph Rami (Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making [2009], 05)
     A reaction: I unfashionably cling on to some sort of correspondence theory. The paradigm case is of a non-linguistic animal which forms correct or incorrect views about its environment. Truth is a relation, not a property. I see the truth in a bad representation.
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami]
     Full Idea: According to the moderate deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property.
     From: Adolph Rami (Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making [2009], 10)
     A reaction: [He cites Horwich 1998] That is, I presume, that truth is embodied in an infinity of propositions of the form '"p" is true iff p'.
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula [Rami]
     Full Idea: There are good reasons for the truth-maker theorist to reject the converse Barcan formula.
     From: Adolph Rami (Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making [2009], note 16)
     A reaction: In the text (p.15) Rami cites the inference from 'necessarily everything exists' to 'everything exists necessarily'. [See Williamson 1999]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
Brain lesions can erase whole categories of perception, suggesting they are hard-wired [Carter,R]
     Full Idea: The discovery that a single brain lesion can erase all knowledge of man-made artefacts, or all knowledge of animals, suggests that these categories somehow hard-wired into the brain - that we all have a set of 'memory pigeonholes'.
     From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.190)
     A reaction: Presumably something can become 'hard-wired' through experience, rather than from birth. The whole idea of 'hard-wired' seems misleading about the brain. What matters is that the brain physically constructs categories.
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties [Rami]
     Full Idea: An internal relation is 'existential' if x and y relate in that way whenever they both exist. An internal relation is 'qualitative' if x and y relate in that way whenever they have certain intrinsic properties.
     From: Adolph Rami (Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making [2009], 05)
     A reaction: [compressed - Rami likes to write these things in fashionable quasi-algebra, but I have a strong prejudice in this database for expressing ideas in English; call me old-fashioned] The distinction strikes me as simplistic. I would involve dispositions.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW]
     Full Idea: Appearances in general are nothing outside our representations, which is just what we mean by transcendental ideality.
     From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], B535/A507)
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Sense organs don't discriminate; they reduce various inputs to the same electrical pulses [Carter,R]
     Full Idea: Despite their variety, each sense organ translates its stimulus into electrical pulses; rather than discriminating one type of input from another, the sense organs actually make them more alike.
     From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.174)
     A reaction: An illuminating observation, which modern 'naïve realists' should bear in mind. Secondary qualities are entirely unrelated to the nature of the input, and are merely 'what the brain decides to make of it'. Discrimination is in our neurons.
The recognition sequence is: classify, name, locate, associate, feel [Carter,R, by PG]
     Full Idea: The sequence of events in the brain for perceptual recognition is first identifying a rough class for the object, then a name, then a location, then some associations, and finally an emotion.
     From: report of Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.181) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: This seems to be one of those places where neuro-science trumps philosophy. You can't argue with empirical research, so philosophical theories had better adapt themselves to this sequence. The big modern discovery is the place of emotion in recognition.
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
There seems to be no dividing line between a memory and a thought [Carter,R]
     Full Idea: It has become clear from research that there is no clear dividing line between a memory and a thought.
     From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.308)
     A reaction: This always struck me as an obvious criticism of Descartes, when he claimed that memory was not an essential part of the 'thinking thing'. How can you think or understand without memory of the different phases of your thoughts? No memory, no mind!
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
No one knows if animals are conscious [Carter,R]
     Full Idea: No one knows if animals are conscious.
     From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.155)
     A reaction: This is a report from the front line of brain research, and should be born in mind when over-confident people make pronouncements about this topic. It strikes me as important to grasp that animals MIGHT not be conscious.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
Pain doesn't have one brain location, but is linked to attention and emotion [Carter,R]
     Full Idea: Scans show there is no such thing as a pain centre; pain springs mainly from the activation of areas associated with attention and emotion.
     From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p. 12)
     A reaction: Most brain research points to the complex multi-layered nature of experiences that were traditionally considered simple. We can be distracted from a pain, and an enormous number of factors can affect our degree of dislike of a given pain.
Proper brains appear at seven weeks, and neonates have as many neurons as adults do [Carter,R]
     Full Idea: The main sections of the brain, including the cerebral cortex, are visible within seven weeks of conception, and by the time the child is born the brain contains as many neurons - about 100 billion - as it will have as an adult.
     From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p. 17)
     A reaction: Of interest in the abortion debate, and also in thinking about personal identity. However, it seems clear that the number of connections, rather than neurons, is what really matters. A small infant may well lack personal identity.
In primates, brain size correlates closely with size of social group [Carter,R]
     Full Idea: Brain size in primates is closely associated with the size of the social group in which the animal lives.
     From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.257)
     A reaction: Intriguing. Humans can have huge social groups because of language, which suggests a chicken-or-egg question. Language, intelligence and size of social group must have expanded together in humans.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
Consciousness involves awareness, perception, self-awareness, attention and reflection [Carter,R]
     Full Idea: Awareness, perception, self-awareness, attention and reflection are all separate components of consciousness, and the quality of our experience varies according to which and how many of them are present.
     From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.300)
     A reaction: Philosophers like to emphasise 'qualia' and 'intentionality'. This remark slices the cake differently. 'Attention' is interesting, dividing consciousness into two areas, with some experience fading away into the darkness. Hume denied self-awareness.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
There is enormous evidence that consciousness arises in the frontal lobes of the brain [Carter,R]
     Full Idea: A huge volume of evidence suggests that consciousness emerges from the activity of the cerebral cortex, and in particular from the frontal lobes.
     From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.298)
     A reaction: Dualists must face up to this, and even many physicalists have a rather vague notion about the location of awareness, but we are clearly homing in very precise physical substances which have consciousness as a feature.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Normal babies seem to have overlapping sense experiences [Carter,R]
     Full Idea: Connections in a baby's brain probably give the infant the experience of 'seeing' sounds and 'hearing' colours - which occasionally continues into adulthood, where it is known as 'synaesthesia'.
     From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p. 19)
     A reaction: A fact to remember when discussing secondary qualities, and the relativism involved in the way we perceive the world. If you have done your philosophy right, you shouldn't be surprised by this discovery.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
In blindsight V1 (normal vision) is inactive, but V5 (movement) lights up [Carter,R]
     Full Idea: Scans show that a sub-section of the visual cortex called V5 - the area that registers movement - lights up during blindsight, even though V1 - the primary sensory area that is essential for normal sight - is not active.
     From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.307)
     A reaction: The whole point of blindsight is to make us realise that vision involves not one module, but a whole team of them. The inference is that V1 involves consciousness, but other areas of the visual cortex don't.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Out-of-body experiences may be due to temporary loss of proprioception [Carter,R]
     Full Idea: Out-of-body experiences may be due to temporary loss of proprioception.
     From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.187)
     A reaction: This is only a speculation, but it is an effect which can be caused by brain injury, and dualists should face the possibility that this evidence (prized by many dualists) can have a physical explanation.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Scans of brains doing similar tasks produce very similar patterns of activation [Carter,R]
     Full Idea: The pattern of brain activation during, say, a word retrieval task is usually similar enough among the dozen or so participants who typically take part in such studies for their scans to be overlaid and still show a clear pattern.
     From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p. 17)
     A reaction: This doesn't surprise me, though it could be interpreted as supporting type-type identity, or as supporting functionalism. Armstrong and Lewis endorse a sort of reductive functionalism which would fit this observation.
Thinking takes place on the upper side of the prefrontal cortex [Carter,R]
     Full Idea: The nuts and bolts of thinking - holding ideas in mind and manipulating them - takes place on the upper side of the prefrontal cortex.
     From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.312)
     A reaction: Keep this firmly in view! Imagine that the skull is transparent, and brain activity moves in waves of colour. Dualism would, in those circumstances, never have even occurred to anyone.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
Babies show highly emotional brain events, but may well be unaware of them [Carter,R]
     Full Idea: Babies show emotion dramatically, but the areas of the brain that in adults are linked to the conscious experience of emotions are not active in newborn babies. Such emotions may therefore be unconscious.
     From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p. 19)
     A reaction: Traditionally, 'unconscious emotion' is a contradiction, but I think we should accept this new evidence and rethink the nature of mind. Not only might emotion be non-conscious, but we should even consider that rational thinking could be too.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
The only way we can control our emotions is by manipulating the outside world that influences them [Carter,R]
     Full Idea: We try to manipulate our emotions all the time, but all we are doing is arranging the outside world so it triggers certain emotions - we cannot control our reactions directly.
     From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.155)
     A reaction: This seems to me to throw a very illuminating light on a huge amount of human behaviour, such as going to the cinema or listening to music. The romantic movement encouraged direct internal manipulation. Compare sex fantasies with viewing pornography.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / c. Animal rationality
A frog will starve to death surrounded by dead flies [Carter,R]
     Full Idea: A frog will starve to death surrounded by dead flies.
     From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.195)
     A reaction: A nice warning against assuming that rationality is operating when a frog feels hungry and 'decides' to have lunch. We should take comfort from the fact that humans are NOT this stupid, and philosophers should try to accurately describe our gift.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
The 'locus coeruleus' is one of several candidates for the brain's 'pleasure centre' [Carter,R]
     Full Idea: Noradrenaline is an excitatory chemical that induces physical and mental arousal and heightens mood. Production is centred in an area of the brain called the locus coeruleus, which is one of several candidates for the brain's 'pleasure' centre.
     From: Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p. 30)
     A reaction: It seems to me very morally desirable that people understand facts of this kind, so that they can be more objective about pleasure. Pleasure is one cog in the machine that makes a person, not the essence of human life.